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CH 1 Introduction 
 
 
 
 
1.1 China’s Puzzling Behavioral Consistency 
 
One fundamental assumption widely accepted by the majority of International Relations (IR) 
scholars is that state behavior will change in accordance with variances of polarity in the 
international system. The anarchical nature of the world causes states to rely on their own 
power to protect themselves from attacks by others. Due to this need for survival, states pay 
close attention to power dynamics in the international system. As a result, changes of power 
distribution among states in the system thus influence how the states define their interests in 
the system, and this in turn affects how they interact with one another. As Kenneth Waltz said, 
“A structural change is a revolution…It is so because it gives rise to new expectations about 
the outcomes that will be produced by the acts and interactions of units whose placement in the 
system varies with changes in structure.”1  In other words, the relationship between state 
behavior and the change of polarity in the system is constantly responsive. 
This assumption that state behavior and changes of polarity is constantly responsive is evident 
in many seminal works in the field of international relations. In the realism school of thought, 
IR polaritists, such as Waltz, Hans Morgenthau, Karl Deutsch, David Singer, and Robert Gilpin, 
have long been debating which type of polarity of the international system would best inhibit 
states’ war-prone behavior.2 Power transitionists in the same school, such as Abramo Organski, 
Jacek Kugler, Charles Doran, and Graham Allison, have pointed to the possibilities of military 
 
1 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 1st ed. (McGraw-Hill, 1979), p. 70. 
2 Ibid., CH 8; Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 7th ed. (New 
York: McGraw-Hill Education, 2006), CH 21; Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981); Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, "Multipolar Power Systems and 
International Stability," World Politics 16, no. 3 (1964).  
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conflict between a rising power and an established power in the system.3 Liberalists who 
promote the constraining effect of international institutions/regimes on state behavior also 
agree that power of those mechanisms has something to do with structural change in the 
system.4  As Robert Keohane put it, “Regimes can be viewed as intermediate factors, or 
intervening variables, between fundamental characteristics of world politics such as the 
international distribution of power and the behavior of states.”5 While constructivists generally 
do not share the same ontology with the scholars mentioned above, Alexander Wendt would 
not be able to deny the validity of this assumption if states are situated in the Hobbesian or 
Lockean culture of anarchy.6 Thus, this assumption has been an essential component in the 
development of theories across different schools of IR thought. 
History provides scholars of IR with countless cases confirming the validity of that assumption. 
Athens and Sparta had been enjoying a peaceful relationship in the Greek Peninsula and 
resisted the invasion from Persia together in the 490 BCE. The growing power of Athens, 
however, changed how these two city-states perceived and interacted with one another, which 
ultimately led to a devastating war in 430 BCE. The US-Britain rivalry, moreover, stemmed 
from implacable territorial and commercial interests in the Western Hemisphere and lasted 
more than a century. The rise of Japan, Russia, and Germany and the challenge they mounted 
to Britain’s dominance on all fronts in the 20th century, made Britain decide to unilaterally 
accommodate the US to eliminate the possibility that the US would be another adversary. And 
today, faced with an increasingly powerful and influential China, Australia, one of the most 
loyal allies of the US, is adjusting its current alliance policy. In early 2019, Australia’s Minister 
of Defense Christopher Pyne stated that “There is no gain in stifling China’s growth and 
prosperity…We are not interested in containing China.”7 It seems, therefore, that states in the 
West and East, past and present, big and small, are not immune to forces of structural change 
 
3 Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap?  (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Harcourt, 2017); A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger  (Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1980); Charles Doran, "Power Cycle Theory, the Shifting Tides of History, and 
Statecraft: Interpreting China's Rise," The Bologna Center Journal of International Affairs 15, no. 1 (2012). 
4  Stephen D. Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables," 
International Organization 36, no. 2 (1982); Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in 
the World Political Economy  (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984); G. John Ikenberry, After 
Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars  (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2001). 
5 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, p. 64. 
6 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
7  Please see the full text of the speech of Christopher Pyne on January 29 2019 here: 
https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/minister/cpyne/speeches/fullerton-forum-keynote (accessed March 20 
2019). 
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in the international system, and have constantly turned their friends into foes or enemies into 
allies over the centuries.  
However, it is not the case in how contemporary China interacts with Taiwan, North Korea, 
and Mongolia. 
On October 18 2017, Chinese President Xi Jinping solemnly addressed hundreds of Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) members in the Great Hall of the People at the Nineteenth National 
Congress of the CCP. In the address, he showed his determination to unify an island 
approximately 150 kilometers away from the Chinese coast, Taiwan: 
We have a firm will, full confidence, and sufficient capability to defeat any form of 
Taiwan independence secession plot. We will never allow any person, any 
organization, or any political party to split any part of the Chinese territory from China 
at any time or in any form.8 
Annexing Taiwan is a policy goal that China has been trying to achieve for several decades. 
Since the CCP established the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, China has regarded 
this island as a territory awaiting for ultimate unification. Although the government of the 
Republic of China (ROC) has ruled this island for seven decades, China’s policy toward 
Taiwan is still aimed at bringing Taiwan under its control. 
This policy goal is not merely CCP propaganda but rather, a policy objective that China has 
been planning assiduously for decades. China first made concrete plans to seize Taiwan by 
military means was in 1949, and it has never reneged on this plan. As recently as June 2015, 
for instance, China launched a four-month military exercise called Stride 2015 at the Zhurihe 
military training base in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. In preparation for the 
exercise, China built replicas of major buildings and structures of Taipei, such as the Taiwan 
Presidential Office, highway interchanges, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Taipei First 
Girl’s High School, to enable the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to simulate how to take 
over Taiwan’s capital more realistically. The prospect of an intervention by foreign forces has 
been a significant factor in deterring China from launching this military operation to date. 
 
8  Please see the full text of Xi’s remark on the Taiwan issue at the 19th Party Congress here: 
http://www.gov.cn/zhuanti/2017-10/18/content_5232659.htm (accessed January 18 2018). 
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Evidence suggests that China has also been contingency planning for a scenario in which 
foreign forces, particularly the US, intervene in its military plan against Taiwan.9 
The rationale behind China’s policy goal of annexing Taiwan is worth pondering for a number 
of reasons. Although China’s official position nowadays is that Taiwan has been part of China 
since ancient times, the CCP did not consider Taiwan part of China nor believe that it should 
become part of China in the 1920s. In the 1930s, the CCP even supported the Taiwanese in 
establishing their own state. Second, Taiwan is not China’s Jerusalem. The island has never 
held any sacred religious meaning for Chinese people. Most importantly, the relatively small 
territorial size of Taiwan makes China’s obsession with annexing it even more puzzling, 
especially compared with China’s attitude toward other disputed territories. For example, 
China concluded a border agreement with Russia in July 2008, under which Beijing officially 
ceased its sovereignty claim over an enormous territory in the northeast of China; Beijing had 
previously regarded this territory as having been taken by the Russian Empire under the Treaty 
of Peking and the Treaty of Aigun during the 19th century. The size of the territory is 
approximately 28 times that of Taiwan. If China could manage its territorial sovereignty 
flexibly in this case, why not in the case of Taiwan? Why is annexing Taiwan so important to 
China? 
China’s behavior toward Taiwan is not the only case departing from above assumption.10 North 
Korea, another peripheral state to China, is a similar case in point. The international community 
has been trying to curb North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons since the 1990s. Yet, at 10:57 
on February 12 2013, the China Earthquake Network Center detected a 4.9 magnitude 
earthquake in North Korea. An hour later, North Korea announced that it had successfully 
conducted an underground nuclear test at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site in Kilju County, 
which was only approximately 150 kilometers away from the Sino-North Korean border. This 
nuclear test by North Korea was in violation of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
Resolutions 1718, 1874, and 2087. It also directly challenged the international non-
proliferation regime which China has been adhering to since 1992. As a result, China issued an 
official statement five hours after the test. On the surface, China’s statement condemned this 
 
9  Wang Hongguang, "Kangzhan Yuebing Wangpai Zhuangbei Qiangxian Puguang: Wang Hongguang 
Zhongjiang Xiangjie 抗战阅兵王牌装备抢先曝光: 王洪光中将详解 [The Revelation of the Best Military 
Equipment in the Anti-Japanese War Military Parade: A Detailed Introduction by Former Lieutenant General 
Wang Hongguang]," Sohu Junshi, August 30 2015; Roger Cliff, Mark Burles, Michael S. Chase, Derek Eaton, 
Kevin L. Pollpeter, Entering the Dragon’s Lair: Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications for the 
United States  (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007). 
10 Thomas J. Christansen, "Chinese Realpolitik," Foreign Affairs 75, no. 5 (1996). 
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nuclear test. In reality, however, the statement simply repeated the same diplomatic rhetoric it 
had produced in responses to the previous two North Korean nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009: 
China firmly opposes nuclear testing, China’s position is that the Korean Peninsula should be 
de-nuclearized, and the concerned parties should peacefully solve this crisis through 
negotiation and dialogue.11 
In addition to the official statement, there were some indications that China still strongly 
supported North Korea in many ways after the nuclear test. Given that China has been the main 
provider of food and energy to North Korea for decades, the international community was 
expecting China to use this leverage to put pressure on North Korea. However, China’s 
behavior toward North Korea defied these expectations. Although China agreed to comply with 
the UNSC’s request to issue Resolution 2094 imposing economic sanctions on North Korea, 
in reality it continued to support North Korea economically. According to a report released by 
the Korea International Trade Association, trade between China and North Korea grew 10.4 % 
in 2013, nearly double the growth rate of 2012.12 And, this report only included the official 
trade record between the two sides. 
In the following years, top Chinese leaders continued to send a message to the world that Sino-
North Korean relations would not change in any significant way. Chinese Foreign Minister 
Wang Yi indicated on March 8 2015, that “Sino-North Korean relations have a very firm 
foundation. They should not and will not be influenced by any temporary event.”13 Moreover, 
Liu Yunsan, a member of the Standing Committee of the CCP Politburo, visited North Korea 
to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the Korean Worker’s Party in October 2015. The Chinese 
government seized Liu’s visit as an opportunity to promote the intimate relationship between 
China and North Korea, describing it as being like “lips and teeth” since ancient times.14 
North Korea’s existence has been highly valued by China in this way since the outbreak of the 
Korean War (1950–53), in which China suffered enormous casualties and losses in order to 
ensure North Korea’s survival. China’s consistent economic assistance, diplomatic support, 
and military protection of North Korea have been the key reason why North Korea has been 
 
11 Please see the official statement of the Chinese government here: 
 http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2013-02/12/content_2331595.htm (accessed January 18 2018).  
12 Scott Snyder, "China-North Korea Trade in 2013: Business as Usual," Forbes, March 27 2014. 
13 "Wang Yi: Zhongchao Guanxi You Laogu Jichu Buying Ye Buhui Shou Yishi Yishi Yingxiang 王毅: 中朝关
系有牢固基础 不应也不会受一时一事影响 [Wang Yi: The Sino-North Korean Relations Had A Very Firm 
Foundation. It Should Not and Will Not Be Influenced By Any Temporary Event]," Xinhuanet, March 8 2015. 
14 Please see the Chinese official website reporting this trip: 
 http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/cnleaders/liuyunshan/lys201510chx/yw.htm (accessed January 18 2018). 
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able to survive until today, and has indirectly contributed to the development of North Korea’s 
nuclear weapons program. Puzzlingly, the policy goal of maintaining the existence of North 
Korea has obviously put China’s northeast region at risk of nuclear accidents and made China 
suffer a lot of criticism from the international community that it is not being a responsible great 
power. Why is maintaining the existence of North Korea so important to China? 
Let us shift our focus to Mongolia, another corner of Northeast Asia wherein China has been 
working to upgrade its relations. On August 21 2014, Xi paid a two-day state visit to Mongolia. 
This was not the first time a top Chinese leader had visited Mongolia, but it was the first time 
that the General Secretary of the CCP had visited Mongolia and not combined the trip with 
visits to other Central Asian countries. The increasing value that China was placing on this 
small state to its north was also apparent in the diligence with which China arranged Xi’s visit. 
Xi met the Mongolian President and Prime Minister, delivered a speech at the State Great 
Khural of Mongolia, and even wrote a personal letter to the Mongolian people, which was 
widely published in Mongolian media. What highlighted this visit was China’s emphasis on 
the importance of the neutrality of Mongolia in the Sino-Mongolian Joint Declaration. The 
declaration stated: 
Both signatories emphasize that they will not conduct any activity undermining the 
other party’s sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity; will not sign any treaty 
undermining the other party’s sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity; will not 
join any alliance or camp undermining the other party’s sovereignty, security, and 
territorial integrity; will not participate any activity of the alliance or camp mentioned 
above which is against the other party; will not allow any third state, organization, or 
group to conduct activities undermining the other party’s sovereignty, security, and 
territorial integrity on its territory.15 
China’s emphasis on Mongolia’s neutrality is very puzzling if one traces the chronological 
history of Mongolian neutrality as a theme in China’s policy. The concept of Mongolian 
neutrality first appeared in the Sino-Mongolian Friendship and Cooperation Relationship 
Treaty of 1994. The concept then was confirmed at least four times since 1994 as it appeared 
in the joint statements of 2003, 2005, 2006, and 2011 between China and Mongolia. By 
 
15 Regarding the text of “the Joint Declaration on the Sino-Mongolian Comprehensive Strategic Partnership,” 
please visit the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China: 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/yz_676205/1206_676740/1207_676752/t1184719.sht
ml (accessed January 18 2018). 
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reiterating this special status of Mongolia to China every few years, China seems to need to 
ensure its northern territory would be continuously free from any sort of military or political 
threat. As Xi said in his speech to the State Great Khural during his visit, “We can have peace 
of mind only when the door of our house is stable.”16 In addition, the content of Mongolian 
neutrality has evolved into a much more specified and sophisticated form in the 2014 joint 
declaration while the treaty of 1994 simply stipulated the concept in this way: 
Both of the signatories will not participate in any military and political alliance against 
the other party; will not sign any treaty undermining the national sovereignty and 
security of the other party; none of the parties will allow a third state to use its territory 
to undermine the national sovereignty and security of the other party.17 
Given that Mongolia lacks the leverage to force China to agree to such a statement, the 
implication of this statement appears to be more reflective of China’s desire for Mongolia 
to be a neutral state with strict terms, than of Mongolia’s own wishes. During the Cold War, 
the Soviet forces stationed in Mongolia posed a significant military threat to China. 
However, along with the Sino-Soviet rapprochement of the 1980s, the Soviet Union 
gradually withdrew its forces from Mongolia. The last Russian troops left Mongolia in 
December 1992. The statement in the joint declaration that the territory of Mongolia should 
be a neutral area would be understandable if it were announced in the Cold War era. Why 
did China need to emphasize the importance of Mongolian then and still today? More 
specifically, why is the policy goal of neutralizing Mongolia so important that China had 
to pursue such a goal for more than two decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union? 
Why is annexing Taiwan, maintaining the existence of North Korea, and neutralizing Mongolia 
so critical to China? Certainly, each question may have an answer in its own right. Put the three 
questions together, however, and an interesting puzzle emerges—the behavior of China toward 
certain neighboring states presents a very strong behavioral consistency. 
This puzzle presents an obvious abnormality for IR theories. The power distribution in 
Northeast Asia has changed many times in the past sixty years, from the unipolarity of US 
superiority in the 1950s, to bipolarity of the Soviet-American confrontation in the Cold War 
 
16 "Xi Jinping Delivers an Important Speech at the State Great Hural of Mongolia," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
the PRC, August 22 2014. 
17 Regarding to the text of “the Sino-Mongolian Friendship and Cooperation Relationship Treaty,” please visit the 
website of the Ministry of Foreign Affair of China: 
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/tytj_674911/tyfg_674913/t5725.shtml (accessed January 18 2018). 
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era, to the return of US hegemony in the 1990s, then to the emerging bipolarity of the Sino-
American rivalry after the 2000s. From a theoretical perspective, the effects of the polarity 
transformations in this region should have pushed China to alter its policy goals toward North 
Korea, Taiwan, and Mongolia fundamentally. Yet, China still upholds those policy goals to 
date. 
What makes this behavioral consistency toward the three states more intriguing is the fact that 
China’s behavior toward certain powerful states does follow what IR theories tell us. In 1950, 
China built a military alliance with the Soviet Union through the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, 
and Mutual Assistance. During the Korean War and wars against Taiwan in the 1950s, China 
completely leaned on the support of the Soviet Union to fight against the US. After the balance 
of power between the US and the Soviet Union gradually shifted, China changed its position 
and formed a semi-alliance with the US and against the Soviet Union in the 1970s. From the 
1980s to the 1990s, China pursued a much more independent foreign policy under the Deng 
Xiaoping era in which US power prevailed in the international system. Along with the decline 
of the material power of the US and China’s own increased power, China interacted with its 
neighbors in a much more assertive and aggressive way in the Xi era. It unilaterally announced 
an Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea, built and then militarized disputed 
islands in the South China Sea, and embarked on its colossal the Belt and Road Initiative. US 
Secretary of Defense James Mattis described this behavior of China as an effort to revive the 
Chinese order of the Ming Dynasty.18 
To sum up, these three long-held policy goals of China are worth examining in both empirical 
and theoretical terms. The core research question of this thesis is: What explains China’s strong 
behavioral consistency toward North Korea, Taiwan, and Mongolia, as exhibited in China’s 
policy goals of maintaining the existence of North Korea, annexing Taiwan, and neutralizing 
Mongolia? 
 
1.2 Thesis in Brief 
 
This thesis attempts to look into China’s foreign behavior through the concept of buffer state, 
and will offer a geopolitical argument to the question raised above. It will demonstrate how 
 
18 Hiroyuki Akita, "Time's Up for Soft China Policy," Nikkei Asian Review, February 8 2017. 
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China’s behavior toward three of its peripheral states has been driven by what I term “buffer 
thinking.” Buffer thinking is a geopolitical mentality, which I developed from the concept of 
buffer state: “secure this territory against my rival now, otherwise the rival may launch a 
military attack from it against me in the future once the rival has occupied the territory.” This 
thinking appears when Chinese leaders are conceiving of ways to fend off potential military 
threats from a specific neighboring territory with great power. This way of thinking generates 
various types of behavior, ranging from military actions to a grand strategic retreat. The core 
purpose of those types of behavior is to create an extra safe space beyond China’s borders in 
the rivalry. To Chinese leaders, the security perimeter of China has included the three 
neighboring states for many decades. This suggests that, when it comes to how to better defend 
China, what dominates Chinese leaders' thinking is not a narrow concept of border defense but 
a broader concept of "buffer states defense." 
Chinese leaders’ historical memory of how a foreign rival invaded China via such territory 
further strengthens this mentality. Once Chinese leaders have established buffer thinking 
toward a specific state on China’s periphery, it is very difficult for leaders to abandon this 
thinking. In this way, buffer thinking is like “glue,” firmly sticking a part of China onto an old 
polarity while the power configuration of the international system enters into new power 
patterns. Thus, the effect of the change of the polarity on state behavior is “territorially 
conditional” in the case of China. As illustrate in Figure 1, the same structural force X generates 
two different outcomes for State A’s behavior toward State B and C. While State A’s behavior 
toward State C can vary according to alternations of X as what it is expected from IR theories, 
State A’s behavior toward State B stays the same due to the effect of buffer thinking. This 
thesis therefore argues that buffer thinking is an intervening variable that mediates the effect 
of variation of the power distribution in the system. This is the reason why China’s behavior 
toward the three states is less responsive to polarity changes. 
 
Figure 1: Buffer Thinking as an Intervening Variable 
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It is important to note that buffer thinking is not simply China’s desire to have a buffer state 
against its rival, but a defensive mindset emerges only after a rivalrous relationship has taken 
shape. Also, it is not simply a perception of a rival’s military threat, but a unique synthesis of 
the sensitivity to the geographical location of a buffer state, traumatic historical memories of a 
buffer state, and estimations of potential military threats from a rival. 
By applying the concept of buffer state in the field of geopolitics, this thesis aims to “bring 
geography back in” to the fields of China Studies and IR. In response to the question of what 
drives China’s foreign behavior, scholars in China Studies usually cite historical legacy, 
Chinese nationalism, belief systems, factionalism, civil-military relations, and the structural 
force of the international system (Please see Chapter Two). Geopolitical imperatives based on 
geography have not attracted much attention in this intellectual debate especially in the 
English-speaking world. As this thesis will show in the following chapters, buffer thinking 
plays a much bigger role than has been recognized in the making of China’s foreign policy. 
Without including China’s buffer thinking, the discussion of the rationale behind China’s 
foreign behavior will be incomplete. 
The goal of bringing geography back also has profound significance for the field of IR as a 
similar research gap to that of China Studies exists in IR. Geopolitics, a discipline concerning 
geography or space factors, was very popular and influential in the first half of the 20th century. 
It, however, lost its appeal to scholars after the 1940s mainly due to the accused connection 
11 
 
between this field and Nazi ideology. Although policymakers worldwide have never stopped 
thinking in geographical or spatial terms when making decisions, IR scholars have often 
prioritized other factors over geography in their analysis over the decades. This thesis, therefore, 
enriches the discussion in this field by exploring the importance of geography factors, which 
have been relatively neglected. 
Treating buffer thinking as an independent variable, this thesis will detail how such thinking 
influenced a series of decisions made by the Chinese government toward Taiwan, North Korea, 
and Mongolia over a period of decades. The remainder of this chapter will give an overview of 
each chapter of this thesis. 
Chapter Two will provide a detailed examination of the China Studies, IR, and geopolitics 
literature in relation to whether it sheds light on the puzzle at the center of this thesis. Adopting 
three levels of discussion, this chapter first provides a holistic view of how scholars in the fields 
of IR as well as China Studies have approached the question of what drives China’s foreign 
policy. The focus then turns to the field of geopolitics. While the concept of buffer state is a 
promising approach to understand China’s behavioral consistency, no work applying this 
concept has yet targeted the case of China systematically. In particular, no attempt has been 
made to detail when and how China started to view Taiwan, North Korea, and Mongolia in a 
buffered way, or how such a view influences China’s behavior. 
Chapter Three sets out the research design section of this thesis. While IR scholars, political 
scientists, and geopoliticians have been discussing the concept of buffer state for decades, few 
works have proposed a methodology to study how buffered states perceive their buffers. To fill 
this methodological void, this chapter will detail how this thesis operationalized the concept of 
buffer state to generate the independent variable of this thesis. In addition, this chapter will 
justify its rationale of selecting North Korea, Taiwan, and Mongolia as case studies, explain 
why Tibet, Nepal, and Vietnam are not suitable case studies for this thesis, and what advantages 
this case selection offers for the thesis. Finally, Chapter Three will identify the sources to be 
used in this thesis with some caveats about sources for studying China’s decision-making. 
This thesis begins to delve into China’s buffer thinking from Chapter Four with the case of 
Taiwan. The chapter shows that the CCP’s early perspective of Taiwan had nothing to do with 
geopolitics. As a party trying to manage its survival in the 1920s–40s, the way the CCP’s view 
of Taiwan’s value varied in accordance to the CCP’s political needs. As a result, CCP’s Taiwan 
policy has gone through three distinct phases—Taiwan-omitting, supporting Taiwanese 
12 
 
independence, and Taiwan-incorporating. June 1946 was the earliest point at which a rivalrous 
relationship was established between the CCP and the US. Stimulated by the Kuomintang-US 
military cooperation in Taiwan after the surrender of Japan, the CCP gradually began to 
perceive the geopolitical value of Taiwan to the security of the Chinese mainland. The vivid 
historical memory of how the Japanese Empire annexed Taiwan and then invaded China, 
further justified the necessity of securing this island. This chapter shows that the geopolitical 
mentality of “take Taiwan now, otherwise the US may use it to undermine the security of 
China’s coastal areas” was a crucial factor in inspiring to China launch military actions against 
Taiwan in 1954, 1958, and 1996. 
Chapter Five shifts the discussion focus of the Sino-US buffer system from Taiwan to North 
Korea. As in the case of Taiwan, the CCP perceived almost no geopolitical value in the Korean 
Peninsula when the survival on the Chinese mainland was at stake during the Chinese Civil 
War (1927–49) and the Anti-Japanese War (1937–45). For the CCP, the issue of Korean 
independence served the CCP’s overarching goal of taking power in China through a lens of 
minority nationality. It was the outbreak of the Korean War, the approaching United Nations 
Command led by the US to be more precise, that made the geopolitical value of North Korea 
emerge in the minds of Chinese leaders. In their eyes, the US as imitating the Japan Empire’s 
strategy of invading China. Along with China’s buffer thinking toward Taiwan, the thinking 
“save North Korea now, otherwise the US may use it to undermine the security of China’s 
northeast” drove the leaders to send Chinese troops to confront US troops on the Korean 
battlefield in October 1950. This perception of the value of North Korea continued even after 
the Cold War ended. This chapter also demonstrates that China’s buffer thinking toward North 
Korea offers a sound explanation for why China protected North Korea diplomatically and 
militarily in the two North Korean nuclear crises after the Cold War. 
The Sino-Soviet buffer system centering on Mongolia is the theme of Chapter Six. The CCP 
did not perceive any geopolitical value in the Mongolian territory in the first four decades after 
the party was established. The evidence presented in this chapter shows that the CCP perceived 
the value of Mongolia through a lens of minority nationality, which reconciled the Soviet 
Union’s geopolitical interests and Chinese nationalism and, at the same time, weakened the 
support base of the ROC government. This perspective persisted until 1964, a critical year in 
which China officially identified the Soviet Union as a hostile rival with the potential ambition 
of invading China. Due to this rivalry, Chinese leaders believed Mongolia was one potential 
military base from which the Soviet Union might launch an attack. The historical memory of 
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how the Russian Empire encroached upon the Qing Empire strengthened this geopolitical 
anxiety. One variation in the case of China’s behavior toward Mongolia is that despite being 
driven by the same geopolitical mentality toward Taiwan and North Korea, China did not 
militarily intervene when its rival took over the buffer state. Instead, China retreated from the 
Sino-Mongolian border after it failed to make Mongolia politically neutral. This chapter also 
proves that China’s effort to neutralize Mongolia contributed to the Soviet military withdrawal 
from Mongolia in the 1980s, as well as and the conclusion of the Sino-Mongolian Friendship 
and Cooperation Relationship Treaty in 1994. 
Chapter Seven concludes the thesis by summarizing the key findings and elucidating its 
academic contributions to the fields of IR and geopolitics. Finally, it outlines four paths for 
further research. 
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CH 2 What Drives China’s 
Foreign Behavior? 
 
 
 
 
To reiterate, the central aim of this thesis is to determine why there is a strong consistency in 
China’s behavior toward certain neighboring states, as exhibited in China’s policy goals of 
maintaining the existence of North Korea, annexing Taiwan, and neutralizing Mongolia. This 
chapter will review the existing literature in the fields of International Relations (IR), China 
Studies, and geopolitics to ascertain whether it sheds light on this question. Specifically, the 
chapter will look at the determinants of China’s foreign behavior as identified by scholars, and 
whether or not these determinants explain the puzzle of China’s behavioral consistency. Second, 
after establishing the linkage between the concept of buffer state and Chinese approaches to 
North Korea, Taiwan, and Mongolia, this chapter will then delve into the literature on buffer 
states in geopolitics to see whether this concept can help us answer the question. While the 
research in these three fields has provided different insights into China’s puzzling behavioral 
consistency toward its peripheral states, they have failed to develop a comprehensive 
theoretical explanation that holds across a number of cases.  
 
2.1 Drivers of China’s Foreign Behavior 
 
To investigate the long-term consistency in China’s behavior toward its neighbors, it is first 
necessary to understand the logic driving such behavior. The question posed in this thesis is in 
fact part of a broader theoretical question in the field of China Studies—what drives China’s 
foreign behavior? Scholars of IR and China Studies have identified a vast number of factors 
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and offered a range of arguments in relation to China’s foreign behavior. To help readers grasp 
the various scholarly approaches to this theoretical question more easily, the discussion below 
is structured in accordance with Kenneth Waltz’s classification, which of entails three levels 
of analysis: leader, state, and system.1 
There are three points to bear in mind regarding Waltz’s categorization. First, the factors below 
are not necessarily mutually exclusive and, in fact, may overlap or reinforce one another. For 
example, the history China’s foreign interventions from the mid-19th to mid-20th centuries 
played an important role both in shaping Chinese leaders’ perceptions of how the world 
functions, and also in laying the foundation of contemporary nationalism for ordinary Chinese 
people. Second, this thesis acknowledges the complexity of a world in which any individual 
event may be caused by multiple factors simultaneously. Finally, Waltz’s categorization may 
not be the best way to classify the literature on the determinants of China’s behavior. Since 
Waltz’s categorization is quite familiar to scholars of IR, it serves the purpose of helping 
readers to grasp the various factors identified by scholars in the two fields.2 
 
Leader Level 
In seeking to explain why a specific foreign decision is made, IR scholars have often focused 
their analysis on people with decision-making power in the government. Scholars in China 
Studies are no exception. In this field, Mark Mancall, John Fairbank, Chen Jian, Lorenz Luthi, 
Alastair Iain Johnston, and Andrew Kennedy have all attempted to explain either China’s 
foreign or military policy from the leader level. Factors they identify include Chinese leaders’ 
worldview, ideology, strategic culture, and psychological characteristics. 
At this level, explaining how China engages with the external world in terms of the impact of 
the legacy of China’s history on Chinese leaders has been widespread. Generally speaking, 
scholars who have taken this approach share an assumption that the history of China’s self-
 
1 Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis  (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1959). 
2 Scholars in the field of China Studies have adopted more than one way to talk about factors influencing China’s 
foreign policy. Please see: Alastair Iain Johnston, "Zhongguo Waijiao Zhengce Yanjiu: Lilun Qushi Ji Fangfa 
Bianxi 中国外交政策研究:理论趋势及方法辨析 [Trends in Theory and Method in the Study of Chinese Foreign 
Policy]," Shjie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi 世界经济与政治 [World Economics and Politics] 8(2006); Wang Dong and 
Li Kan, "Meiguo Zhongguo Waijiao Yanjiu De Liubian: Fangfa, Yiti, Yu Qushi 美国中国外交研究的流变:方
法、议题与趋势 [Study of China’s Foreign Policy in the U.S.: Methodologies, Topics and Trends]," Meiguo 
Yanjiu 美国研究 [American Studies Quarterly] 3(2013). 
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perception of being at the center of Asian economic, political, and cultural affairs prior to the 
mid-19th century, has shaped the worldview of Chinese leaders and this worldview has been 
influencing the way they handle contemporary foreign affairs. For example, in the article “The 
Persistence of Tradition in Chinese Foreign Policy,” Mancall investigates why communication 
between the US and the Soviet Union was successful during the Cold War but communication 
between China and the Soviet Union failed in the 1960s.3 He attributes this to a series of 
assumptions by Chinese leaders about the world order they inherited from China’s unique 
history. One important assumption of Chinese leaders, Mancall argues, is that the world order 
should be hierarchical and China should be at the top of it. He further reasons that Nikita 
Khrushchev’s concept of peaceful co-existence with the US conflicted with this assumption, 
which explains the Chinese and Soviet polemics in the 1960s. 
In a similar fashion, Fairbank develops the concept of Chinese assumptions about the world 
order into a more systematic theory in The Chinese World Order. Fairbank constructs a pattern 
of China interaction with other countries in the Qing Dynasty based on what he termed “a 
traditional Chinese world order.”4 In this graded and concentric hierarchy, China regarded 
itself as the center, and China’s manner of interacting with a country was largely determined 
by a country’s location within these concentric circles. Fairbank further argues that because the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) inherited a set of institutionalized attitudes and historical 
precedents toward other countries from this order, it was difficult for China to accept the current 
international order based on the concept of egalitarian nation-states. 
Among scholars who have argued that history has a major influence on Chinese decision-
makers, the argument posed by Chen is perhaps the most advanced. Rebutting a prevalent 
realist model explaining China’s foreign policymaking, Chen emphasizes the role of ideology 
in this process. 5  He argues that the idea of continuous revolution held by the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) leaders, Mao Zedong in particular, was at the heart of China’s 
revolutionary foreign policy under Maoist China. The “central kingdom mentality” of China’s 
desire to be at the center of the world was one critical element of this idea. Moreover, Chen 
argued that it was the gap between China’s idea of centrality on the world stage and its weak 
 
3 Mark Mancall, "The Persistence of Tradition in Chinese Foreign Policy," Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 349(1963). 
4 John Fairbank, The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations, ed. John Fairbank (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1974). 
5 Chen Jian, Mao's China and the Cold War  (Chapel Hill & London: University of North Carolina Press, 2001). 
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status in actuality that caused CCP leaders to feel a constantly sense of insecurity, which in 
turn led them to believe that a huge domestic mobilization was necessary. 
Luthi also takes Chinese leaders’ ideology as the foundation of his argument about the Sino-
Soviet split in the 1960s. 6  From his perspective, the theoretical ambiguity of Marxism-
Leninism was the very reason the Sino-Soviet alliance could initially be established but was 
also the reason the alliance collapsed. To be more specific, China and the Soviet Union 
genuinely worked toward the same ideological goal, the realization of a communist society, 
which Marxist-Leninist theory clearly outlined. However, the theory was ambiguous about the 
means of achieving such a goal and this provided both China and the Soviet with room to 
pursue different long-term domestic and foreign policies, and also caused short-term political 
dissonance. In other words, ideological disagreement was the fundamental cause of Sino-Soviet 
economic, military, and foreign policy conflicts. 
In addition to worldview and ideology, Chinese leaders’ preferences and assumptions about 
addressing security threats is another important factor in understanding modern China’s 
strategic policy. Johnston concludes in his influential work The Seven Military Classics that 
“the parabellum paradigm” was the dominant strategic thinking among Chinese leaders in the 
Ming Dynasty.7  This paradigm was a hard realpolitik strategic culture which encouraged 
leaders to accept the mindset that the best way of dealing with security threats is to eliminate 
them by force. The weaker the opponent, the more likely leaders in Ming China used force. 
Johnston further indicates that the parabellum paradigm still influences China’s security policy 
today. 
The power of the belief system of individual leaders is emerging as a new area of analysis in 
the field of China Studies. Explored by Robert Jervis in his work Perception and Misperception 
in International Politics, the importance of decision-makers’ belief systems has been broadly 
accepted by scholars in IR since the 1970s.8 However, this approach has not been used to 
explain China’s foreign behavior in China Studies as broadly as in the IR field. Kennedy’s 
work is vital in this regard. He examines the conviction among Chinese leaders that China had 
the ability to accomplish specific military and diplomatic challenges against a materially 
 
6 Lorenz M. Luthi, The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World  (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton 
University Press, 2008). 
7 Alastair Iain Johnston, Culture Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History  (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1995). 
8 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics  (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1976), CH 1-3.  
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advantaged opponent, which he called “national efficacy beliefs.”9 From his perspective, the 
efficacy beliefs that Mao possessed—a strong sense of martial efficacy and a weak sense of 
moral efficacy—contributed to a series of decisions made by China from the 1950s to the 1960s, 
including the decision to enter the Korean War (1950–53), become involved in the Vietnam 
War (1955–75), and shy away from the world nuclear disarmament conference. 
The literature arguing for factors at the leader level is vibrant, but it does not offer much in 
response to the puzzle that drives this thesis. First and foremost is the limitations of the 
available sources. Probing the rationale behind China’s behavior from the level of analysis 
indeed has its potentials. However, to make a strong case that leaders are the primary influence 
of such behavior, it is necessary to access archival documents regarding the kind of values that 
Chinese leaders hold, the ways that Chinese leaders think, and how Chinese leaders made 
decisions about given events. Without such documents, it is extremely difficult to produce a 
solid argument that leaders’ values and ideologies explain China’s long-term behavioral 
consistency towards specific states. Given that the Chinese government only allows the 
declassification of documents dated before 1966, only cases predating the mid-1960s can be 
examined in this manner. Since this thesis also aims to explain the behavioral consistency of 
China in the contemporary era, the literature is only of limited help. 
Second, one assumption shared by those studies outlined above seemingly runs counter to the 
aim of this thesis. To some extent, works examining factors at the leader level all operate under 
the assumption that decision-makers of China, Mao in particular, have a lot of liberty to make 
any given decision. However, as shown in Chapter One, the agency of Chinese leaders has 
been significantly constrained. China’s policy goals toward North Korea, Taiwan, and 
Mongolia have not changed for decades, across at least four generations of Chinese leaders. 
This phenomenon implies that the leaders probably did not have enough agency to do so due 
to certain factors. Thus, this thesis is interested in uncovering the factors constraining the policy 
decisions of Chinese leaders. 
 
State Level 
The most popular approach to understanding constraints on Chinese leaders’ ability to make 
policy decisions has been to focus on Innenpolitik. Since the 1990s, IR scholars have been 
 
9 Andrew Bingham Kennedy, The International Ambitions of Mao and Nehru: National Efficacy Beliefs and the 
Making of Foreign Policy  (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
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trying to methodologically unpack the black box called state and then theorize how its unique 
domestic characteristics affect its foreign behavior. Political institutions, economic structures, 
national character, preference of key domestic actors, and partisan politics are factors that 
scholars have examined at this level. This research trend also influenced scholars in the field 
of China Studies. Among all of the factors, the two most popular in China Studies are domestic 
politics and Chinese nationalism. The common ground between these two groups of scholars 
is that they both agree there is a strong causation between what happens inside China and 
China’s external behavior. The difference between the two, however, is the question of which 
unit should be the primary analytical unit observed by researchers. While experts who consider 
domestic politics to be the more dominant focus on political elites at the top; on the other hand, 
scholars who emphasize the role of Chinese nationalism place much more importance on the 
ordinary Chinese people. 
In terms of domestic politics, China’s decision to participate in the Korean War in 1950 is a 
case that scholars often use to explain how Chinese leaders exploited an external crisis to serve 
their specific domestic needs. Yang Kuisong, for example, discovered a connection between 
the initiation of the Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries and Mao’s decision to get 
involved in the Korean War 10  He maintains that the Korean War offered Mao a great 
opportunity to eliminate potential political enemies to the nascent CCP regime in China, such 
as bandits, tyrants, the Nationalist agents, and the bourgeoisie. Under the name of mobilization 
to “resist America, assist Korea,” the CCP executed, imprisoned, and controlled more than a 
million people. The evidence of such a connection between the domestic campaign and the war 
is that a directive to suppress counterrevolutionaries, which Mao personally oversaw on 
October 10, was issued only two days after China’s decision to participate in the war. Thomas 
Christensen’s work shares a similar perspective to Yang’s on China’s participation in the 
Korean War, but Christensen links it into a much broader context.11 He indicates that Chinese 
leaders tend to use force if they encounter a situation in which China’s strategic situation will 
worsen domestically or internationally if China chose to do nothing. He terms this logic 
“windows of vulnerability and windows of opportunity.” Mao’s final decision to fight for North 
Korea, he contends, was largely driven by this logic. For the Chinese leaders at that moment, 
 
10  Yang Kuisong, "Reconsidering the Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries," The China Quarterly 
193(2008). 
11 Thomas J. Christensen, "Windows and War: Trend Analysis and Beijing's Use of Force," in New Directions in 
the Study of China's Foreign Policy, ed. Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press, 2006). 
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if China let US troops station in North Korea, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) would be 
tied down by US troops along the Sino-North Korean border, a situation which would 
significantly weaken the Chinese government’s ability to control its domestic stability. Thus, 
fighting a war against the US in the short term would be less painful than fighting a larger war 
later. Taylor Fravel’s works documented the other side of the coin—how domestic politics 
cause China to cooperate with the outside world. He argued that internal instability, such as the 
failure of social movements in China Proper and ethnic revolts in the frontier regions, is a 
primary factor leading China to make territorial concessions to neighboring states.12  
Rivalry within the CCP, or so-called factionalism, is another essential way of understanding 
China’s foreign behavior from the state level. Established by the pioneering work of Andrew 
Nathan, this factionalism model was used in the field of China Studies after the 1970s as a way 
to pry into elite rivalry within the CCP.13 Kenneth Lieberthal is the towering figure of this type 
of approach. In one study, he categorizes the CCP leaders as three groups (nativist, eclectic 
modernizers, and all-around modernizers) and then creates a dynamic picture of how rivalries 
among these groups affected a series of China’s foreign policy decisions, such as “leaning to 
one side” in the 1950s, the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s, and the Sino-American 
rapprochement in the 1970s.14 In a following work with Michael Oksenberg, he also discovers 
that the key to understanding China’s energy policy is each CCP leader’s personal interests, 
encompassing their background and previous positions, which strongly influenced the 
formulation process and consequences of the energy policy.15 
Many scholars have observed that the growing influence of the PLA since the 1990s has 
generated considerable impact on the civilian-military relationship in China’s decision-making 
system. The decision-making system of China was institutionalized after the Deng Xiaoping 
era. The result of this transformation is that the paramount leader in China is not paramount 
anymore, but “the first among equals” in the Standing Committee of the CCP Central Politburo. 
Notwithstanding the fact that Jiang Zemin still had the final say on the most important security 
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Territorial Disputes," International Security 30, no. 2 (2005); M. Taylor Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation: 
Cooperation and Conflict in China's Territorial Disputes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). 
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Harry Harding (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1984). 
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issues, compared to Mao and Deng, his freedom to make decisions was significantly 
constrained by decision-making institutions controlled by multiple professional bureaucrats. 
Because of this institutional transformation, most scholars believe Jiang was pressured by the 
military a number of times during his tenure. The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995–96 is one 
case in which scholars frequently examine how the changed civilian-military relationship 
affected policymaking. Michael Swaine, Jianhai Bi, and You Ji all pointed out that Jiang’s 
hawkish policy toward Taiwan during this crisis was the result of the pressure from the 
military.16 
On the other hand, studying China’s foreign behavior from the angle of Chinese nationalism 
has become prevalent in recent decades.17 The fundamental assumption shared by scholars 
arguing from this standpoint is that Chinese people are proud of China’s glorious history in 
which it was the center of Asian economic, cultural, and political affairs in the past. At the 
same time, they ashamed of the history of the period between the First Opium War (1839–42) 
and the surrender of Japan at the end of World War II (WWII, 1939–45), in which China 
experienced a painful political incursion, economic exploitation, and military aggression by 
foreign powers. This sharp contrast between pride and stigma creates parotic nationalism 
grounded on the so-called “the century of humiliation” in the minds of Chinese people. The 
Patriotic Education Campaign, which the Chinese government initiated after the Tiananmen 
crackdown of 1989, further strengthened this nationalism. Although an authoritarian 
government like China is theoretically immune to this kind of domestic pressure, the scholars 
tend to agree that Chinese peoples’ nationalism is a factor that nowadays increasingly 
constraints or even pushes China’s foreign behavior toward other countries. 
Susan Shirk takes this argument the farthest, positing that the main driver of China’s foreign 
policy since 1989 has been domestic nationalism. Chinese leaders, she argues, has a deep sense 
of insecurity as they fear a mass protest by a vast number of discontented people rising up 
 
16 Michael D. Swaine, "The Role of the Chinese Military in Naional Security Policymaking," (Washington, D.C.: 
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against the CCP regime, united by nationalism. As a result, whenever an external crisis 
involving the US, Taiwan, and Japan in particular have occurred, the Chinese government had 
no choice but to act aggressively in order to demonstrate its toughness to the domestic audience. 
Shirk argues that “In the face of daily reports about violent protests, Communist Party leaders 
will never make international considerations a priority.”18 
Some scholars have noted that Chinese nationalism is evolving. From the discourse on Chinese 
nationalism inside China, Christopher Hughes observed a new version of Chinese nationalism 
emerging after 2008.19 The new nationalism exhibits several geopolitical traits very similar to 
the political thought of Germany and Japan before WWII, such as arguing for lebensraum, 
calling for a revival of military spirit, and worshipping strong leaders. He terms this new 
version of nationalism “geopolitik nationalism,” and predicts that if the marriage between 
nationalism and geopolitics gains more traction in China, Chinese leaders will have less room 
for compromise on issues related to Taiwan and Japan. 
State level variables can only shed limited light on the research question driving this thesis, 
mainly due to the narrow case selection of studies. Scholars approaching China’s foreign 
behavior from the state level usually choose China’s policies toward the US, Japan, or Taiwan 
as case studies. In particular, there is a vast body of work related to Taiwan from the perspective 
of both domestic politics and Chinese nationalism. The popularity of Taiwan as a case study 
may be a result of the fact that the Chinese government has been publicly open with its military 
plan of taking Taiwan, and sources are therefore readily available. Nevertheless, there have 
been relatively fewer studies on North Korea except for the case of the Korean War. Works on 
Mongolia at this level, on the other hand, are few despite the fact that China once claimed that 
Mongolia was part of Chinese territory. 
In terms of China’s behavioral consistency toward Taiwan, one may argue that Chinese 
nationalism is the factor that prevents China from changing its state policy toward Taiwan. As 
Shirk puts it, “The roots of the Chinese fixation on Taiwan are purely domestic, related to 
regime security not national security…Every statement or action China’s leaders make about 
Taiwan is aimed at first the Chinese audience.”20 However, the position of this thesis is that 
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Chinese nationalism is one important factor contributing to China’s obsession with 
incorporating Taiwan. Chinese people have been living in an environment for decades in which 
there has been a pervasive message indicating that Taiwan was historically a part of China and 
that unification with Taiwan is the holy mission of China. It is therefore unsurprising that the 
Chinese people would pressure the Chinese government over this issue. However, as Chapter 
Four will show, Chinese nationalism did not actually play a major role in China’s decisions to 
attack Taiwan in the three Taiwan Strait crises in 1954, 1958, and 1996. 
 
System Level 
When it comes to identifying constraints on China’s intention or ability to change its policy 
goals towards Taiwan, North Korea, and Mongolia, system level factors would appear to have 
the most potential because the three states posed severe military threats to China during the 
Cold War. Scholars most often apply the realist research paradigm when working at the system 
level. For realists, the structural force of the international system, constituted by anarchy and 
power distribution among states, is the primary factor shaping state behavior in the system. The 
logic of this paradigm is as follows: the international system is anarchical and there is no night 
watchman to regulate or control how states interact with each other. Given that survival is the 
primary goal for every state, maximizing relative power, especially military power, against 
others is the only way that a state can ensure its own survival. Different power distributions in 
this system, such as unipolarity, bipolarity, or multipolarity, also considerably influence how 
states ally or conflict with each other in this system. 
Robert Ross, Andrew Nathan, Andrew Scobell, and John Mearsheimer are all scholars who 
have emphasized the impact of anarchy on China’s foreign behavior. Nathan and Ross argue 
that the key driver of China’s foreign policy is China’s sense of vulnerability, originating in its 
geographical location in Asia, sharing borders with a number of powerful rivals and potential 
foes.21 This unique location means that Chinese leaders cannot rule out the possibility that war 
may come from any direction. Driven by this sense of vulnerability, the ultimate goal of 
China’s foreign policy is to maintain a secure geopolitical environment by defensive and 
deceptive means. Nathan and Scobell reiterate the validity of this argument in a following book 
fifteen years later. By rebutting the arguments that China’s foreign policy is driven by 
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nationalism, culture, or the century of humiliation, they contend that China’s foreign policy has 
been very rational and self-interested and is based on the potential threats emanating from its 
borders. 22  Holding the same realist notions, Mearsheimer reached a different conclusion. 
Instead of adopting defensive behavior, he believes the effect of anarchy would propel China 
to act offensively to pursue a safe geopolitical environment in which there is no peer competitor. 
In order to achieve this goal, China would aim to become a regional hegemon in the future, 
dominating the Asia-Pacific region and pushing the US out in much the same way as the US 
pushed European powers out of the Americas in the 19th century.23 
Many scholars who adopted this research paradigm also point to changes of power 
configuration in the international system as driving the external behavior of China. Resting on 
the assumption that wealth is power, Nicolas Kristof, Aaron Friedberg, Randall Schweller, Pu 
Xiaoyu, and Hugh White all hold the position that China’s growing economic power provides 
China with increasing capabilities and willingness to change the established international order. 
Soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kristof predicts that so long as China’s economic 
growth continues, China will undoubtedly seek a more powerful role in the Pacific, perceiving 
an emerging power vacuum after the strategic retrenchment of Russia and the US.24 Kristof’s 
argument did not gain much traction in the field of China Studies at that time.25 After the US 
financial crisis from 2008–09, however, more and more scholars increasingly favor this kind 
of argument. For instance, Friedberg argues the Sino-American rivalry is deeply rooted in the 
shifting structure of the international system.26 Schweller and Pu also discovered that China 
undermining of the Western-led order varied in tandem with China’s rising material power.27 
White, on the other hand, contends that “China is now too strong to accept a subordinate role 
under American leadership.”28 The closing power gap between China and the US further gives 
momentum for the IR scholarship to research into whether the US and China are slowly sliding 
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into the so-called Thucydides’ Trap, which poses that a war between an established power and 
a fast-rising power for the leadership of the world is highly likely.29 
But anarchy and power structure only tell us half of a story about why there is strong behavioral 
consistency in China’s North Korea, Taiwan, and Mongolia policies as explained in 
Introduction. One possible argument that could be derived from these two variables is that 
China has felt insecure due to military threats posed by North Korea, Taiwan, and Mongolia 
for decades. To create a secure geopolitical environment, China has to maintain the existence 
of North Korea, try to take Taiwan, and neutralize Mongolia. However, this argument does not 
hold water if one carefully considers what constitutes a threat. 
Capability and intention are two essential components of a threat, and neither of them currently 
exist in any of these dyads. North Korea, Taiwan, and Mongolia have not posed a military 
threat to China for decades either in terms of intention or capability. The three countries do 
possess a certain degree of military capability, but not one of them has ever aimed to invade 
China after the end of the Cold War. Even if they had that intention, they are obviously not 
powerful enough to make China feel threatened. None of the great powers such as the US, 
Russia, and Japan have military forces stationed on the territories of these three states either. 
Of the three, perhaps Taiwan is the only case that realists can further argue. The US has trained 
and equipped Republic of China (ROC) forces since the Chinese Civil War (1927–49) and 
defended Taiwan against invasion by communists after the ROC retreated from the Chinese 
mainland in 1949. But the US began to withdraw its military forces deployed in Taiwan after 
the joint communique of 1972 with China. After 1979, there has not been a single US military 
deployment in Taiwan. In terms of intention, the ROC government officially renounced its plan 
of military roll back to the Chinese mainland in 1991. Although the US was once an ally of 
Taiwan during the Cold War, it never supported any plans of the ROC government to retake 
the Chinese mainland. Realists may say that states can never be sure about others’ intentions 
so they must always prepare for the worst-case scenario. As Mearsheimer wrote, “Intentions 
can change quickly, so a state’s intentions can be benign one day and hostile the next.”30 
Although North Korea, Taiwan, and Mongolia do not present any military threat to China now, 
China, as it operates in an anarchical environment, must always be ready for an unexpected 
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attack in the future. Thus, China’s long-held policy goals could be explained from the 
viewpoint of preparing for the worst. 
However, if the argument above was correct, then why doesn’t China always prepare for the 
worst-case scenario against great powers? From the 1950s to 1960s, China had military 
conflicts with the US on the Korean Peninsula, over the Taiwan Strait, and on the territory of 
Vietnam. Nevertheless, Mao and Richard Nixon still shook hands with each other in the 1970s. 
Deng then opened China to embrace the international order led by the US in the 1990s. Until 
recently, Xi Jinping’s China openly rivaled with the US for the dominance of Asia. The same 
flexibility can also be seen in China’s behavior toward Russia. When the PRC was established 
in 1949, China comprehensively leaned toward the Soviet Union and agreed Mongolia, which 
was de facto controlled by the Soviet Union, to be independent from China. However, China 
had military conflicts with the Soviet Union in the 1960s and then China dramatically shifted 
its position, claiming that the Soviet Union had taken Mongolia and northeast China from 
China. The Sino-Soviet rapprochement took place in the 1980s. After 2000, China officially 
ceased all territorial claims over Russia, with which China is gradually building a 
comprehensive strategic partnership. From these cases, it is apparent that China can 
demonstrate great flexibility in its behavior toward great powers across time while the 
“intentions can change quickly” remains a constant. So the real question is why does China 
need to prepare for the worst-case scenario against much weaker small states at its borders? If 
the fates of all the states in the international system are supposedly affected much more by the 
acts and the interactions of major powers as argued by Waltz, it is necessary to seek the missing 
piece that help us to answer why China is more concerned about these three small states than 
its two powerful rivals. 
In summary, scholars in IR and China Studies have generally approached the question of what 
drives China’s foreign behavior from leader, state, and system levels. Factors they have 
identified include leaders’ worldviews, leaders’ ideologies, leaders’ strategic cultures, leaders’ 
psychological characters, domestic politics, nationalism, anarchy, and the power structure of 
the international system. While those factors all possess a certain degree of explanatory power 
in some cases and in some timeframes, none of them have provided a satisfactory answer to 
the question posed by this thesis. Therefore, it is necessary to search for possible factors from 
another field. 
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2.2 Geography as an Explanation 
 
Geography shows great potential as an explanation for China’s behavioral consistency. From 
a geopolitical point of view, North Korea has been at the center of the Sino-US rivalry from 
the Korean War until today. Due to North Korea’s geopolitical position, China has long been 
describing its relationship with North Korea as “lips and teeth.” China is the teeth while, North 
Korea is the lips. This metaphor is from an ancient Chinese historical story recorded in Zuo 
Zhuan. In 655, Gong Zhiqi, an important adviser to the King of Yu, strongly opposed the king’s 
idea to allow the troops of Jin to have passage through Yu in the name of invading Yu’s 
neighbor, Guo. Gong used the metaphor “lips and teeth” to describe the geopolitical relations 
that closely bound the fates of Yu and Guo together: “If the lips are gone, the teeth will feel 
cold. (chuen wang chi han 唇亡齿寒),” meaning that , after Jin conqurered Guo, Yu would 
face Jin’s military threat directly. In other words, the metaphor of “lips and teeth” characterizes 
a strong geopolitical connection between two territories in the eyes of Chinese—one territory 
is a security screen for the other. As a result, both Western and Chinese scholars on China 
usually conclude that China’s years-long sheltering policy toward North Korea is to maintain 
a “buffer state” against the US, keeping the US and its allies away from the Sino-North Korean 
border.31 
While scholars widely recognize that North Korea as a buffer state of China, what most scholars 
have not noted is that North Korea is not the only state which China views in this “lips and 
teeth” way. As a matter of fact, China also describes Mongolia and Taiwan as its lips at times. 
For instance, He Guoqiang, a member of the Standing Committee of the CCP Central Politburo, 
used the term “lips and teeth” to describe the relations between China and Mongolia when he 
met Mongolian Prime Minister Sanjaagiin Bayar and Mongolian Speaker of the State Great 
Hural Damdiny Demberel in 2009. He said: 
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China and Mongolia are amicable neighbors which are connected by mountains and 
rivers and are like lips and teeth.32 
People’s Daily also used the same metaphor to characterize the relationship between the 
Chinese mainland and Taiwan Island. An editorial published on June 3 1993 commented: 
Taiwan and the mainland are lips and teeth. Their fates are connected to each other. 
Compatriots on both sides of the strait always defend the territory of the sacred 
motherland together.33 
Since “lips and teeth” is the common feature linking China’s perspectives on North Korea, 
Taiwan, and Mongolia together, the remainder of this chapter will investigate the literature 
on buffer states to see whether it can help to shed light on the research question of this 
thesis. 
 
2.3 Buffer States 
 
Geopolitics is the field that contains the most relevant literature on buffer states. Aimed at 
understanding state behavior from a geographical perspective, geopolitics as a discipline 
originated in the 19th century, flourished in the early 20th century, and faded away after World 
War II (1939–45). The central theme of this field is to explore the relationship between state 
and geography, or space in a broader sense. 
The IR field has previously included geography as a variable for some analysis. Many works 
in IR do take geographical factors into consideration to explain state behavior. The most 
relevant discussion which incorporates geography factors into the analysis of state behavior in 
the field of IR is the offensive-defensive realism debate, which lists geography as one of many 
factors with the potential to alter states’ external behavior, such as waging wars or choosing 
alliances.34 Although it is not the most marginal, geography is usually not the primary research 
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variable examined in this intellectually rich debate. Robert Ross’ article of 1999, “The 
Geography of the Peace,” in International Security was a breakthrough as it placed geography 
at the center of analysis, examining the question of how geography pacified the structural 
effects of the bipolarity of East Asia. In 2001, John Mearsheimer argued that geography is one 
factor determining a state’s strategy for countering a threatening power in a multipolar system.  
Jack Levy and William Thompson also found that a land-based hegemonic power more easily 
triggers balancing behavior among great powers. Despite those efforts, works attempting to 
explore the relationship between geography and state behavior are still very sporadic and 
unsystematic in this field. 
The most telling difference between geopoliticians and IR scholars is their research method 
preference. Specifically, geography is often than not methodologically treated as an intervening 
variable with a moderate or even inconsequential effect on dependent variables in IR works,35 
while towering figures in geopolitics like Friedrich Ratzel, Rudolf Kjellen, Karl Haushofer, 
Alfred Mahan, Halford Mackinder, and Nicolas Spykman all prioritize geographical factors 
over others. For example, Mahan, in his influential book The Influence of Sea Power Upon 
History, discusses six elements that allowed one state to have the potential of being a sea power, 
three of which relate to geography.36 
In the eyes of geopoliticians, the relationship between states and geography is a very interactive 
one. On the one hand, geography can condition state behavior. Geopoliticians usually support 
the notion that the chance of success for any state to realize its goal of foreign policy largely 
depends on a series of its own geographic features such as territorial shape, topography, 
location, resources, climate, and distance to others. To apply IR jargon to this idea, states do 
have choices, but their agency (the act of pursuing their interests and goals) is largely 
conditioned by geography. 
On the other hand, states are also able to rearrange or create a favorable geographical setting 
to advance their interests. When the world was primitive and relatively empty, polities (the 
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forerunner of states) tried in multiple ways to make their surrounding environment safer in 
order to protect their survival. Those polities, for example, kept swamps, marshes, deserts, 
rivers, and mountains as complete as they were. By doing so, they fortified themselves behind 
those natural barriers in case of enemy invasion. If there was no natural barrier in place, the 
polities sometimes created one. The Holy Roman Empire’s creation of “march states” as 
military outposts to guard their frontiers is one example of this kind. This strategy of defending 
borders from the frontiers was the origin of the concept of buffer state. 
Though the discussion on buffer states is very academically rich, up until now there is no 
consensus among scholars on what buffer states are. The term buffer state was first applied in 
the 19th century when Britain referred to the status of Afghanistan in the Britain-Russian 
rivalries over Asia called the Great Game. After more than a century, scholars on buffer states 
are still trying to define what a buffer state really is from different points of view. George Hall, 
for instance, defines buffer states in terms of power hierarchy in world politics. He categorizes 
states as two distinct tiers: salient powers, which possess the bulk of national power in material 
form such as land, population, gross national product, and military budget, and the minor states 
group, which do not possess extensive material power but have semi-permanent alliances or 
come under the influence of stronger powers in the meantime.37 Buffer states, in the eyes of 
Hall, are part of the minor states group. By contrast, Trygve Mathisen, Martin Wight and 
Spykman define buffer states in a more functional context.38 For them, buffer states bear a 
strong resemblance to wasteland zones which historically were built to maintain peace by 
keeping two expanding powers spatially apart. There are also scholars who focus more on the 
unique, sandwiched position of buffer states, and they consider buffer states to those states that 
are geographically located between two or more rival powers or camps.39 Taking together the 
power, function, and geography perspectives, a current definition of buffer state can be 
generated—a buffer state is a relatively weak state that is geographically located in a place with 
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strategic importance for two or more stronger rival states and that directly contributes to matters 
of key national security for either one of them.40 
In the literature on buffer states, the discussion mainly centers around the causal relationship 
between the sandwiched geographical position of buffers and their lifespan. The most common 
type of buffer system consists of one buffer state and two buffered states rivaling for control 
over the buffer. While scholars on buffer states all agree that a buffer system has something to 
do with the lifespan of the buffer within it, they differ in the nature of the effect of this system 
on the buffer, whether it is positive or negative. Specifically, there is a debate as to whether 
buffer states have a shorter life span than non-buffer states, and, if so, what factors can reduce 
the negative effect on the lifespan of buffers. 
Intuitively, buffer states should outlast non-buffer states because states will endeavor to keep 
buffers around them to avoid sharing a border with a more powerful state.41 From a realist 
perspective, states usually regard their neighbors as natural enemies, so having a common 
border would increase the likelihood of border skirmishes, which potentially can escalate to 
large-scale military conflicts. Many political scientists’ works have confirmed this positive 
correlation between spatial contiguity and state violence behavior.42 As a logical extension, 
therefore, states should prefer having a buffer state in areas of geostrategic importance so as to 
maintain a physical distance between themselves and potential/current opponents. Having a 
small friend standing on the doorstep of your house is always better than seeing a strong guy 
with a gun there. As a result, because they are maintained by their neighbors, buffer states 
should have a privileged life compared to non-buffer states. 
However, most scholars on buffer states tend to agree that a buffer system negatively affects 
the lifespan of buffer states. Regarding the question of precisely what factor shortens the 
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lifespan of buffers, scholars have looked at both factors related to buffered states and factors 
related to buffer states. 
In regard to the former, scholars first draw attention to the balance of power between the two 
buffered states. To create a sustainable buffer system, it is vital that the two buffered states 
within it should have approximately equal strength because, as Spykman points out, “Since 
buffer states separate two or more powers that desire to expand, there is a constant tendency 
for those powers to encroach on the territory of the buffer states.”43 If one side is strong enough 
to disregard the interests of the other, the buffer state will crumble and eventually be absorbed 
by the stronger side. Similar to the discussion of the balance of power in IR, Mathisen, Olav 
Knudsen, and John Chay’s works furthered this idea and explored how the sense of threat, the 
balance of interests, and the balance of intention between two buffered states affected the 
survival of buffer states.44 
In addition, some scholars have attributed the demise of a buffer state to a geopolitical prisoner 
dilemma in the buffer system.45 In a buffer system, the two rivaling powers both have a strong 
incentive to dominate the buffer state. In the meantime, however, they both fear that if the other 
side controls the buffer state first, it will gain an inordinate advantage in any future conflict 
between them. Driven by this fear, the best solution to this geopolitical dilemma is to absorb 
the buffer state before the other side does. In other words, it is the uncertainty regarding the 
rivals’ intentions toward the buffer, caused by this unfortunate geographical setting, that leads 
to buffers being conquered. 
Scholars have also approached the question of the shortened lifespan of buffers by analyzing 
the innate factor of buffer states to understand how those factors could produce different 
outcomes. Factors identified by scholars have included topography, location, transportation 
network, military strength, and foreign policy. Sypkman, for example, argues that when the 
transportation network in a buffer state is more developed, transforming the buffer from a 
barrier to a military highway, the temptation to control this highway becomes almost irresistible 
to its powerful neighbors.46 Mary Gear echoes Sypkman’s argument, indicating that political 
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buffers will enjoy a longer life if they become natural buffer states with barrier-type terrain, 
underdeveloped transport conduits, and a populace largely indifferent to the rest of the world.47 
Also, how buffers handle their relations with strong neighbors matters. Brandon Valeriano and 
John Van Benthuysen use 18th and 20th century Poland as a case study to prove that, rather 
than location alone, location combined with a territorial dispute with a powerful neighbor was 
the main cause which led buffer states to be conquered.48 Tornike Turmanidze distinguishes 
buffer states from quasi-buffer states, which are buffer states allied with a powerful neighbor, 
and argues that the quasi-buffer states seem to have more chances of survival if they choose 
the right side in the great power confrontation. 49  Efraim Karsh’s case study on Finland 
demonstrated that it was Finland’s mistaken policy of neutrality before WWII which made the 
Soviet encroachment on Finland inevitable.50 
Perhaps the root of this ill-fated destiny of buffer states is the very reality that they are simply 
too weak to defend themselves. History has provided numerous examples of a state’s relative 
weakness being a source of temptation to a powerful neighbor with ambition. Accordingly, for 
any buffer system to be sustainable for long, it is necessary for buffer states to have a certain 
degree of resistance to military or political encroachment by powerful neighboring states. 
Buffers are viable only when they possess enough power to maintain independence. Chay and 
Ross maintain, “The excuse provided by the powers was that since the buffer was so weak it 
could no longer function as a buffer and therefore threatened the power’s security.”51 
To sum up, the rich discussion on buffer states in the existing literature above does shed some 
light on the research questions of this thesis. It is clear from the literature that having a buffer 
state is a very common solution across time and space when two rivaling great powers are 
seeking a way to manage their surrounding geopolitical environment. Once small powers are 
caught in the middle of great power rivalries, they will be regarded by the great powers as an 
extended layer of national defense. Given that the disappearance of small powers is usually the 
prologue of a rival’s invasion, having a buffer, therefore, is a means to strengthen the defense 
beyond state borders. In this sense, it is not difficult to understand why some research describes 
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North Korea, Taiwan, and Mongolia each as buffers of China, providing a physical barrier for 
strengthening the national security of China.52 Therefore, the concept of buffer state is a 
potentially viable explanation for China’s long-held policy goals toward North Korea, Taiwan, 
and Mongolia.  
While the literature mentioned above points us in a promising direction to unravel China’s 
behavioral consistency, it has not yet covered three essential questions related to the central 
question of this thesis: When did China start to view the three states as buffers? How did this 
view influence the making of China’s North Korea, Taiwan, and Mongolia policy? And, more 
importantly, why does China need buffer states even when its rivalrous relationship with other 
great powers has dissolved? Those questions are the key to make looking into China’s foreign 
behavior through this buffer state lens substantive and meaningful. Unfortunately, there is also 
a gap in the current literature about how a buffered state creates, maintains, and fights for its 
buffer states. 
The same research gap is apparent in the IR literature. In the field of IR, a vast number of works 
recognized North Korea, Mongolia, and Taiwan as buffer states of China in both Chinese and 
Western academic circles.53 In addition to the term “buffer state”, some works use a different 
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Relationship]," Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies 11(2005); Alan M. Wachman, "Mongolia's Geopolitical 
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term with the same meaning of buffer state to describe the geopolitical importance of North 
Korea, Taiwan, and Mongolia to the Chinese mainland such as buffer, bulwark, screen, 
bridgehead, or springboard. But there is a lack of in-depth discussion of when and under what 
conditions China starts to view them as buffer states, how such a view influenced relevant 
policy outcomes, and why such a view persists is still obvious. Ross’s article is exemplary in 
this regard: 
A strategic buffer encouraged patience and observation as the potential adversary 
mobilized its forces. For the United States, the Taiwan Strait and the Western Pacific 
shield US forces from the risk of a decisive Chinese attack on US forces. On the 
Korean peninsula, North Korea is a land buffer shielding Chinese forces from an 
immediate escalation of a US–North Korean conflict that could threaten Chinese 
territorial security.54 
Although Ross clearly identified North Korea and Taiwan as two buffers in the Sino-American 
rivalry, he did not explain how this concept influenced either Chinese or American 
policymaking. Alan Wachman’s Why Taiwan offered the most lucid explanation of when China 
views Taiwan as a buffer, but the book did not cover a detailed description of how such a view 
influenced the making of China’s Taiwan policy.55 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
The existing literature in IR, China Studies, and geopolitics all provide a certain degree of help 
to the inquiry of this thesis. The relevant literature of IR and China Studies are helpful for 
narrowing down its level of analysis to the system level, since it is security concerns that tie 
China’s perspectives on these three states together. In addition, the literature in geopolitics 
offered this thesis a promising way to answer the research question—employ the concept of 
buffer state. However, at the same time, the works on buffer states lack a comprehensive study 
on China’s behavior from the perspective of a buffered state. This research gap further 
highlights the necessity and importance of understanding China’s behavioral consistency via 
 
Gambit: Preserving a Precarious Independence While Resisting "Soft Colonialism"," EAI Fellows Program 
Working Paper Series 18(2009). 
54 Robert S. Ross, Chinese Security Policy: Structure, Power and Politics, p. 13. 
55 Alan M. Wachman, Why Taiwan? Geostrategic Rationales for China's Territorial Integrity. 
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the concept of buffer state. In other words, solving the puzzle of China’s behavioral consistency 
through the concept of buffer can contribute to all three fields. The next chapter will illustrate 
how the concept of buffer state will be operationalized in this thesis. 
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CH 3 Research Design 
 
 
 
 
This chapter will outline the research design of this thesis in three sections. The first section 
will illustrate how the concept of buffer state will be operationalized to examine China’s 
foreign behavior. Building on the foundations of the current literature on buffer states, I 
propose the term “buffer thinking” to describe the manner in which a buffered state views its 
neighboring buffer states. The second section will explain the rationale behind the case 
selection for this thesis. Why are cases like Tibet, Nepal, and Vietnam not suitable for studying 
China’s buffer thinking? And, conversely, what are the benefits of selecting North Korea, 
Taiwan, and Mongolia as case studies? Finally, the third section will identify the primary 
materials that will be utilized for the examining China’s buffer thinking in this thesis. 
 
3.1 Buffer Thinking 
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, scholars have generally defined buffer states from three different 
perspectives: geography, power, and function. Each aspect presents one essential element in 
the making of a buffer state. A buffer state can be defined as a relatively weak state that is 
geographically located in a place with strategic importance for two or more stronger rivaling 
states, and in the meantime directly contributes to matters of key national security for either 
one of them. Based on this definition, there have been and continue to be many states in the 
world that can be called buffer states. For example, Belgium was a classic example of a 
European buffer state between the United Kingdom and Germany from the 19th to 20th century. 
Finland, with its strategic importance to the Soviet Union, was regarded by Moscow as a critical 
buffer state during the Cold War era. Uruguay was a buffer state between Brazil and Argentina 
in Latin America, and Mozambique was a buffer state of South Africa in Africa. As for buffer 
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states in Asia, Korea is most commonly noted to by scholars for its role as a buffer state 
between the Japanese and Qing Empire. Afghanistan is another well-known buffer state that 
existed between the British and Russian Empire in the 19th century. Also, Thailand functioned 
as a buffer state between the British and French Empire at the end of the 19th century.1 
Although the literature on buffer states shows that their existence is a universal phenomenon 
across time and continents, some conceptual gaps still need to be addressed before it can be 
used in research. From the literature examined in Chapter Two, it is clear that buffer states 
appear amidst a rivalry between two powerful states, and states should prefer having a buffer 
state in areas of geostrategic importance. However, two questions remain ambiguous in the 
literature: 
1. What is meant by a rivalrous relationship? 
2. What does it mean to view a state as a buffer?  
These two questions are critical to this thesis as it attempts to pinpoint when China started to 
regard North Korea, Taiwan, and Mongolia as buffers, and how such a view influenced China’s 
foreign policy. Without solving these two questions in advance, a project on the concept of 
buffer states cannot proceed. 
The first question is relatively easy to address. Few works in International Relations explain 
the nature or content of state rivalry in detail, though the scholarship has been using the term 
rivalry to characterize the relationship between two states for decades. The most relevant body 
of literature defining rivalry is that which deals with the concept of “enduring rivalry” in 
political science. Scholars of enduring rivalry have generally argued that a rivalry between 
states means that the states are in conflict over specific issues in which diplomatic or military 
means are employed to resolve such issues.2 Although the meaning of rivalry still varies 
slightly between scholars, one essential component in a relationship of rivalry is states’ 
perception of imminent military threat from their opponents. State A cannot but view state B 
as its rival when state B represents an imminent military threat toward state A. In other words, 
 
1 For more buffer states around the world, please refer to these two books: John Chay and Thomas E. Ross; 
Tanisha M. Fazal, State Death: The Politics and Geography of Conquest, Occupation, and Annexation. 
2 D. Scott Bennett, "Security, Bargaining, and the End of Interstate Rivalry," International Studies Quarterly 40, 
no. 2 (1996): pp. 160-1; Eric W. Cox, Why Enduring Rivalries Do--or Don't--End  (Boulder, Colo.: 
FirstForumPress, 2010), pp. 3-4; Paul F. Diehl and Gary Goertz, War and Peace in International Rivalry  (Ann 
Arbor: University Of Michigan Press, 2000), CH 2; Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl, "The Initiation and 
Termination of Enduring Rivalries: The Impact of Political Shocks," American Journal of Political Science 39, 
no. 1 (1995): pp. 32-9. 
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the emergence of rivalry between two states cannot conceptually be separated from the 
imminent military threats one poses to the other. In this sense, the moment that one state starts 
to perceive a real possibility of its opponent using military force to threaten its own national 
security, is when we can safely assume their relationship has become rivalrous. 
To address the second question, it is first necessary to unpack the constituent elements of buffer 
states. When debating what makes a buffer state, most scholars have focused on the objective 
elements that constitute a buffer state (geography, function, and power). They seldom consider 
in detail the potential subjective elements. This lack of attention to subjective elements is quite 
common in the current scholarship on buffer states. For example, Tanisha Fazel defined a 
buffer state as “A state geographically located between two other states engaged in a rivalry.”3 
Hans Morgenthau described buffer states as “Weak states located close to powerful ones and 
serving their military security.”4 Brandon Valeriano and John Benthuysen argued that “The 
essential attribute of a buffer state is to stand at the center of a strong pattern of securitisation, 
which separates rival powers.”5 Conceptualizing buffer states in this way seems to suggest that 
as long as a weak state is strategically located in the middle of a rivalry between its powerful 
neighbors, the state can be automatically referred to as a buffer state without question. However, 
the emergence of buffer state status is empirically more complicated than what they described. 
As a matter of fact, a buffered state’s subjective perception of the territory between itself and 
its rival is a necessary element that causes the buffered state to refer to that territory as a buffer. 
Take North Korea as an example. Right after the end of World War II (WWII, 1939–45) in 
1945, the US and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) were arguably rivals; the CCP and the 
Kuomintang (KMT), supported by the US, engaged in military conflict throughout the Chinese 
mainland right after the end of WWII. At that time, the US had military forces stationed in the 
south part of the Korean Peninsula. This situation meant that North Korea fitted the objective 
standards of being a buffer state between the People’s Republic of China (PRC), established 
by the CCP, and the US before the outbreak of the Korean War (1950–53). However, for CCP 
leaders at that time, this situation did not automatically make the north part of the peninsula, 
controlled by Kim Il Sung, a buffer state between China and the US. As Chapter Five will show 
in detail, the CCP had not seen the Korean Peninsula as having essential geostrategic meaning 
for the defense of China since the establishment of the CCP in 1921. The peninsula, for the 
 
3 Tanisha M. Fazal, State Death: The Politics and Geography of Conquest, Occupation, and Annexation, p. 70. 
4 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, p. 189. 
5 Brandon Valeriano and John Van Benthuysen, "When States Die: Geographic and Territorial Pathways to State 
Death," p. 1167. 
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CCP, was nothing but a symbol of how an oppressed nation fought against foreign imperialism. 
It was the US forces marching toward the Sino-Korean border during the Korean War that 
dramatically changed the CCP’s original perspective to that of a buffered view, in which the 
territory of North Korea was seen as a critical shield protecting China’s northeast. In other 
words, the formation of a rivalry between two states does not necessarily mean that either of 
those states will consider the state between them as a buffer. What matters is a buffered states’ 
subjective perception of whether a territory possesses the status of buffer state. 
It is also important to point out that this subjective perception of buffer state status can 
sometimes be wholly unilateral. Nicholas Spykman, who has published many studies on buffer 
states, uses the term “no man’s land or two man’s land” to describe buffer states.6 This term 
implies that an agreement between two buffered states is a necessary element to make a 
particular territory a buffer. Empirically, however, this is not always the case. Once again, 
North Korea serves as an excellent example. China has perceived North Korea as a critical 
buffer protecting its geopolitical security against the US from the Korean War until today. Yet 
the US does not regard North Korea as a buffer in the same way that China does. To the US, 
whether China would dominate North Korea has nothing do to with US American continental 
security but more about its security interests in East Asia. As early as 1947, the US Secretary 
of State Dean Acheson approved one interdepartmental repot on Korea, which specified that 
“The US had little strategic interest in maintaining troops or bases in Korea…nonetheless, 
control of all Korea by the Soviet Union or Soviet-dominated forces…would constitute a 
strategic threat to US interests in the Far East.”7 These distinct views of the value of North 
Korea between China and the US illustrate the very fact that any given territory acting as a 
buffer state does not need to be recognized as such by two rivaling states simultaneously. It 
follows that even if only one state in a rivalry views a territory as containing critical 
geostrategic meaning (it would feel vulnerable if the territory is controlled by its rival), that 
territory can still be seen as a buffer. A mutual consensus between two rivals on how to manage 
a territory between them should not be a criterion for determining the territory’s buffer state 
status. 
This unilaterally subjective perception of buffer state status closely relates to the second 
question of how the concept of buffer state can be operationalized in this thesis. The literature 
 
6 Nicholas J. Spykman and Abbie A. Rollins, "Geographic Objectives in Foreign Policy, I," p. 408. 
7 Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War: Volume II, the Roaring of the Cataract 1947-1950  (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 46. 
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suggests that buffered states in a buffer system will face a geopolitical prisoner dilemma in 
which both will want to take the buffer first. Figure 2 illustrates this predicament. In Figure 2, 
a buffer state, B, is geographically located between the two rivaling states, A and C. The 
territory controlled by B provides several significant geostrategic advantages to A, such as 
extending A’s strategic defenses and providing more time and space to mobilize or defend, 
blocking C’s potential invasion route of A, and quarantining hazardous cultural or ideology 
influences from C. Considering the loss of B (if C occupies B or imposes militarily stations on 
B) would place A at a great disadvantage in terms of its defense against C in the future; taking 
B before C acts in the same way is the best course of action for A when facing this geopolitical 
dilemma. In other words, A’s behavior toward B will inevitably be driven by a geopolitical 
mentality that “if C takes B, C will definitely use B as an invasion route to attack me in the 
future. So I should take B first before C does.” Chancellor of the German Empire Theobald 
Von Bethmann-Hollweg’s speech to the Reichstag at the beginning of World War I in August 
1914 shows one good example of such a mentality: 
Gentlemen, we are now (acting) in self-defense; and necessity knows no law! Our own 
troops have occupied Luxembourg, and possibly, have already entered Belgian 
territory. Gentlemen, this is against the rules of international law. It is true that the 
French government has informed Brussels that it is willing to respect Belgium's 
neutrality, as long as the opponent will respect it. We knew, however, that France stood 
ready to invade. France would wait but we could not! A French attack upon our flank 
on the Lower Rhine might have become fatal. Thus, we were compelled to disregard 
the justified protest of the Luxembourg and of the Belgian governments. The wrong—
I speak frankly—the wrong which we thereby commit, we shall try to make good again 
as soon as our military object is attained. Whoever is threatened, as we are, and fights 
for his highest possession, may only consider how he is to hew his way through.8 
 
Figure 2: A Buffer System 
 
8 Michael Greenfield Partem, "The Buffer System in International Relations," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 
27, no. 1 (1983): p. 11. 
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Motivated by its own geostrategic vulnerability in relation to B in a rivalry against C, at some 
point A would inevitably regard the territory controlled by B as an extra layer of national 
defense against C in a buffer system. In other words, once A shows such a geopolitical 
mentality, that is the moment we can safely assume A subjectively regards B in a buffered way. 
Therefore, I term this geopolitical mentality “buffer thinking.” This term is encapsulated by 
the logic of secure this territory against my rival now, otherwise the rival may launch a military 
attack from it against me in the future once the rival has occupied the territory. 
Lastly, although this thesis will utilize the concept of buffer state to explain China’s behavior 
consistency, it does not intend to distinguish the nuanced differences among the terms of buffer 
state, buffer zone,9 buffer area,10 buffer space,11 strategic buffer,12 or buffer etc.13 While the 
term buffer state has been relatively rigorously discussed in the academic literature on this topic, 
the definitions of the other terms are quite ambiguous. Some studies suggest that there should 
be a polity on a given territory. Some of them imply an assumption that only land matters and 
maritime zones do not. The common ground of these ambiguous terms is that they all refer to 
a given territory which is not controlled by either of the parties in a rivalry and it serves to 
separate the two rivaling opponents. Given that the target of this thesis is to understand China’s 
 
9 Rajan Menon and Jack L. Snyder, "Buffer Zones: Anachronism, Power Vacuum, or Confidence Builder?." 
10 Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War  (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1960), p. 152. 
11 Mohammad Reza Hafeznia, Syrus Ahmadi, and Bernard Hourcad, "Explanation of the Structural and Functional 
Characteristics of Geographical Buffer Space," Geopolitics Quarterly 8, no. 40 (2013). 
12 Robert S. Ross, Chinese Security Policy: Structure, Power and Politics, p. 13. 
13 Stephan De Spiegeleire, "Of Buffers and Bridges: Some Geodetic Thoughts on European Stability in the Post-
Cold War Era," in Zwischeneuropa: Historic Experiences and Security Alternative (Helsinki: Finnish Institute of 
International Affairs, 1994). 
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foreign behavior via the concept of buffer state, how to define and distinguish those terms is 
outside the scope of this thesis. 
Based on the discussion in this section, the research procedure of this thesis in each case will 
unfold in three interlinked steps in the following three chapters. It will firstly examine China’s 
early view of the territories of Taiwan, North Korea, and Mongolia before China established 
any rivalry with its rivals, the US and the Soviet Union. Then it will show how China’s buffer 
thinking toward these territories takes shape amidst its respective rivalries with the US and the 
Soviet Union. Finally, this thesis will examine the explanatory power of buffer thinking in a 
series of military and diplomatic actions that China took toward North Korea, Taiwan, and 
Mongolia. 
 
3.2 Case Selection Rationale 
 
As explained in Chapter Two, the term “lips and teeth” is the link that enables us to connect 
China’s perspectives on these three states together and hence make the concept of buffer state 
look promising in explaining the behavior of China. However, some might argue that, 
geopolitically speaking, these three states are not the only three buffer states of China. Tibet, 
Nepal, and Vietnam are also likely candidates for being buffer states of China. In response to 
this potential query, this section will elucidate the rationales of why Tibet, Nepal, and Vietnam 
were not selected as case studies. 
Firstly, Tibet can hardly be considered an independent state actor in the international system. 
China’s buffer thinking is a product of geopolitical anxiety resulting from a concern that a rival 
of China may use the territory in between as an invasion route to undermine China’s 
geopolitical security. For the concept of a buffer state to work properly, the existence of the 
following three units are a prerequisite: China, a rival, and a territory free from the control of 
either side. If either side of the rivalry controls the territory, the territory cannot be considered 
to be a buffer. Historically speaking, Chinese control over Tibet has been off and on in the past 
centuries. From the early 1910s, Tibet operated as an independent state actor in the 
international system. However, the PRC incorporated Tibet in 1951, and the Chinese 
government has exercised substantive control over it as a part of Chinese territory until today. 
In this sense, theoretically, Tibet cannot be considered to be a buffer. 
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Secondly, Nepal lacks the subjective constituent elements of being a buffer state. The founder 
of modern Nepal, Prithvi Narayan Shah, once described Nepal as “a yam between two stones” 
to characterize its geopolitical situation.14 Sandwiched between India ruled by Britain and 
China, Nepal’s geopolitical environment is very similar to that of Mongolia. However, what 
makes the case of Nepal different from North Korea, Taiwan, and Mongolia is that there is no 
evidence that China perceives any military threat from Nepal nowadays. Moreover, China did 
not engage in a strategic rivalry with India over Nepal, and, interestingly, China frequently 
consults with India over affairs relating to Nepal. As Kunda Dixit argues, “Beijing is happy to 
let India handle Nepal, as long as the Americans and Europeans don’t use Nepal to support 
Tibetan nationalists.”15 Indeed, the question of why China does not subjectively perceive Nepal 
as a buffer state today needs to be answered. In any case, this lack of subjective perception is 
the major reason this thesis does not account Nepal among the buffer states of China. 
Thirdly, Vietnam is not a buffer state of China anymore. During the Vietnam War (1955–75), 
Vietnam could be regarded as a buffer state between China and the US. Chinese scholars often 
compare China’s perceptions of the Korean and Vietnam War.16 Indeed, in the early 1960s, 
Chinese leaders viewed Vietnam in much the same way as they viewed North Korea. They 
believed that the true intentions of the US behind this war were to invade China via Vietnam 
much the same as its intentions behind the Korean War. That was why the Chinese government 
also referred to the Sino-Vietnamese relationship as being like “lips and teeth” at that time.17 
However, along with the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations after the mid-1960s, the war 
was further complicated by structural factors such as the Sino-Soviet rivalry over Vietnam and 
the Sino-American rapprochement. After the war, Sino-Vietnam relations have evolved into an 
entirely different context from that of Taiwan, North Korea, and Mongolia. In 1979, the two 
sides had a war against each other over the Cambodia issue. After the Cold War, the 
relationship between China and Vietnam has mostly centered on a series of territorial and 
 
14 Fauzia Atique, "Nepal's Foreign Policy," Pakistan Horizon 36, no. 4 (1983): p. 97. 
15 Kunda Dixit, "Nepal: Dictated By Geography," World Policy Journal 30, no. 36 (2013): p. 38. 
16 Zhang Baijia, "Kangmei Yuanchao Yu Yuanyue Kangmei: Zhongguo Ruhe Yingdui Chaoxian Zhanzheng He 
Yuenan Zhanzheng 抗美援朝与援越抗美: 中国如何应对朝鲜战争和越南战争 ['Resist the US to Aid Korea' 
and 'Aid Vietnam to Resist the US': How Did China Deal with the Korean War and the Vietnam War]," World 
Economics and Politics, no. 3 (2005); Li Danhui, "Zhongsu Guanxi Yu Zhongguo De Yuanyue Kangmei 中蘇關
係與中國的援越抗美 [The Sino-Soviet Relations and China's Aid Vietnman to Resist the US]," Contemporary 
China History Studies 3(1998). 
17 "Zhongguo Zhichi Yuenan Renmin Tongyi Zuguo De Douzheng 中国支持越南人民统一祖国的斗争 [China 
Supports Vitanamese Struggle for the National Unification]," People's Daily, December 23 1961. 
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maritime disputes. In other words, China’s geopolitical anxiety over Vietnam has faded away 
substantially nowadays. 
One might argue that Taiwan is not a state so it cannot be a buffered state in theoretical terms. 
This argument is groundless. To determine whether a political entity is a state or not, the 
standard stipulated in the Convention on Rights and Duties of States is what most scholars refer 
to. According to this standard: “the state as a person of international law should possess the 
following qualifications: a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) government; and 
d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.” Taiwan satisfies each of these 
stipulations. In fact, the Republic of China on Taiwan has been functioning as a de facto 
independent state in the international system since 1949, despite the PRC’s claim of 
sovereignty over Taiwan. What makes the case of Taiwan unique is that it is the only case 
among the three that China wants to annex into its territory. This uniqueness, however, does 
not change the fact that Taiwan is an island controlled by its own government and is situated 
in between a US-China rivalry. Therefore, Taiwan along with North Korea and Mongolia are 
the principal (and perhaps the only) states that currently function as buffer states on China’s 
periphery. 
More importantly, there are two important advantages in choosing these three states to 
investigate the buffer state concept. First, selecting North Korea, Taiwan, and Mongolia greatly 
minimized the potential issue of unrepresentativeness may raise in research centering on the 
concept of buffer state. Methodologically, social scientists have long been struggling with the 
reliability of their research. Given that the empirical samples social scientists collect are 
relatively more limited than those of natural scientists, the arguments they want to make from 
small-n research usually faces the problem of being unrepresentative of the entire population. 
However, as explained above, Nepal, Vietnam, and Tibet are all not suitable candidates due to 
their respective limitations. Only North Korea, Taiwan, and Mongolia fit the criterion of being 
a buffer state of China today. By including all of the potential cases, in other words, the risk of 
the findings being the unrepresentative are minimized. 
Second, arranging the case selection in this manner also makes it easier to gauge the 
explanatory power of China’s buffer thinking. Social scientists can benefit both from a “most-
likely” or “least-likely” research design for examining the power of the theories they intend to 
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expound.18 The former “most-likely” design means cases that a theory is expecting to explain 
very well, while the latter “least-likely” cases are ones in which a theory is assumed to perform 
very poorly (the theory is still valid though). The explanatory power of a theory cannot be said 
to be powerful if it performed badly in most-likely cases, but can be regarded as powerful if it 
explained least-likely cases well. In this thesis, each case selected shows different geopolitical 
features of China’s buffer states. Mongolia is the clearest case of a Chinese buffer among the 
three because it borders both with Russia/the Soviet Union and China on land. This is the most 
typical form of a buffer state. Taiwan is the least likely case among the three as it does not 
share a land border with China and the US, but connects to the two strong neighbors by two 
water bodies. Due to this unique geographical setting, Taiwan is not a traditional type of buffer 
state. North Korea is somewhere in between. Although North Korea shares a land border with 
China, it would not present any direct military threat to North America even if China absorbed 
North Korea. The buffer state status of North Korea, as discussed above, is mainly shaped by 
China’s own perception of the North Korean territory. Therefore, instead of counting on the 
homogeneous cases only, including three different types of buffer states makes it possible to 
evaluate the explanatory power of buffer thinking with methodological rigor. 
Finally, some may wonder whether it is appropriate to treating both maritime (Taiwan) and 
land neighbors (North Korea and Mongolia) as similar. Intuitively, the answer is no. 
Theoretically speaking, all other things being equal, a state's threat perception would decrease 
when its geographical distance from the rival decreases. Power projection becomes much more 
difficult when there is a body of water separating two rivaling states. However, the case of 
Taiwan is a different story. The Taiwan Strait is only around 100 kilometers wide. Such a small 
body of water cannot function as a meaningful and effective physical barrier to prevent the US 
from projecting its navy and air force powers from the island to China. It is because of this 
geographical proximity of Taiwan to the Chinese coast that makes Chinese leaders worry about 
a possible US invasion from the island, as CH 4 will show. Moreover, the frequency with which 
Chinese leaders discuss about great power threats from Taiwan is noticeably higher than in the 
other two cases. Based on these reasons, it is appropriate to treat Taiwan as equivalent to North 
Korea and Mongolia. 
 
18 Harry Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Political Science," in Handbook of Political Science, ed. Fred 
Greenstein and Nelson Polsby (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975); Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, 
Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences  (Cambridge & London: Mit Press, 2005), pp. 120-
3. 
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To make a coherent and cogent argument, this thesis will delineate a specific analytical 
timeframe. The analysis will span the time from which that the CCP established the PRC under 
the leadership of Mao Zedong in 1949, to the time that Hu Jintao took power in the 2000s. 
Within this timeframe, this thesis will examine the explanatory power of China’s buffer 
thinking in a series of important events occurring between China and North Korea, China and 
Taiwan, and China and Mongolia respectively. The events selected are all large-scale military 
conflicts or significant diplomatic episodes, as I assume China’s buffer thinking to be more 
obvious during major events. The assumption behind this selection manner is that the true 
reasons why Chinese leaders think a certain geographical area is vital to China are more likely 
to appear in a high level of confrontation. As a number of cognitive psychology studies have 
found, people’s reasoning complexity would increases when the stakes of the issues being 
confronted are high.19 This supports the prediction that arguments Chinese leaders use during 
high-level confrontations are more trustworthy than that of low-level confrontations, as the 
amount of time and efforts the leaders would spend on internal debating, gather information, 
and filtering out priorities increases. 
Certainly, it is the expectation of this thesis that China’s buffer thinking can be and will be a 
valid explanation for China’s behavior beyond the Hu era. However, due to the limitations of 
time and space as well as available primary materials, this thesis will not go beyond Hu’s era. 
In addition, this thesis acknowledges the possibility that China’s buffer thinking may evolve 
into a different form in the future due to the complexities of world politics. 
 
3.3 Data Set 
 
The main task of this thesis is to establish a causal relationship between China’s behavioral 
consistency and its buffer thinking. Key to this task will be investigating of the decision-making 
process of the Chinese government in the selected events. With that goal in mind, this section 
 
19  Mary Frances Luce, James R. Bettman, and John W. Payne, "Choice Processing in Emotionally Difficult 
Decisions," Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 23, no. 2 (1997); Shelly 
Chaiken, Akiva Liberman, and Alice H. Eagly, "Heuristic and Systematic Information Processing within and 
beyond the Persuasion Context," in Unintended Thought, ed. John A. Bargh and James S. Uleman (New York: 
Guilford Press, 1989); Daryl G. Press, Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats  (Ithaca, 
N.Y.: Cornell Paperbacks, 2007), p. 23. 
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will identify the primary materials to be used in this thesis, where they are from, and the 
feasibility of accessing those materials. 
The National Archives Administration (NAA) and the Foreign Ministry Archive (FMA) in 
Beijing are the two main locations that collect relevant sources on the decision-making process 
of the Chinese government. The NAA and the FMA in Beijing store almost all of the important 
documents on decisions made by Chinese leaders since the 1920s. In accordance with the 
Archive Law of the PRC, archived materials should be opened to the public upon the expiration 
of thirty years from the date of their formation.20 The Chinese government embarked on archive 
declassification in 1999, and the FMA officially opened to the public the first wave of 
declassified archives dated before 1966 in 2004. However, the FMA was shut down by the 
Chinese government in 2012 for unknown reasons. After it reopened in December 2016, almost 
all documents made available were from the International Organizations Division and the 
Protocol Division of the Foreign Ministry, which bear little relevance to the decision-making 
process. In addition, foreign researchers are normally not allowed to visit the NAA. 
As an alternative, this thesis acquired primary materials from archives at municipal and 
provincial levels. Jiangsu Provincial Archives and Shanghai Municipal Archives are two 
archives with a rich store of documents regarding foreign policy at these two levels.21 Although 
most archives stored at these levels are documents which the CCP Central issued to lower-level 
administration agencies, the documents are still very valuable in many ways. For one thing, 
they sometimes include a copy of how a relevant decision was made by top Chinese leaders. 
For another, from the documents at hand, it is still possible to sometimes infer how Chinese 
leaders viewed a given issue. Most importantly, the Chinese government puts relatively fewer 
restrictions on foreign researchers’ access to these archives. Hence, archives at municipal and 
provincial levels are one important channel for delveing into China’s foreign and military 
decisions. 
Open sources published by the Chinese government are also a crucial means to look into how 
a specific decision is made. The Chinese government has published a vast number of books 
containing primary materials on foreign and military policy. For instance, the 18 volumes of 
 
20  Please see Chapter IV of the Archives Law of the PRC: http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-
12/12/content_1383932.htm (accessed January 18 2018). 
21 Jiang Huajie, "Zhonguo Dalu Diqu Dangan 中国大陆地区档案 [Archives in the Chinese Maindland Area]," in 
Lenzhanshi Yanjiu Dangan Ziyuan Daolun 冷战史研究档案资源导论 [Introduction of Archival Sources on Cold 
War History Studies], ed. Yao Baihui (Beijing: Shijiezhishi Chubanshe, 2015). 
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The Selected Documents of the CCP Central Committee, 1921–1949 and 50 volumes of The 
Selected Documents of the CCP Central Committee, 1949–1966 published by the Chinese 
government, both contain a considerable amount of information about the CCP’s foreign and 
military decisions since 1921. China researchers also frequently utilize Chinese leaders’ 
writings, diaries, and autobiographies to investigate how a certain decision is made, as Chinese 
leaders like Mao and Deng Xiaoping usually circumvented the restrictions of the bureaucratic 
system to make a decision. Therefore, sources such as The Selected Military Writings of Mao 
Zedong and The Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping are widely referenced by researchers on 
China when they are making their arguments. In addition, Shen Zhihua collected a large 
number of declassified documents on Sino-Soviet relations from Russia and translated them 
into Chinese in the 12 volumes of Sino-Soviet Relations: The Selected Declassified Documents 
in Russian Archives in 2014. Those 12 volumes, published by the Orient Publishing Center in 
Shanghai, have a great number of the most recent telegrams between leaders in Beijing and 
Moscow regarding military and diplomatic issues. 
This thesis also takes into account that one has to be very cautious when using sources 
published by the Chinese government. The Chinese government frequently deletes or adds 
specific information to the sources to suit its political needs. For example, Mao outlined 
China’s borders in his article “The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party” of 
1939, in which he wrote: “China’s current borders are…neighbors with Taiwan.”22 This article 
was first published in The Selected Works of Mao Zedong in 1944. However, the Chinese 
government deleted the sentence “neighbors with Taiwan” in a later version of The Selected 
Works of Mao Zedong after the CCP changed its official position on the sovereignty of this 
island (Please see Chapter Four). Thus, in analyzing such documents in this thesis, it was 
deemed to necessary to check the earliest version of the source. Also, the Wilson Center’s 
History and Public Policy Program, the Central Intelligence Agency's Freedom of Information 
Act Electronic Reading Room, the National Security Archive at Washington D.C., and the 
Office of the Historian at the US State Department all provide voluminous digital archives on 
Cold War history. These online archives are useful for not only verifying the authenticity of 
the Chinese sources but also acquiring relevant information about Chinese foreign and military 
policy during the Cold War. 
 
22 Liu Xiaoyuan, "Zhongguo Gongchandang Guojia Jiangyuguan De Yuanyuan Yu Fazhan, 1921-1949 中国共
产党国家疆域观的渊源与发展, 1921-1949 [The Source and Development of the CCP's National Territorial 
Perspective, 1921-1949]," Twenty-First Century 160(2017): p. 24. 
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Regarding sources for events in more contemporary periods, this thesis took into consideration 
that changes over time that have occurred in the decision-making apparatus of China. From the 
Jiang Zemin period onward, China’s decision-making apparatus has gradually transformed 
from a personal style to a much more institutional style. As part of this transformation, the 
power to make foreign and military policy was no longer the exclusive domain of a small group 
of top CCP leaders, but came to be shared by multiple competing agencies. Although top CCP 
leaders still have the final say on critical military and foreign policies, they usually need to 
work with relevant formal and informal policymaking agencies to acquire policy consensus. 
Therefore, instead of solely paying attention to the top CCP leaders, this thesis pays attention 
to those multiple agencies and utilizes them as sources of data. This helps to provide a more 
accurate picture of how a certain policy is made. 
Leaders’ statements and policy papers from these agencies were collected as part of the data 
set utilized in this thesis. Among all of the policymaking agencies of China, the most important 
is the CCP Central Politburo, especially the CCP Central Politburo Standing Committee. 
Members of this committee make the final call on all important decisions regarding China’s 
foreign and military policy. The second level of agencies targeted was a series of small groups 
on foreign or military policy. Among these, the Central Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group, 
which is responsible for debating, coordinating, and recommending policies to the Politburo, 
and the Central Leading Group for Taiwan Affairs, which is responsible for giving suggestions 
to the Politburo about affairs related to Taiwan. The People’s Liberation Army is undoubtedly 
an essential player in the making of China’s military policy, though its role has been 
substantially narrowed to professional military affairs by decades of institutional reform. 
Finally, with regard to China’s North Korea policy, the outputs of the International Department 
(formerly the International Liaison Department) were also included as this is the main channel 
through which China has communicated with North Korea from the Cold War until today. 
In addition, interviews were conducted with Chinese scholars from influential think-tanks or 
key universities, which is an increasingly effective means to understand China’s policy toward 
the outside world. Chinese officials are, generally speaking, the best interview for finding out 
how a specific decision is reached. In practice, however, conducting interviews with Chinese 
officials is not feasible given the political culture and environment of China. A viable 
alternative is to interview Chinese scholars at important and influential think-tanks or key 
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universities in China.23 Given that many of such institutions are administered to a certain extent 
by relevant government agencies, personal connections between researchers at those 
institutions and actual policymakers are often strong (Please see Figure 3). From this 
perspective, researchers at these government-affiliated institutions may have a deep 
understanding of how a given policy is formulated. More importantly, they have greater 
freedom to express their opinions on China’s foreign policy relative to Chinese officials. 
 
Figure 3: Key Think-Tanks in China24 
Name Administered by 
China Institutes of Contemporary International 
Relations 
Ministry of State Security 
China Institute of International Studies Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences State Council 
Development Research Center of the State 
Council 
State Council 
Academy of Military Science Central Military Commission 
Shanghai Institutes for International Studies Wang Daohan’s Office 
Foreign Ministry 
Jiang Zemin’s Office  
Shanghai City Government 
Institute of Taiwan Studies Chinese Academy of Social Science 
Taiwan Affairs Office 
Central Committee Leading Group on 
Taiwan Affairs  
State Council Ministry of State Security 
International Strategy Research Institute Central Party School 
 
 
23 G. E., "The Brains of the Party," The Economist, March 10 2014; Bates Gill and James Mulvenon, "Chinese 
Military-Related Think Tanks and Research Institutions," The China Quarterly, no. 171 (2002); Linda Jakobson 
and Dean Knox, New Foreign Policy Actors in China  (Solna: Stockholm International Peace Research Institution, 
2010); David Shambaugh, "China's International Relations Think Tanks: Evolving Structure and Process," The 
China Quarterly, no. 171 (2002). 
24 The information in this table is from footnote 22. 
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Finally, newspapers circulated in China are one meaningful lens through which this thesis will 
examine how Chinese leaders perceive or want Chinese people to view a given event, 
especially for the period during the Cold War. Newspapers such as People’s Daily, Jiefang 
Daily, Guangming Daily, and PLA Daily will be drawn upon in the analysis. In summary, this 
thesis will rely on declassified archives, memoirs, telegrams, manuscripts, interviews, and 
newspapers as its main primary materials. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has paved the groundwork for delving into China’s buffer thinking. It discussed 
the procedure of generating the independent variable of this thesis, justified the case selection 
rationale, and identified relevant sources material. Based on this groundwork, the next three 
chapters will examine the explanatory power of China’s buffer thinking through the respective 
cases of Taiwan, North Korea, and Mongolia. Each chapter will unravel China’s behavioral 
consistency in three steps: China’s early view of a specific territory, when and how China 
established buffer thinking towards such territory, and how such thinking affected certain 
policy outcomes. 
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CH 4 The Case of Taiwan 
 
 
 
 
The long-held position of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is that Taiwan has been a part 
of China’s territory since ancient times. In backing up this position with military threats and 
drawing diplomatic red lines against the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan since 1949, 
China 1  has apparently been sending a message to the world that the Taiwan issue has 
everything to do with China’s sovereignty. This implies that China’s behavior toward Taiwan 
has been driven by a desire to protect China’s sovereignty. This chapter aims to challenge this 
widely accepted held impression by demonstrating that China’s buffer thinking toward Taiwan 
is the key driver of its behavior toward Taiwan in this regard. It argues that this thinking is the 
main factor that drove China to launch military action against Taiwan in 1954, 1958, and 1996.  
This chapter will begin by showing that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s first view of 
the island was of a minority nationality. It will then detail the process in which how this view 
gradually transformed into a geopolitical rationale over a three-phased policy evolution when 
a US-CCP rivalry began taking shape. Through an examining of the explanatory power of 
buffer thinking against other competing explanations, this chapter argues that such thinking not 
only changed the timing in which China initiated its military plan of taking Taiwan but it also 
altered the order of the plan in the First Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1954–55. The outbreak of the 
Second Taiwan Crisis of 1958 was a continuation of the first crisis in terms of the buffer 
thinking. The Sino-American rapprochement of the 1970s did not fundamentally alter China’s 
view of Taiwan, which ultimately led China to initiate a military plan of annexing Taiwan—
not just only military drills—in 1995–96. 
 
 
1 For clarification purposes, in this chapter and beyond Taiwan refers to the ROC government and China refers to 
the PRC government. Chinese leaders refers to government officials in the PRC. 
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4.1 The CCP’s Early View of Taiwan: Minority Nationality 
 
The very first view held by the CCP regarding Taiwan was of a minority nationality. In such a 
view, the CCP did not think that people in China and people in Taiwan shared national 
homogeneity, nor that Taiwan should be a part of China’s territory. It took the CCP more than 
twenty years to arrive at its Taiwan policy as we know it today, moving through three phases: 
Taiwan-omitting, supporting Taiwanese independence, and Taiwan-incorporating. The value 
of this island to the CCP, however, was in no way geopolitical in the first two phases. 
Before the Anti-Japanese War (1937–45), Taiwan was a very peripheral concern for the CCP, 
if not wholly omitted from its considerations. Compared to China’s heavy focus on Taiwan 
nowadays, the term Taiwan barely appeared in CCP policy discourse in the first few years after 
its founding. The best example of such an omission was “The Manifesto of the Second National 
Congress” of the CCP in 1922, which was the first time the CCP explicitly outlined its vision 
of China’s future territorial makeup.2 In this manifesto, the CCP advocated to the uniting of 
each province in China proper and the establishment a Chinese Federal Republic with 
Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang. Taiwan did not appear in this vision. More importantly, in this 
manifesto the CCP used nine thousand words to list all sorts of economic exploitation and 
political oppression that foreign countries had conducted in China since the Opium War of 
1839, but it did not mention the profound event of ceding Taiwan to the Japanese Empire. 
This omission was not a coincidence but more of a reflection of a traditional Chinese view of 
Taiwan—people in Taiwan were not Han Chinese and the island was external to China proper. 
Due to China’s long-held land power worldview, rulers on China were not particularly 
interested in bringing Taiwan, which was approximately 150 km away from China’s coast, 
under its control. The first time that China officially annexed the island was in 1684 in the Qing 
Dynasty. In 1683, Shi Lang, a naval commander of the Qing Empire, defeated Ming loyalists 
who fled to Taiwan in 1662 and planned to take this island. While the commander believed 
that Taiwan could function geopolitically as a screen to protect China’s southeast coastal area, 
the Kangxi Emperor opposed the idea of annexing Taiwan after the victory. The nationality 
 
2 "Zhongguo Gongchandang Dierci Quanguo Dahui Xuanyan 中国共产党第二次全国大会宣言 [The Manifesto 
of the Second National Congress of the CCP]," in Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenjian Xuanji: 1921-25 中共中央文
件选集: 1921-25 [The Selected Documents of the CCP Central Committee: 1921-25], ed. The Central Archive 
(Beijing: The CCP Central Party School Press, 1991), p. 111. 
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difference and the lack of interaction between China and Taiwan in the past were two major 
reasons that the emperor was against this idea. He argued: 
Taiwan is a place beyond the sea. It has no relations with us. The reason we invaded 
Taiwan was because the people on it, who have not been civilized yet, keep harassing 
our people along the coast...Taiwan is no bigger than a ball of mud. We will gain nothing 
from having the island and we will lose nothing if we do not take it.3 
Two official documents of the CCP in the early period revealed that the CCP first perceived 
Taiwan through a lens of minority nationality. The first one is “The Resolution on Nationality 
Problem” of 1928, in which the CCP listed “Taiwanese in Fujian” as one of the minority 
nationalities in China: 
The Sixth National Congress of the CCP thinks that the issue of minority nationality 
(Mongolians in the north, Hui, Manchu, Koreans, Taiwanese in Fujian, Miao, Li in the 
south, Xinjiang, and Tibet) in China has a significant meaning for the revolution.4 
The second one is the Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic of 1931, in which the CCP 
declared: 
Every race (Han, Manchu, Mongolians, Hui, Tibetans, Miao, Yao, Li, and Taiwanese, 
Koreans, and Vietnamese inside China), and religion is equal before Soviet laws.5 
These two documents both echo the two reasons argued by Kangxi regarding the relationship 
between China and Taiwan. Compared to China’s current policy of refraining from calling the 
people in Taiwan “Taiwanese,” the CCP at the time apparently regarded people from Taiwan 
as a unique group called Taiwanese, who were neither Taiwanese aboriginals nor Han Chinese. 
Second, there was an obvious implication for the CCP that Taiwan was not and should not be 
a part of China’s territory. In the constitutional categories of races in China, the CCP grouped 
Taiwanese together with Koreans and Vietnamese, rather than putting Taiwanese with 
 
3 Qingshilu 清实录 [The Veritable Records of the Qing Dynasty]. vol. 5 (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 
1985), p. 155. 
4 "Guanyu Minzu Wenti De Jueyi 关于民族问题的决议 [Resolution on the Nationality Problem]," in Zhonggong 
Zhongyang Wenjian Xuanji: 1928 中共中央文件选集: 1928 [The Selected Documents of the CCP Central 
Committee: 1928], ed. The Central Archive (Beijing: The CCP Central Party School Press, 1991), p. 388. 
5 "Zhonghua Suweiai Gongheguo Xianfa Dagang 中华苏维埃共和国宪法大纲  [The Outline of the Constitution 
of the Chinese Soviet Republic]," in Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenjian Xuanji: 1931 中共中央文件选集: 1931 
[The Selected Documents of the CCP Central Committee: 1931], ed. The Central Archive (Beijing: The CCP 
Central Party School Press, 1991), p. 772. 
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Mongolians and Tibetans, whom the CCP claimed to unite with the future Chinese Federal 
Republic. Grouping Taiwanese in this manner suggested that the future arrangement of 
Taiwanese would be different from Mongolians and Tibetans in the eyes of the CCP. 
It is important to point out that although Taiwan fell into the category of minority nationality 
policy, the CCP had not yet specified its Taiwan policy in this period. Fighting for the liberation 
of weak nationalities inside and outside China was one of founding goals of the CCP but not 
every nationality seemed to carry the same weight to the CCP. While Mongolians, Tibetans, 
and Koreans were three nationalities frequently mentioned in all documents related to minority 
nationality work, references to Taiwanese people were missing from the documents most of 
the time, implying the Taiwan issue was marginalized in the CCP’s policy priorities. 
It was Japan’s military action against China from 1931 that drove the CCP’s Taiwan policy 
into its second phase: supporting Taiwanese independence. In order to counter the Japanese 
invasion of China, the CCP built three united fronts against Japan: an alliance with the 
Kuomintang (KMT), an alliance with foreign countries, and an alliance with people inside 
Japan and people colonized by Japan. Taiwanese emerged on the CCP’s radar in the third united 
fronts as they, like Koreans, were under the colonial rule of Japan. Consequently, the policy of 
supporting Taiwanese independence was formulated. The most frequently cited evidence of 
this support of the CCP is the conversation between Mao Zedong and Edgar Snow in July 1936. 
Referring to the case of Korea, Mao’s position on Taiwan was unambiguous: 
It is the immediate task of China to regain all lost territories, not merely to defend our 
sovereignty south of the Great Wall. This means that Manchuria must be regained. We 
do not, however, include Korea, formerly a Chinese colony, but when we have re-
established the independence of the lost territories of China, and if the Koreans wish to 
break away from the chains of Japanese imperialism, we will extend them our 
enthusiastic help in their struggle for independence. The same thing applies for Taiwan.6 
Mao’s support for Taiwanese independence cannot be argued as having been a careless mistake. 
This is firstly because Mao’s position on Taiwan was congruent with multiple CCP official 
documents that were issued later. For instance, without any revision, the CCP emphasized the 
importance of Mao’s conversation with Snow twice at the Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth 
 
6 Edgar Snow, Red Star over China  (London: Victor Gollancz LTD, 1973), p. 110. 
57 
 
Central Committee in 1938.7  Second, Mao was not the only CCP leader who supported 
Taiwanese independence at the time. Zhou Enlai, for instance, shared the same view as Mao. 
He extended his support to the Taiwanese who were fighting against Japanese rule in his 
“Nationality Supremacy and State Supremacy” of 1941: 
Since we opposed aggression from the other nations, we should sympathize with 
independence-liberation movements of other nation-states. We will not only assist the 
anti-Japanese movements of Korea or Taiwan, or anti-German, anti-Italian aggression 
movements of the Balkan and African nations, but also sympathize with the national 
liberation movements of India and various South Asian countries.8 
The importance of Taiwan grew significantly in the CCP’s policy priorities in this period. To 
the CCP, Taiwan had become a matter of concern equal to Korea and Vietnam after the 
establishment of an alliance with people under Japanese colonial rule. This change was 
reflected in the fact that whenever the CCP mentioned the mission of building an anti-Japanese 
alliance with weak nationalities outside China in relevant policy papers, Taiwanese were 
named together with Koreans and Vietnamese, which was a sharp contrast to ten years earlier.9 
This policy on Taiwan also explains why the CCP used the phrase “current China’s 
borders…neighbor Taiwan” in 1939, the first time the term Taiwan appeared in the CCP’s 
policy discourse on China’s borders.10 
1942 was the year that the CCP’s policy toward Taiwan entered into the Taiwan-incorporating 
phase. In 1942, the CCP suddenly switched its position on Taiwan from “Taiwan should be 
independent” to “Taiwan should be a part of China.” Evidence for this changed position can 
be seen in a column in Xinhua Daily in March 1942.11 Instead of using the long-embraced 
“Taiwan Independence Movement” title, the column used “Taiwan Restoration Movement,” 
 
7 "Lun Xin Jieduan 论新阶段 [On the New Stage]," in Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenjian Xuanji: 1936-38 中共中
央文件选集: 1936-38 [The Selected Documents of the CCP Central Committee: 1936-38], ed. The Central 
Archive (Beijing: The CCP Central Party School Press, 1991), pp. 565-6 & 69. 
8 Frank S. T. Hsiao and Lawrence R. Sullivan, "The Chinese Commnist Party and the Status of Taiwan, 1928-
1943," Pacific Affairs 52, no. 3 (1979): p. 453. 
9 "Zhonggong Kuodade Liuzhong Quanhui Zhengzhi Jueyian 中共扩大的六中全会政治决议案 [The Political 
Resolution of the Enlarged Sixth Plenary Session of the CCP]," in Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenjian Xuanji: 1938 
中共中央文件选集: 1938 [The Selected Documents of the CCP Central Committee: 1938], ed. The Central 
Archive (Beijing: The CCP Central Party School Press, 1991), p. 752. 
10 Liu Xiaoyuan, "Zhongguo Gongchandang Guojia Jiangyuguan De Yuanyuan Yu Fazhan, 1921-1949 中国共
产党国家疆域观的渊源与发展, 1921-1949 [The Source and Development of the CCP's National Territorial 
Perspective, 1921-1949]," p. 24. 
11 A Partnership for Disorder: China, the United States, and Their Policies for the Postwar Disposition of the 
Japanese Empire, 1941-1945  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 163. 
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implying that the CCP had abandoned its minority nationality view of Taiwan and wished to 
bring Taiwan into its vision of future China. 
Alan Wachman and Liu Xiaoyuan both argued that such a policy volte face resulted from the 
CCP’s power struggle against the KMT for control over China.12 During the Anti-Japanese 
War, the most powerful Taiwanese organization against Japan in Taiwan was the Taiwan 
Revolutionary Alliance, which was established in 1941 under the leadership of Xie Nanguang, 
Zhang Bangjie, and Li Youbang. Given that the ROC did not regard Taiwan as belonging to 
China at the time, one key objective of the alliance was to make the ROC government ruled by 
the KMT recognize that Taiwan was a part of China and would become a part of China after 
the defeat of Japan. Accordingly, the strategy of the CCP was to weaken the supporting base 
of the KMT in Taiwan by accepting the wish of the majority of Taiwanese before the KMT did 
so. 
After 1943, the CCP’s view of Taiwan had substantively departed from minority nationality 
and started to overlap with that of the KMT. The first time the KMT clearly outlined its vision 
of China’s future territorial makeup was in Chiang Kai-shek’s China’s Destiny of 1943, in 
which Chiang ultimately listed Taiwan as one of the key fortresses guarding the defense of 
China.13 While the CCP harshly criticized Chiang’s Han-centered chauvinism of the book by 
pointing out Mongolians, Tibetans, Miao, Yao, and Yi should not have been grouped into what 
Chiang called the Chinese nation (Zhonghua Minzhu 中华民族), it did not include Taiwanese 
in the criticism.14 In other words, bringing the island into China’s territory was something the 
two parties both agreed on. From then, the term Taiwanese gradually disappeared from the list 
of weak nations outside China that the CCP claimed to fight for.15 
It is important to note, however, that although the CCP agreed that Taiwan should be a part of 
China after 1943, this did not mean that the CCP perceived Taiwan as possessing important 
 
12 Alan M. Wachman, Why Taiwan? Geostrategic Rationales for China's Territorial Integrity, pp. 96-8; Liu 
Xiaoyuan, A Partnership for Disorder: China, the United States, and Their Policies for the Postwar Disposition 
of the Japanese Empire, 1941-1945, pp. 155-63. 
13 Chiang Kai-shek, Zhongguo Zhi Mingyun 中國之命運 [China's Destiny]  (Liming Wenhua: Taipei, 1976), pp. 
1-10. 
14 "Ping Zhongguo Zhi Mingyun 评中国之命运 [on China's Destiny]," in Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenjian Xuanji: 
1943 中共中央文件选集: 1943 [The Selected Documents on the CCP Central Committee: 1943], ed. The Central 
Archive (Beijing: The CCP Central Party School Press, 1991), pp. 506-10. 
15 "Zhonggong Zhongyang Jinian Kangzhan Bazhounian Kouhao 中共中央纪念抗战八周年口号 [The CCP 
Central Committee's Slogan for the Eighth Anniversary of the Anti-Japanese War]," in Zhonggong Zhongyang 
Wenjian Xuanji: 1945 中共中央文件选集: 1945 [The Selected Documents on the CCP Central Committee: 1945], 
ed. The Central Archive (Beijing: The CCP Central Party School Press, 1991), p. 177. 
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geopolitical value to China as it did to the KMT. The value of this island to the CCP was more 
related to its role in the CCP’s political struggle against the KMT. It was only after the US 
became involved in the Chinese Civil War (1927–49) following the surrender of Japan that the 
geopolitical value of Taiwan to the security of the Chinese mainland gradually emerged in the 
minds of the CCP leaders. 
 
4.2 The Formation of China’s Buffer Thinking toward Taiwan 
 
Ideologically, the US was the CCP’s natural enemy because the CCP claimed from the outset 
to oppose capitalism and overthrow the oppression which international imperialism imposed 
on the Chinese people. However, the flexibility and practicality of the CCP during the Chinese 
Civil War and the Anti-Japanese War deferred the establishment of a rivalrous relationship 
between the two. Instead, the CCP had tried many ways to gain friendship from the US during 
this period. As a result, the CCP’s perception that the US was a hostile rival threatening its 
survival was established as late as June 1946, and China/the CCP’s buffer thinking toward 
Taiwan gradually took shape amidst this rivalrous relationship. 
The CCP had noticed the potential role the US could play in its power struggle against the 
KMT as early as 1935. The conventional wisdom about the timing with which the US became 
substantively involved in China’s domestic politics is that it dates from the Japanese attack on 
Pearl Harbor in 1941. However, soon after Mao gained power within the CCP following the 
Zunyi Conference in 1935, he tried to convey to US President Franklin Roosevelt via Snow a 
message that the CCP hoped to build a working relationship with the US.16 Considering the US 
was the most powerful state in the world at the time, the CCP leaders clearly understood how 
critical it would be to have the US as a friend in their fight against the KMT after World War 
II (1939–45). A hostile US would greatly threaten the survival of the CCP in the post-war 
period, as Mao’s statement in 1940 noted: 
 
16 Edgar Snow, Red Star over China, p. 94. 
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The most difficult, dangerous, and dark possibility of Chinese politics is that, after 
defeating Japan, the US financially and militarily arms the pro-US and Britain people 
in China and turns China from a Japanese colony into a US colony.17 
Accordingly, rather than following its ideology faithfully, the CCP tailored its US policy under 
an international united front in order not to destroy the possibility of CCP-US cooperation. To 
this end, the CCP had to conduct its relations with the US at the expense of its ideological 
purity. This delicate policy maneuver can be seen in the CCP’s “On Policy” of 1940: 
Although the CCP is against any imperialism, it has to distinguish the Japanese 
imperialism, which is encroaching upon China, from other imperialism, which are not 
encroaching upon China…[It] has to distinguish the US and Britain of the past, which 
jeopardized China’s war against Japan, from the US and Britain now, which have 
given up that policy and are aiding China’s war against Japan.18  
Many examples showed the CCP put a lot of effort into establishing contact with the US in this 
period. For example, the CCP attempted to make direct official contact with the US to 
circumvent the constraint the KMT put on the CCP. Zhou, as the CCP’s representative in the 
ROC government in Chongqing, repeatedly invited American Foreign Service officers to send 
a small group of American officers to build airfields for the war against Japan in areas 
controlled by the CCP.19 Also, the CCP Southern Bureau suggested the CCP Central to occupy 
areas where the US might land after Japan’s surrender so as to increase the possibility of US-
CCP cooperation in the post-war period.20 Nothing could better characterize this effort of the 
CCP than Mao’s conversation with John Service in 1945: 
Communist policy toward the United States is, and will remain, to seek friendly 
American support of democracy in China and cooperation in fighting Japan. But 
regardless of American action, whether or not they receive a single gun or bullet, the 
 
17 Niu Jun, "Hezuo Zhongli Duikang: 1944-1946 Nian Zhonggong Dui Mei Zhengce Zai Tantao 合作中立对抗: 
1944-1946年中共对美政策再探讨 [Cooperation-"Neutralizing"-Confrontation: A Reexamination of CCP's US 
Policy from 1944-1946]," Sichuan Daxue Xuebao 四川大学学报 [Journal of Sichuan University] 1(2016): p. 6. 
18 "Lun Zhengce 论政策 [On Policy]," in Mao Zedong Xuanji 毛泽东选集 [The Selected Works of Mao Zedong], 
ed. Mao Zedong (Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1991), p. 764. 
19 "Memorandum of Conversation, by the Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Davies)," in Foreign Relations 
of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, China, ed. Daniel J. Lawler and Erin R. Mahan (Washington, D.C.: 
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Communists will continue to offer and practice cooperation in any manner possible to 
them. Anything they can do—such as intelligence, weather reporting and rescue of 
airman—the Communists consider an obligation and duty because it helps the Allied 
war effort and brings closer the defeat of Japan.21  
The watershed of the CCP’s changed perception of the US from a potential ally to a potential 
enemy was 1945. In April 1945, the CCP’s US policy suffered a major setback. While the CCP 
hoped that Patrick Hurley, who managed the negotiation between the KMT and the CCP in the 
post-war period as Roosevelt’s special envoy, would recognize its power and status in China, 
Hurley made it very clear at a press conference in 1945 that the ROC government under the 
leadership of Chiang would be the only party that the US would work with diplomatically and 
militarily. 22  Evidently, Hurley’s statement was widely interpreted by the CCP as a sign 
showing US hostility toward Chinese communists was growing as assessments that the US 
might be a threat to the CCP in the future started to appear. In August1945, CCP Central alerted 
party members to the possibility of a China version of “the Scobie danger,” in which the 
Chinese communists might be killed and disarmed by the ROC government forces backed by 
Britain and the US in the post-war period.23 
Driven by the worry that the US would side with the KMT in the post-war period, the CCP 
pushed a more nuanced united work toward the US in the following years. For example, the 
CCP carefully distinguished the American targets of its propaganda machine, separating 
ordinary Americans citizens from American policymakers, and pro-CCP American 
policymakers from anti-CCP American policymakers. In the meantime, CCP Central also 
reminded its forces to avoid military conflicts with the US forces receiving Japan-occupied 
territories in China at that time as much as possible so as not to further ignite the CCP-US 
conflict.24 
 
21 "Report by the Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Service)," in Foreign Relations of the United States: 
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22 "Transcript of Press and Radio News Conference by the Ambassador in China (Hurley)," in Foreign Relations 
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(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2010), Vol. Vll, Document 226. 
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Zhongyang Wenjian Xuanji: 1945 中共中央文件选集: 1945 [The Selected Documents of the CCP Central 
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In theoretical terms, a rivalrous relationship between the CCP and the US became established 
in June 1946. As indicated in Chapter Three, the moment that A starts to recognize the 
possibility of B’s military invasion is the moment that a rivalrous relationship between the two 
sides is established. In hindsight, June 1946 was the time that the CCP formally identified the 
US as a rival threatening its own survival. After US forces landed in China, military conflicts 
of various scale between CCP and US-KMT forces occurred throughout the Chinese mainland. 
The conflicts were taken by the CCP as evidence that its previous assessment of US intentions 
was correct. On June 1 1946, the CCP predicted in a cable sent to its field officers that a 
nationwide civil war against the KMT supported by the US was unavoidable.25 Two weeks 
later, the CCP started to prepare its military deployments for the resumption of the Chinese 
Civil War.26 
The buffer state status of Taiwan in this US-CCP rivalry gradually took shape in the minds of 
CCP leaders in the years following 1946. As discussed in the last section, the CCP did not 
initially perceive the geopolitical value of Taiwan. However, the increase in US military 
activities in Taiwan after the outbreak of the second stage of the Chinese Civil War made the 
CCP acknowledge that the island posed a potential military threat to the security of the Chinese 
mainland. Indeed, the US not only sent the American Liaison Group to train the ROC’s 204th 
and 205th Divisions in Taiwan but also started to build a series of military bases in Taiwan.27 
Kiyoshi Hasegawa, the former Taiwanese Governor-General, was sent to Taiwan by the US to 
oversee the construction and training there. In the eyes of CCP leaders, Taiwan became an 
important logistical base where the US was supporting the KMT’s fight against the CCP on the 
Chinese mainland. As a result, the geopolitical value of Taiwan became another reason that for 
the CCP to incorporate this island into China’s territory in future. An editorial published in 
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People’s Daily on March 15 1949 marked the debut of China/the CCP’s buffer thinking toward 
Taiwan: 
The colonial rule of US imperialism over China, which was through its lackey, KMT 
reactionaries, is about to vanish. The US is therefore eager to directly take a territory 
from China, Taiwan, as its future military springboard to invade the Chinese 
mainland…The US is trying to occupy Taiwan as the Japanese Empire did in 1895.28 
Taiwan has therefore had the status of buffer state between China/the CCP and the US since 
March 1949. Due to the CCP-US rivalry, the nature of the CCP’s view of Taiwan was 
transformed from non-geopolitical to geopolitical. Annexing Taiwan as part of China’s future 
territory was not only about weakening the KMT’s support base in Taiwan, but also about the 
geopolitical security of the Chinese mainland, which the CCP would later control. Annexing 
Taiwan would ensure that foreign threats were kept away from China’s southeast coastal areas, 
which might otherwise be used by a foreign enemy against China, as had been the case in 
Japan’s use of the island in the past. The following three sections will examine the explanatory 
power of China’s buffer thinking toward Taiwan in three military conflicts between China and 
Taiwan.  
 
4.3 Buffer Thinking in Action 
 
Since the ROC government retreated to Taiwan in 1949, the military conflicts between China 
and Taiwan over the islands off the southeast coast of the Chinese mainland have never ceased. 
Those conflicts were much smaller in scale and had nothing to do with China’s plan to take 
Taiwan or Taiwan’s plan of fighting its way back to the Chinese mainland. However, in July 
1954 China launched a massive military action against the islands controlled by Taiwan off 
Zhejiang and Fujian, known as the First Taiwan Strait Crisis.  
Scholars are still debating China’s rationale behind this military action for two important 
reasons. First, China should not have launched this military action in 1954. China originally 
 
28 "Zhongguo Renmin Yidingyao Jiefang Taiwan 中国人民一定要解放台湾 [Chinese People Must Liberate 
Taiwan]," People's Daily, March 15 1949. 
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planned to take Taiwan in the winter of 1949. 29 However, due to the lack of air force, navy, 
and experience and training in amphibious warfare, China decided to seek help from the Soviet 
Union and hence postponed the plan to 1950.30 After the outbreak of the Korean War (1950–
53), the plan was postponed again. When the Korean War ended in 1953, China still faced the 
same constraints in materializing the plan. This was one important reason why the general 
course of China’s policy toward the world after the war was to avoid engaging in another war 
with another state, especially the US. Mao, for example, praised Su Yu’s careful handling of 
the situation when the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) spotted US warships unexpectedly 
appearing on the waters of the Zhoushan Islands in June 1954.31 In other words, China had not 
fully finished its preparations for seizing Taiwan at the time. 
Second, China’s course of action during this crisis did not faithfully follow the military plan it 
had previously set for taking Taiwan. Zhang Zhen, the Head of the Combat Operation 
Command in the PLA General Staff Department, was the key person who designed China’s 
plan for seizure of Taiwan. According to his plan, China should take the small islands off the 
Chinese coast held by Taiwan one at a time, from the north to the south, from the weak to the 
strong, and finally Taiwan Island.32 In other words, the plan consisted of three sequential 
phases: taking the islands off Zhejiang, taking the islands off Fujian, and taking Taiwan Island 
(Please see Figure 4). Under this plan, Zhejiang's Yijiangshan Islands, which were located at a 
critical strategic spot in the Dachen Islands, would be taken in the first phase, while Fujian’s 
Jinmen and Mazu Islands would be taken in the second phase. Nevertheless, China attacked 
those islands simultaneously in the First Taiwan Strait Crisis. 
 
Figure 4: Zhang Zhen’s Plan for Taking Taiwan 
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The argument put forward in this section is that China’s buffer thinking toward Taiwan, spurred 
by the US-Taiwan mutual defense treaty, was the main cause of this unexpected military action 
by China. Since 1953, Taiwan had been promoting a US-Taiwan mutual defense treaty to the 
US and hoped to put Taiwan and the offshore islands held by Taiwan under US military 
protection.33 The US originally regarded this security treaty as unnecessary and risky, but it 
began to change its position as early as 1954. This changed position was the very cause of 
Chinese leaders’ decision to take Taiwan earlier than previously scheduled. More specifically, 
Chinese leaders calculated that if China chose not to expel US forces from Taiwan at this 
moment, Taiwan would become a potential “disease of the heart” to the security of the Chinese 
mainland in the longer term. On the other hand, if they initiated the plan to take Taiwan, they 
might at best be able to deter the US from signing that treaty, or at least secure China’s coastal 
areas by taking a few more islands held by Taiwan. The editorials in People’s Daily during the 
crisis clearly reveal this geopolitical mentality: 
 
33 The official name of the treaty is the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the 
Republic of China. 
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For years, [the US] has been actively supporting the Chiang Kai-shek group, using 
Taiwan as a colony and military base of US imperialism, attempting to use Chiang in 
Taiwan as a tool for invading the PRC…When US warmonger James Van Fleet was 
conducting his evil scheme in Taiwan, he once claimed that the US and Chiang are 
going to sign so-called “a bilateral mutual security agreement.” Now, Chiang and US 
Ambassador to Taiwan Karl L. Rankin have both confirmed this risky plan, which 
would make the US an enemy of the entire Chinese people…This plan reflects that, 
driven by the current situation, Washington’s policy is not limited to defending 
Taiwan.34 
Taiwan is the first line of China’s national defense and is a strategic island shielding 
China’s southeast coast. It is inseparable to China’s security. Now, the US is turning 
China’s first line of defense into its first line of invasion. It proves that US occupation 
of Taiwan is not for the security of the US but threatening China’s security and 
preparing for an invasion of China.35 
This buffer thinking toward Taiwan held by Chinese leaders was not just propaganda as it 
appeared in many conversations between Chinese and foreign leaders during the crisis, in 
which Chinese leaders tried to explain the geopolitical rationale of Chin behind this military 
action. For example, Zhou reported the impending military action against Taiwan to a Soviet 
leader Georgy Malenkov on July 29 and said: 
Chiang Kai-Shek and the US government are planning to sign a mutual defense treaty, 
but the Americans have not made up their mind yet…Based on these facts, the CCP 
Central has decided to place the issue of liberating Taiwan back on agenda, and take 
powerful measures to sabotage the plot of signing the treaty between the US 
government and Chiang Kai-Shek group of signing a treaty.36 
Mao’s conversation with Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in October 1954 showed the 
same logic:  
 
34 "Yidingyao Jiefang Taiwan 一定要解放台湾 [Taiwan Must Be Liberated]," People's Daily, July 23 1954. 
35 Chiang Yuanzhuang, "Taiwan Shi Zhongguo Anquan Suo Buke Queshaode 臺灣是中國安全所不可缺少的 
[Taiwan Is Inseparable to the Security of China]," ibid., February 2 1955. 
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来会谈纪要: 重新将解放台湾提上议程 [Summary of the Meeting Record between Malenkov and Zhou Enlai: 
Putting the Liberation of Taiwan Back on the Schedule]," in Zhongsu Guanxi: Eguo Danganguan Jiemi Wenjian 
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We have more than thirty islands, which are just a few kilometers away from the 
Chinese mainland. Three of them are big islands. Those islands are occupied by the 
US and Chiang so our ships cannot pass and neither can foreign ships. The American 
aircraft fly into our inland airspace and drop special agents…The US deployed 
defense lines to South Korea, Taiwan, and Indo-China. Those places are far away 
from the US but very close to us. That makes it very hard for us to sleep tight.37 
Why, then, did China attack the Jinmen Islands? Instead of following Zhang’s original plan, 
China attacked small islands off Zhejiang and Fujian at the same time, which made the Jinmen 
Islands suffer unexpected bombardment on September 3 1954. The traditional explanation of 
this bombardment is that China’s military action against the Jinmen Islands was just a political 
strategy—China neither intended nor was it capable of taking over the islands.38 China’s true 
intentions were twofold: to hide its true military targets (the small islands off Zhejiang) and to 
remind the international community that the Taiwan issue was unsettled.  
This traditional explanation, however, raises more questions than it answers. First of all, it was 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, for China to hide its real intentions of taking the islands 
off Zhejiang simply by bombarding the Jinmen Islands. Taiwan’s intelligence reconnaissance 
plus the US’ air and sea supremacy together would mean that any Chinese military movement 
would be easily discovered. Second, making the Taiwan issue an international matter was 
exactly what China had opposed. China had long held a stance that the Taiwan issue was a 
domestic matter and it refused to allow foreign involvement. Shelling the islands would attract 
more international attention than otherwise. Third, was it worthwhile for China to conduct such 
a costly feint, which included mobilizing forces, expending munitions, and in particular the 
human cost of casualties caused by Taiwanese counterattack from the Jinmen Islands? Would 
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it not have been much easier for China to concentrate on seizing the islands off Zhejiang since 
those islands were not yet under US military protection? 
This section argues that China’s buffer thinking toward Taiwan not only changed the timing of 
China’s initiation of its military plan of taking Taiwan, but also altered the order of the plan. 
Understanding how Zhang perceived the security relations between the small islands off the 
Chinese coast and Taiwan is the key to explaining China’s puzzling military action against the 
Jinmen Islands. For Zhang, the small islands off the Chinese coast, including the Shengshi 
Islands, the Zhoushan Islands, the Taizhou Islands,39 the Dongtou Islands, the Mazu Islands, 
the Jinmen Islands, and the Dongshan Islands, formed an island chain which constituted 
Taiwan’s defense perimeter.40 Destroying this arc was a necessary step in order to take Taiwan. 
In addition, in 1951, Zhang had assessed that the Jinmen and Mazu Islands would be the places 
most likely to become the forward bases of a US-Taiwan invasion of China.41 Therefore, 
considering that taking the Jinmen Islands was already a part of Zhang’s plan and that Taiwan 
and the US were about to finalize the treaty, China decided to integrate the two phases of attack 
into one. By inflicting military pressure on the Jinmen islands, China aimed at compelling 
Taiwanese forces on the islands to retreat, or at least preventing the US from including the 
islands in the security treaty. 
The argument offered in this section is supported by China’s following course of behavior 
toward the Jinmen and Mazu Islands during the crisis. The timing of China’s military action 
against the islands off the Chinese coast was closely related to the concluding process of the 
US-Taiwan security treaty, which was finalized in December 1954 and came into force in 
March 1955. Peng Dehuai ordered the PLA to take over the Yijiangshang Islands, the Nanji 
Islands, and the Beiji Islands as soon as possible at a Central Military Commission (CMC) 
meeting on November 29 1954, based on the prediction that Taiwan and the US were about to 
conclude the treaty.42 In mid-December, the CMC further altered the mission of the PLA from 
seizing the Yijiangshan Islands to taking any islands with weaker defenses.43 When the PLA 
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occupied the Dachen Islands on February 13, Su submitted a report on taking the Jinmen 
Islands to the CMC after three weeks, in which he predicted that the Taiwanese forces on the 
Jinmen Islands might retreat if China attacked the Mazu Islands.44 Based on this prediction, 
Mao instructed Peng on March 14 that the PLA should let the enemy on the Mazu Islands or 
other islands retreat if that happened.45 
 
4.4 The Unfinished Business: Jinmen in 1958 
 
China ceased its military action against the Jinmen Islands in April 1955 after the US threatened 
to use nuclear weapons. Puzzlingly, China initiated another round of military action on the 
Jinmen and Mazu Islands in 1958, which scholars call the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. 
Regarding China’s rationale for taking military action this time, the current scholarship has 
offered a wide range of explanations. From the perspective of China’s buffer thinking toward 
Taiwan, however, this military action was a continuation of the 1954 episode. 
After the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, a prevalent assessment among Chinese leaders was that the 
probability of the US using Taiwan as a route to invade China was very high. Strictly speaking, 
the US-Taiwan mutual defense treaty was a defense-oriented treaty per se because it would 
only be triggered when the two signatories were under attack. Also, the treaty not only adhered 
to the Charter of the United Nations (UN) and but also stipulated that any response to an armed 
attack should be reported to the UN Security Council and be terminated after the Council’s 
response. However, Chinese leaders’ geopolitical anxiety over Taiwan was not pacified by 
those factors. Evidently, a scenario in which the US supported the ROC in order to use Taiwan 
as a base to fight back to the Chinese mainland still loomed large in the minds of Chinese 
leaders after 1955. Liu Shaoqi, for example, expressed his anxiety over Taiwan at the Eighth 
National Congress of the CCP in September 1956: 
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Publishing House, 1998), p. 592. 
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Our territory, Taiwan, is still occupied by American imperialists. This is the biggest 
threat to our national security.46 
At the same conference, Chen Yi spoke about China’s foreign policy: 
Since after the PRC was established, the US has been threatening and invading China 
from these three fronts: Korea, Indochina, and Taiwan. The US is still occupying our 
territory, Taiwan, and intervening in our liberation of the offshore islands.47 
Peng stated at a military conference on PLA logistics issues on January 20 1958:  
Taiwan is still waiting for liberation…But modernized, fully-armed imperialist troops 
are standing at the door of our country. The danger of our country being invaded is 
still very high.48 
Driven by this geopolitical anxiety, China ceaselessly worked on its plans of taking Taiwan 
after the cease-fire in 1955. To iterate, China’s plan of taking Taiwan consisted of three phases: 
taking the islands off Zhejiang, taking the islands off Fujian, and then taking Taiwan Island. 
China completed the first phase during the military action of 1954–55, so the Jinmen and Mazu 
Islands located near Fujian were naturally the next targets in this sequence. The following 
evidence showed that China orderly addressed three key issues regarding how to successfully 
take the two islands: logistics during wartime, air control, and sea blockade.  
For China, building a railway was the most effective way to solve the logistics problem for the 
planned military action against the Jinmen and Mazu Islands. Peng visited Xiamen in 
September 1955 to study how to take those islands, and subsequently decided to construct the 
Yingtan-Xiamen Railway connecting Fujian and Jiangxi.49 Seven divisions of railway forces 
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and a hundred thousand workers were mobilized to construct this 700km railway, which was 
completed in 1957.50 This railway enabled China to ship military equipment and weapons to 
the Xiamen frontline for the coming military action.  
As for control over the air, the most urgent task was to enable Chinese air forces to operate in 
the airspace over Fujian. From 1955–57, China built seven airfields in total in Fujian.51 Soon 
after those airfields were completed, Mao ordered Peng to deploy air forces to Fujian in 
December 1957.52 The first wave of the PLA Air Force was deployed in July the following 
year, which then engaged with Taiwan’s fighters over the airspace of Fujian. 
China’s navy and artillery were assigned the mission of blockading the waters around the 
Jinmen and Mazu Islands. While China’s fighters were trying to gain control over the Fujian 
airspace in July 1958, the navy and artillery forces steadily assembled to Xiamen in the 
meantime. They were in position and ready to fight in August. The day after China controlled 
the airspace over Fujian, the artillery shelled the Jinmen Islands.53 
The meticulous and incessant military preparations of China presented above suggest that the 
temporary peace over the Taiwan Strait from 1955 to 1958 was just an interlude in China’s 
attempt to secure the Taiwan buffer after the ceasefire of 1955. Instead of viewing this military 
action of China as a single and independent episode, as is usually argued (please see below), 
this military action should be viewed as a part of China’s continued efforts after 1949 to block 
a potential US invasion route and enhance coastal security. This buffer thinking of China can 
be seen in how Chen responded to John Dulles in September 1958 at the UN: 
The truth proves that if [we] do not recover the Jinmen and Mazu islands one day, the 
direct threat that our mainland and coastal areas suffered cannot be defused one 
day…[US imperialists] attempts to put our islands in the inland sea, such as the Jinmen 
and Mazu Islands, under its direct military control and then turn the islands into 
springboards for invading the Chinese mainland. Chinese people will never forget the 
historical lesson that the Japanese militarism occupied Taiwan and the northeast and 
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used them as springboards to invade the whole of China. Chinese people will never 
allow US imperialism to copy the same trick of Japanese militarism.54 
Regarding the motivation behind this military action, scholars have offered various arguments, 
including: testing US resolve to protect those islands, testing the Soviet Union’s support of 
China, utilizing this crisis to mobilize Chinese people to support the Great Leap Forward, 
lending China’s support to the revolution in the Middle East against the US, and defusing the 
increasing US-Taiwan military threat to China. 55  These arguments, however, are either 
incorrect or only partially correct from hindsight. 
Firstly, the argument of testing US resolve is partially correct. China did try to ascertain the 
determination and range of US military protection of the offshore islands held by Taiwan, but 
this did not mean that China never intended to seize those islands to defuse its geopolitical 
anxiety over Taiwan. There is plenty of evidence in this regard. For example, on the question 
of whether China should land on the islands, Mao indicated that it depends on the response of 
Taiwan after three days of the bombardment.56 Also, in Zhou’s report to the Soviet Union 
briefing China’s true purpose behind this action in September 1958, he made it clear “China 
plans to increase the firepower against the Jinmen and Mazu Islands to strengthen China’s 
request to the US that the US needs to withdraw from the Taiwan region.”57 Therefore, taking 
the two islands to inflict military pressure was certainly a part of China’s intentions. 
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Secondly, the argument that China was testing Soviet support is less likely. The conversation 
between Nikita Khrushchev and Mao in October 1959 suggested that Khrushchev was quite 
angry about China’s reckless military action because Chinese leaders did not inform him in 
advance.58 So, if Chinese leaders had wanted to test the support of the Soviet Union, why did 
they not ask for any assistance from the Soviet Union before taking any action, as they did 
before sending troops to North Korea? In addition, one day before making the final call on the 
Jinmen bombardment, Chinese leaders were still struggling to find a way to avoid American 
casualties in the military action.59 If Chinese leaders had attempted to gauge the support of the 
Soviet Union, was not it a good way to engage in a military conflict with the US to an extent? 
Thirdly, the way Chinese leaders handled this military action was at odds with the mobilizing 
argument proposed by Thomas Christensen and Yang Kuisong. The goal of the Great Leap 
Forward was to realize China’s industrial and military modernization. From Christensen and 
Yang’s perspective, a timely international crisis would provide Chinese leaders with a decent 
excuse to mobilize Chinese people to support the campaign. However, the conversation Zhou 
had with Soviet officials in September disproves this line of reasoning. Zhou reported that 
China would only agree to cease the shelling if the US could promise to withdraw from Taiwan 
and Taiwanese forces would withdraw from the Jinmen and Mazu Islands.60 If then the success 
of the campaign rested on an international crisis, why were Chinese leaders eager to take out 
the sufficient condition of the success? The best evidence that Chinese leaders saw the shelling 
and the campaign as two independent events was Mao’s speech at the Supreme State 
Conference in September, in which he stated: 
It will be in the US’ interests to get rid of places like Taiwan as early as possible. If it 
stays, then let’s let it be trapped there. This really doesn’t harm the big picture. We are 
still doing the Great Leap Forward.61 
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Fourthly, the years-long military preparations of China presented earlier are the best counter-
evidence to the argument that this military action was intended to lend support to the Iraqi coup 
d'état taking place on July 14 1958. In fact, Mao could have bombarded the islands right after 
the outbreak of the revolution to demonstrate his timely support, but he chose to postpone the 
timing of bombardment to observe US reaction to the coup.62 Thus, rather than showing its 
support, China exploited this coup that tied up US forces in the Middle East. 
Finally, the argument that the US-Taiwan military threat caused China’s military reaction is 
partially correct. This military action was the product of China’s buffer thinking toward Taiwan, 
which was aimed at blocking a possible invasion route for US forces. This means that Chinese 
leaders cared more about the US’ intentions and behavior toward Taiwan and the islands 
associated with it, and less about what Taiwan was going to do. In the eyes of Chinese leaders, 
Taiwanese forces alone would not pose too much damage to the security of the Chinese 
mainland. In other words, as long as Chinese leaders could ascertain that the US would not 
support Taiwan’s plan of fighting back to the Chinese mainland via the two islands, their 
geopolitical anxiety over Taiwan would be significantly mollified. Indeed, China’s course of 
behavior in this crisis confirms this line of reasoning. China’s bombardment of the Jinmen and 
Mazu Islands quickly switched to a much more periodical and political-oriented mode in 
October, after Chinese leaders became certain of the US’ position toward the islands in 
September. On September 4, Dulles made a public statement at Newport that the US was bound 
by the treaty to secure and protect the islands. In the meantime, the US also promised China on 
September 19 that the US would abandon taking military actions from the islands and would 
monitor those islands not to take any offensive, provocative actions toward the Chinese 
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mainland or other island areas.63 This reassurance seemed to have a causal connection with 
Mao’s decision at the Politburo meetings of October 3 and 4 not to take the two islands.64 
 
4.5 Buffer Thinking Revisited: The Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier 
 
China’s geopolitical anxiety over Taiwan was greatly pacified during the Sino-American 
rapprochement in the 1970s. Aimed at reconciling its relations with China, the US shifted its 
diplomatic recognition of the legitimate representative of China from the ROC to the PRC, 
terminated the US-Taiwan mutual defense treaty, and withdrew its forces from Taiwan. In the 
meantime, US Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act to maintain unofficial relations with 
Taiwan and provide it with an ambiguous security guarantee. Against this background, China 
initiated a peaceful offensive toward Taiwan in the 1980s under the formula of “one country, 
two systems.” This peaceful offensive, however, was brought to an end by a series of Chinese 
military actions toward Taiwan from 1995 to 1996, which some scholars called the Third 
Taiwan Strait Crisis.65 
In the current scholarship, the most prevalent argument as to why China initiated this crisis is 
that, angered by Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui’s pursuit of the Taiwan independence 
activities, China conducted coercive or what Todd Hall called anger diplomacy.66 Through a 
show of force around Taiwan, China aimed to:  
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1. Create a sense of fear in the Taiwanese electorate that a war between China and 
Taiwan was ensured if they voted for Lee, who was conducting activities that 
symbolized Taiwanese independence, or Peng Ming-min, who was promoting the 
idea that Taiwan does not belong to China. 
2. Warn the US not to encourage Taiwanese independence. 
However, this argument is dubious if one examines Lee’s words and deeds at the time. In fact, 
Lee’s political activities in the international arena could not have been a surprise to China. Lee 
had been pursuing so-called pragmatic diplomacy to expand Taiwan’s international space from 
1988. The Taiwanese government officially announced its first presidential election in August 
1994. China certainly regarded those activities as unpleasant, but its attitude was rather 
moderate overall up until July 1995.67 Most importantly, Lee never once claimed that Taiwan 
was not a part of China during his campaign, but maintained a position that Taiwan should 
unify with China in due course. What Lee was trying to do at the time was to increase Taiwan’s 
leverage to negotiate with China over the unification issue. In this sense, Lee’s ultimate 
political goal did not depart too much from China’s political expectations. 
Also, one important assumption supporting this argument—China was conducting military 
drills only—is problematic if one carefully analyzes China’s behavior during the crisis. Many 
military operations taken by China during this crisis apparently crossed the boundary of 
military drills. For example, by launching missiles into waters within ten-mile vicinities of 
northern and southern Taiwan, China’s artillery could calculate the precise distance and range 
for the subsequent shot targeting any place in Taiwan. In addition, Chinese aircraft kept flying 
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across the middle line of the Taiwan Strait. Hong Kong media reported that one military drill 
(from February 1996 to March 1996) alone had cost China almost a quarter of its annual 
military budget.68 
Thirdly and mostly importantly, recent scholarly works reveal that China did attempt to take 
concrete military action against Taiwan initially: not just a military drills. In three consecutive 
articles, Kawasugi Nakamori detailed China’s military plan of the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis. 
He showed that China had gradually mobilized and moved its forces to the southeast coast of 
China from July 1995 in the name of military drills. The forces were scheduled to land on 
Taiwan via the southern and northern waters around Taiwan in March 1996.69 This military 
plan, however, was secretly passed by Liu Liankun, a PLA general working for Taiwanese 
intelligence, to the Taiwanese government in December 1995.70 Lee then passed this plan to 
the US via the Secretary-General of the National Security Council, Ting Mao-shih. In the 
meantime, Taiwan prepared eleven contingency plans to counter every possible military attack 
from China.71 The plan passed along by Liu ultimately contributed to the US’ decision to 
assemble two aircraft carrier striking groups to the waters around Taiwan, where the PLA’s 
staging areas were within the striking range of the carriers (please see Figure 5). Since a US 
intervention would significantly complicate its plan, China altered the military action to a 
military drill instead. 
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Figure 5: China’s Military Plan against Taiwan of 1995–9672 
 
  
The above questions and episode both make it worth reconsidering why China initiated military 
action against Taiwan at that time. This section argues that the Sino-American rapprochement 
did not fundamentally alter China’s view of Taiwan as a geopolitical buffer protecting the 
Chinese mainland against a foreign enemy incursion from the sea. The geopolitical mentality 
that “if Taiwan is not under China’s control, the US may have the ability to a launch military 
attack on China from Taiwan in the future” was deeply embedded in the minds of Chinese 
leaders. This mentality was especially evident in Chinese leaders’ repetitive description of 
Taiwan as a potential unsinkable aircraft carrier of the US. Chen Yun, for instance, stated in 
December 1983: 
Not everyone in the world would like to see the Chinese unification. Someone is 
holding Taiwan firmly and regards Taiwan as its “unsinkable aircraft carrier.”73 
In 1986, Deng Xiaoping talked to Michael Wallace in a TV interview:  
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In the 1950s, MacArthur and Dulles regarded Taiwan as an unsinkable aircraft carrier 
in Asia and the Pacific…So long as Taiwan is not reunified with the mainland, its 
status as part of Chinese territory will not be secure. No one knows when Taiwan will 
be taken away again.74 
While the geopolitical value of Taiwan was still a prominent concern for China, the US 
gradually beefed up its military and diplomatic ties with Taiwan after the Cold War. Militarily, 
the US adopted a series of measures to strengthen Taiwanese defensive capacity against China. 
In 1992, the US decided to sell Taiwan 150 F-16 fighter aircraft. In January 1993, it provided 
Taiwan with 200 Patriot missiles and related equipment. In October, the US Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations passed a resolution asking the US government to lift the limit of 
qualitative and quantitative restrictions on US arms sales to Taiwan. Diplomatically, the US 
announced in April 1994 that the Taiwan Relations Act had a superior legal position to the 
Joint Communique of 1982 with China. “The Taiwan Policy Review” was released in 
September of the same year, in which the US allowed top Taiwanese officials to transit through 
US territory during their travels and supported Taiwan to participate in international 
organizations. 
This gradual fostering of US-Taiwan relations in the post-Cold War era stimulated Chinese 
leaders’ geopolitical anxiety over Taiwan. From Jiang Zemin’s statement at a meeting of the 
Taiwan Affairs Office in January 1995, it was clear that Chinese leaders started to become 
seriously concerned over the increasing links between the US and Taiwan.75 As a result, the 
US’ move of issuing Lee with a visa in May 1995 was a critical indicator for Chinese leaders 
that the US was about to create a new cold war in Asia by using Taiwan to contain China, as it 
had in the past. China’s buffer thinking toward Taiwan demonstrated in how China perceived 
this move by the US: 
The US government brazenly changed its policy that forbade top Taiwanese leaders 
from visiting the US, which was upheld by every US government in the past seventeen 
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years, that. The truth is that the US will never give up the policy of regarding Taiwan 
as an American unsinkable aircraft carrier. The US attempts to play the so-called 
Taiwan card and contain the development, growth, and unification of China.76 
It was in precisely this context that China made the decision to militarily attack Taiwan. From 
available sources, it is not fully clear yet who made the decision and when, but the PLA 
arguably played a very significant role in this decision. Numerous academic works suggest that 
the PLA’s influence on policy outcomes was considerably increased in the Jiang era. 77 
Meanwhile, Jiang, unlike Mao and Deng, did not have enough prestige and personal 
connections with the PLA. Thus, he was quite often under pressure to appease the PLA’s 
demands.78 Hong Kong media repeatedly reported that, since 1995, the three most senior 
military leaders, Yang Shangkun (former Chinese President and the leader of the Central 
Leading Group for Taiwan Affairs), Liu Huaqing (Vice Chairman of the CMC and member of 
CCP Politburo Standing Committee), and Zhang (Vice Chairman of the CMC), had kept 
pushing civilian leaders to adopt more hawkish means to solve the Taiwan issue.79 
The three military leaders all held the same perspective: seize Taiwan sooner rather than later, 
lest the security of China’s coastal areas worsen in the future.80 Yang had long been a hardliner 
toward Taiwan. His perspective on Taiwan was very similar to that of Deng—China needed to 
have full control over Taiwan as soon as possible, otherwise it would be taken away by foreign 
countries and used against China in the future.81 As for Liu, Taiwan Island had been a critical 
component in China’s maritime strategy, aimed at safeguarding the national security of 
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Trends," Asian Survey 33, no. 8 (1993); Michael D. Swaine, "Chinese Decision-Making Regarding Taiwan, 1979-
2000," in The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, ed. David Lampton (Stanford, 
Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2001). 
78 "The Role of the Chinese Military in Naional Security Policymaking," pp. 41-3. 
79  Shan Yue, "Jiang Hexin Dui Qiangganzi De Ruanhua 江核心对枪杆子的软化  [The Jiang Core 
Accommodated the Military]," Dongxiang 动向 [Trend] 1995; Luo Bing, "Deng Xiaoping Zai Hu Wu San 
Yuanlao 鄧小平在滬晤三元老 (Deng Xiaoping Met Three Sinor Leaders in Shanghai)," Dongxiang 动向 [Trend] 
1996; Guan Jie, "Zhongguong Dui Meitai Xinzhengce 中共對美台新政策 (The New CCP's Policy towrard the 
US and Taiwan)," ibid. 1995. 
80 Zhang did not speak too much about the Taiwan issue in public during this crisis. His perspective on Taiwan, 
however, has been discussed in the two previous sections. 
81 "Yang Shangkun Zhuxi Zaici Yanzheng Shengming Taiwan Zigu Jiushi Zhongguo Lingtu 杨尚昆主席再次严
正申明台湾自古就是中国领土 [President Yang Shuangkun Firmly States Once Again That Taiwan Is China's 
Territory Since Ancient Time]," People's Daily, October 10 1991; "Yang Shangkun Zhuxi Lun Zuguo Tongyi 杨
尚昆主席论祖国统一 [Presient Yang Suangkun Speaks about The Motherland Unification]," People's Daily, 
November 10 1990. 
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China.82 Believing the future invasion of the US would surely come from the sea, he had been 
promoting the concept of offshore defense (jinhai fangyu 近海防御) for a decade. In his 
maritime strategy, Taiwan was a part of the offshore defense system that China needed to 
secure and thereby protecting its coastal areas. Therefore, it is sufficient to argue that the 
perspectives held by the three senior generals had arguably translated into the making of the 
decision of the military action taken against Taiwan in 1996. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
This case study shows that China’s buffer thinking toward Taiwan has been critical factor 
influencing China’s behavior toward Taiwan since 1949. Before 1949, the value of Taiwan to 
the CCP was very non-geopolitical. Through the lens of minority nationality, the CCP initially 
perceived Taiwan’s value in its fight against Japan and then in its power struggle against the 
KMT. However, along with the formation of the CCP-US rivalry after the surrender of Japan, 
this non-geopolitical perspective gradually changed into a geopolitical one—Taiwan was a 
critical buffer to the security of the Chinese mainland that could block an invasion route of the 
US. China’s geopolitical anxiety over its southeast coastal areas could only be pacified if it 
could control this island. As a result, the mentality of “take Taiwan now, otherwise the US may 
use it against China later” became a significant motivating factor for China to initiate military 
actions aimed at seizing Taiwan in 1954, 1958, and 1996. The historical memory of how a 
foreign enemy used this island to harm China’s security interests further justified the necessity 
of taking this island. In the cases of 1954 and 1958, China was worried that the US was taking 
a similar path to that of the Japanese Empire. In the case of 1996, the memories embodied in 
the metaphor of an unsinkable aircraft carrier of the US continually reminded Chinese leaders 
of China’s geopolitical vulnerability to the US in the 1950s. Certainly, it is not argued here that 
China’s buffer thinking toward Taiwan was the only factor driving such three military action. 
The most important insight from these three episodes of conflict, however, is that China’s 
 
82 Liu Huaqing, "Haijun Zhanlue Yu Weilai Haishang Zuozhan 海军战略与未来海上作战 [The Naval Strategy 
and Future Warfare on the Sea]," in Liu Huaqing Junshi Wenxuan: Shang 刘华清军事文选: 上 [The Selected 
Military Works of Liu Huaqing: I] (Beijing: The PLA Publishing House, 2008); "Haijun De Diwei He Zuoyong 
Wenti 海军的地位和作用问题 [The Matter of the Position and Function of the Navy]."; Liu Huaqing Huiyilu 刘
华清回忆录 [Liu Huaqing's Memoirs], 2nd ed. (Beijing: The PLA Publishing House, 2007), CH 16. 
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obsession with annexing Taiwan cannot be fully understood without taking its buffer thinking 
into consideration. 
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CH 5 The Case of North 
Korea 
 
 
 
 
For many decades, scholars and policymakers have typically regarded North Korea as a 
geopolitical buffer for China, fending off potential US influence and invasion of China from 
the Korean Peninsula. Officials in China also characterize bilateral relations with North Korea 
as “lips and teeth” at times. However, there have been few scholarly have explained the 
geopolitical relationship between China and North Korea in depth. The purpose of this chapter 
is to delve into three critical questions relating to this geopolitical relationship. First, what was 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s early view of the Korean Peninsula? Second, when and 
under what conditions did the CCP form its buffer thinking toward North Korea? Finally, how 
did China’s buffer thinking toward North Korea affect China’s North Korea policy in the cases 
of the Korean War (1950–53), the First North Korean Nuclear Crisis of 1993–94, and the 
Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis of 2002–03?  
This chapter argues that the CCP did not perceive the Korean Peninsula geopolitically between 
the 1920s to 1940s, though they fought with Korean communists. The prevailing view of the 
CCP at that time was minority nationality. China’s buffer thinking toward North Korea 
emerged in the minds of Chinese leaders in a policy debate over the question of whether to 
save North Korea in the second half of 1950, and China’s buffer thinking toward Taiwan also 
contributed to China’s final decision of sending troops to Korea. Examining the explanatory 
power of buffer thinking against competing explanations, this chapter contends that this 
thinking was a critical factor in shaping China’s defense of North Korea in the Korean War, 
and protecting North Korea diplomatically and militarily in the two nuclear crises. 
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5.1 The CCP’s Early View of Korea: Minority Nationality 
 
Unlike its policy toward Taiwan, the CCP’s policy toward Korea did not undergo a 
fundamental transformation before the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
in 1949. Korea was not really a key concern of the CCP in the first decade of the establishment 
of the CCP, though it did notice that Koreans were suffering under the colonial rule of the 
Japanese Empire. The CCP formulated its first policy toward Korea in the 1930s, which 
focused on providing support for Korean independence. However, for the CCP in this period, 
the value of an independent Korea to the CCP, like an independent Taiwan, had more to do 
with the CCP’s war against Japan and political struggle against the Kuomintang (KMT), and 
less to do with the geopolitical security of China. 
Before the establishment of the CCP in 1921, contact between Chinese communists and 
Koreans had already been established. China and Korea had a very close cultural and economic 
relationship for centuries, in which China regarded itself as the maintainer of order in a self-
proclaimed tribute system in Asia and Korea positioned itself as a role model of a tribute state 
within this system. Because of this layer of relationship, China helped Korea resist the 
influence and control of foreign powers, especially Japan, many times in history. Therefore, 
when the Japanese Empire annexed Korea in 1910, a significant number of Koreans moved or 
were expatriated to China. It was at this moment that a number of Koreans who were fighting 
for Korean independence joined the CCP or started to provide financial support to assist its 
revolution against Japanese. For example, Choe Yong Gon, who was North Korean Minister 
of Defense, joined the CCP in 1926 and held a position as the Party Secretary at the CCP 
Northeast Region.1 1930 was another year in which the number of Koreans joining the CCP 
increased greatly, as the Communist International ordered the Korean Communist Party (KCP) 
to disband and merge into the CCP owning to the fierce faction rivalry inside the KCP. Kim Il 
Sung joined the CCP in this period and in later years became one of the commanders of the 
Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army (NAJUA).2 
 
1  Shen Zhihua, "Tongming Xianglian: Chaoxian Gongchandangren Rongru Zhonggong De Lishi Guocheng 
(1919-1936) (Shang) 同命相连: 朝鲜共产党人融入中共的历史过程 (1919-1936) (上) [Sharing the Same Fate: 
The Historical Process of the Korean Communist Party Merging into the CCP (1919-1936) (I)]," Jianghuai 
Wenshi 江淮文史 [Anhuei Literature and History] 4(2015): p. 50. 
2 "Tongming Xianglian: Chaoxian Gongchandangren Rongru Zhonggong De Lishi Guocheng (1919-1936) (Xia) 
同命相连: 朝鲜共产党人融入中共的历史过程 (1919-1936) (下) [Sharing the Same Fate: The Historical 
Process of the Korean Communist Party Merging into the CCP (1919-1936) (II)]," Jianghuai Wenshi 江淮文史 
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Although there was early contact between the CCP and Koreans, the CCP initially did not pay 
too much attention to Korea. Korea was not a part of the Qing Empire’s territory, which made 
this issue not a matter of importance for the CCP in the 1920s. What the CCP focused on the 
most at that moment was its own party development in China, especially its power struggle 
against the KMT. This explains why the CCP did not mention anything about a future 
settlement for the Korean Peninsula in “The Manifesto of the Second National Congress of the 
CCP” of 1922. 3  Moreover, instead of including the Koreans’ objectives into the CCP’s 
founding goals, the involvement of Koreans in the CCP only served to strengthen the CCP’s 
anti-KMT agenda.4 
This lack of attention to Korea was also reflected in the CCP’s lack of a consistent term to refer 
to Korea. The first time the CCP referred to Korea was in “The Manifesto of the Second 
National Congress,” in which the CCP criticized how the Japanese exploited “Gaoli 高丽” 
people.5 However, Gaoli apparently was not the only term the CCP used at the time when 
referring to the people of/from the Korean Peninsula. The CCP also used “Chaoxian 朝鲜” and 
“Han韩.” While Gaoli, Chaoxian, and Han could all translate into “Korea” in English, these 
three terms contain different meanings in Chinese in terms of history and geography. One letter 
in which the CCP Central Committee explained its mission in Manchu served as a classic 
example of this mixed use of terms: 
[We] need to think of a special struggle slogan for Gaoli people and Mongolians…The 
slogan should be as follows…the Chinese, Han, Mongolians and other workers 
conduct a nationality revolution war together…The slogan for Chaoxian people would 
be like: The peasants of Chaoxian, Japanese imperialism took your land and expelled 
you from your home country.6 
 
[Anhuei Literature and History] 5(2015): p. 42; Dae-Sook Suh, Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader  (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1988), CH 2. 
3 "Zhongguo Gongchandang Dierci Quanguo Dahui Xuanyan 中国共产党第二次全国大会宣言 [The Manifesto 
of the Second National Congress of the CCP]," pp. 99-118. 
4 "Open Letter to the Korean Communists in Manchuria from the Manchurian Provincial Committee of the 
Chinese Communist Party," in Documents of Korean Communism: 1918-1948, ed. Suh Dae-Sook (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. 398-9. 
5 "Zhongguo Gongchandang Dierci Quanguo Dahui Xuanyan 中国共产党第二次全国大会宣言 [The Manifesto 
of the Second National Congress of the CCP]," p. 101. 
6 "Zhongyang Gei Geji Manzhou Dangbu Ji Quanti Dangyuan De Xin 中央给各级满洲党部及全体党员的信 
[The Letter Which the CCP Central Committee Issued to Every Branch of and all the CCP Members in Manchu]," 
in Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenjian Xuanji: 1933 中共中央文件选集: 1933 [The Selected Documents of the CCP 
Central Committee: 1933], ed. The Central Archive (Beijing: The CCP Central Party School Press, 1991), p. 37. 
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This lack of attention to Korea did not mean, however, that the Korean issue was not on the 
CCP’s radar at all. To the CCP, what was happening to the Koreans, Mongolians, and 
Taiwanese had one thing in common from a minority nationality perspective: they were all 
small and weak nationalities oppressed by Japanese imperialism. In particular, the status of 
Korea was quite similar to that of Taiwan. Taiwan, which was traditionally considered external 
to China proper by the Chinese, was colonized by Japan after the Shimonoseki Treaty of 1895.  
Korea, which inherently was not a part of China’s territory, was also colonized by Japan after 
the Japan–Korea Annexation Treaty of 1910. In this sense, the issue of Korea was still 
associated with the founding goals of the CCP to some extent. 
Owing to this association, the issue of Korea became a higher priority in CCP policy during 
the Anti-Japanese War (1937–45). In order to counter the Japanese invasion of China, the CCP 
tried to build three united fronts against Japan in the 1930s: an alliance with the KMT, an 
alliance with foreign countries, and an alliance both with people within Japan and people 
colonized by Japan. Koreans, together with Taiwanese, fell into the third alliance. The CCP’s 
calculation was that if Koreans could militarily fight for their independence, this would steer 
Japan’s military power away from China. Driven by this strategic rationale, the policy of 
supporting Korean independence was hence formalized. As Mao Zedong said to Edgar Snow 
in July 1936: 
It is the immediate task of China to regain all lost territories, not merely to defend our 
sovereignty south of the Great Wall. This means that Manchuria must be regained. We 
do not, however, include Korea, formerly a Chinese colony, but when we have re-
established the independence of the lost territories of China, and if the Koreans wish 
to break away from the chains of Japanese imperialism, we will extend them our 
enthusiastic help in their struggle for independence.7 
Closer military cooperation between the CCP and Koreans gradually unfolded after the 
mid-1930s under the policy of supporting Korea’s independence. Throughout the 1930s 
and 1940s, the CCP and Koreans fought alongside one anther against the Japanese forces 
and later the KMT forces. There were two main Korean groups that the CCP worked with 
at the time: the Korean Volunteer Army (KVA) in Yanan, which was headed by Kim 
Tubong and Mu Chong, and the NAJUA in northeast China, which was joined by Kim 
Chaek, Choe Yong Gon, and Kim Il Sung. Both of these groups were invaluable forces 
 
7 Edgar Snow, Red Star over China, p. 110. 
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in the CCP’s war against Japan. The KVA once rescued the Political Department of the 
Eighth Route Army’s Headquarter in a battle against the Japanese forces in the Taihuang 
Mountain.8 And Kim Il Sung and his associates organized guerrilla forces to fight against 
the Japanese in Jilin for the CCP, which spurred the Japanese to offer a 500,000 Japanese 
yen reward for his arrest.9 
This deepened relationship between the CCP and Koreans was not simply based on the reality 
that the CCP needed Koreans much more at that time, but also on the principle of a long-term 
quid pro quo. During the Anti-Japanese War, the CCP provided military munitions, training, 
and equipment to Koreans, which the Koreans would need for their own fight for Korea in the 
future. Also, while Koreans provided necessary manpower for the CCP’s fight against Japan 
and the KMT, it is probably that CCP leaders agreed to return the favor later. This was why the 
CCP agreed to assist Kim Il Sung’s military plan of unifying the Korean Peninsula when he 
proposed his plan in May 1949.10 
As a by-product of this explicit Korea policy, the CCP gradually standardized its language in 
reference to Korea in this period. After 1937, Chaoxian became the only term the CCP used to 
refer to for the most part to the people of/from the Korean Peninsula, and this is the term that 
China officially uses today. The best example of the use of this term can be seen in the Sixth 
General Order of Zhu De, in which he commanded the Korean forces to attack the Japanese 
forces in China’s northeast with the CCP and Soviet forces in 1945: 
 
8  Liu Xiaoyuan, A Partnership for Disorder: China, the United States, and Their Policies for the Postwar 
Disposition of the Japanese Empire, 1941-1945, pp. 164-8. 
9 Shen Zhihua, "Chunchi Xiangyi Haishi Zhengzhi Lianyin Zhongchao Tongmeng De Jianli Jiqi Yanxu, 1946-
1961 唇齿相依还是政治联姻? 中朝同盟的建立及其延续, 1946-1961 [As Close as Teeth and Lips or a 
Marriage of Convenience? The Origins and Development of the Sino-Korean Alliance, 1946-1961]," Zhongyang 
Yanjiuyuan Jindaishi Yanjiusuo Jikan 中央研究院近代史研究所集刊  [Academia Sinica Modern History 
Institute Bulletin] 63(2009): p. 150; "On the Eighty-Eighth Brigade and the Sino–Soviet–Korean Triangular 
Relationship: A Glimpse at the International Antifascist United Front during the War of Resistance against Japan," 
Journal of Modern Chinese History 9, no. 1 (2015): p. 14. 
10 "Shtekefu Zhi Weixinshiji Dian: Jin Richeng Tongbao Jinyi Zai Beiping Huitan Qingkuang 什特科夫致维辛
斯基电: 金日成通报金一在北平会谈情况 [Shtykov's Cable to Vyshinsky: Kim Il Sung Informs the Meeting of 
Kim Yi in Beiping]," in Zhongsu Guanxi: Eguo Danganguan Jiemi Wenjian Xuanbian 中苏关系: 俄国档案馆
解密文件选编 [Sino-Soviet Relations: The Selected Declassified Documents in Russian Archives], ed. Shen 
Zhihua (Shanghai: The Orient Publishing Center, 2014), Vol. 2, pp. 48-9. 
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For cooperating with the Soviet forces entering China and Chaoxian to fight and 
liberate the Chaoxian people, I ordered…Chaoxian people in northeast to accomplish 
the mission of liberating Chaoxian.11 
Most importantly, the CCP leaders apparently did not consider Korea in geopolitical terms 
during this period, even though the issue of Korea had appeared on the CCP’s radar during the 
Anti-Japanese War. Unlike the KMT, Korea was a “non-geopolitical” issue to the CCP. The 
Cairo Declaration offers a good example of these two distinct viewpoints. While both the CCP 
and the KMT supported the declaration, which demanded Japan to return the Pescadores, 
Taiwan, and Manchuria to the Republic of China (ROC) and also endorsed a free and 
independent Korea after the defeat of Japan, the rationales behind these moves were worlds 
apart. For the KMT, Japan’s policy toward China had been faithfully following the Meiji 
Instructions for Decedents and the Continental Policy, both of which indicated a roadmap for 
how Japan could conquer the world—first, Korea and Taiwan, then Manchuria and Mongolia, 
then China, and finally the world at large.12 Korea, being part of Japan’s invasion roadmap, 
was a critical geopolitical buffer to keep a resurgent Japan out of China. Therefore, in the eyes 
of the KMT leaders, a geopolitically secured China was inseparable from a free and 
independent Korea. 
By contrast, the CCP supported the Cairo Declaration on account of its power struggle against 
the KMT. During the Anti-Japanese War, what the CCP worried most about was the possibility 
that the KMT and Japan might agree to eliminate the CCP together. A declaration asking Japan 
to return every territory it took from China would reduce this possibility significantly. As 
demonstrated by a cable Mao and Peng Dehuai sent to Deng Xiaoping two weeks after the 
declaration showed, the CCP leaders had quite a positive attitude towards the declaration 
because it blocked the potential room for negotiation between Chiang Kai-shek and Japan 
 
11  "Yanan Zongbu Mingling Deliuhao 延安总部命令第六号  [The Sixth General Order of the Yanan 
Headquarter]," in Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenjian Xuanji: 1945 中共中央文件选集: 1945 [The Selected 
Documents of the CCP Central Committee: 1945], ed. The Central Archive (Beijing: The CCP Central Party 
School Press, 1991), p. 223. 
12 "Ri Qin Manmeng Zhi Yexin 日侵满蒙之野心 [Japan's Ambition to Invade Manchuria and Mongolia]," in 
Zhongchao Zhonghan Guanxi Wenjian Ziliao Huibian: 1949-1919 中朝中韩关系文件资料汇编: 1949-1919 
[Sino-North Korean and Sino-South Korean Relations Document Compilation: 1949-1919], ed. Liu Jinzhi 
(Beijing: China Social Science Press, 2000), pp. 289-92; "Shixian Kailuo Huiyi Xuanyan 实现开罗会议宣言 
[Realization of the Cario Declaration]," in Zhongchao Zhonghan Guanxi Wenjian Ziliao Huibian: 1949-1919 中
朝中韩关系文件资料汇编: 1949-1919 [Sino-North Korean and Sino-South Korean Relations Document 
Compilation: 1949-1919], ed. Liu Jinzhi (Beijing: China Social Science Press, 2000), pp. 1026-9. 
89 
 
during wartime.13 Mao reiterated this position on the Cairo Declaration in his “On Coalition 
Government” at the Seventh National Congress of the CCP in 1945.14 Unsurprisingly, the issue 
of Korean independence was not mentioned in either the cable or the report. 
To sum up, throughout the 1920s to 1940s, the CCP had little, if any, perception of the 
geopolitical value of the Korean Peninsula to the security of China. The CCP’s conception of 
Korea in this period was that of a minority nationality. The CCP viewed Koreans as sharing 
the same fate of the Chinese and other small and weak nationalities, all of whom were fighting 
for independence against Japan and other imperialists. As a result, the value of Korea to the 
CCP was more about what role Korea could play for the CCP’s own party development in 
China, first in the CCP’s war against Japan and second in the political struggle against the 
KMT. Helping Koreans fight for their independence never ranked as a high priority in the 
CCP’s foreign policy in this period, and this objective had very limited geopolitical meaning. 
As Mao repeatedly stated in a speech in 1938, “the Anti-Japanese War can only be considered 
complete when the Chinese forces reach the bank of the Yalu River.”15 
 
5.2 Gaining Two Buffers through One Fight 
 
In May 1949, Chinese leaders agreed with Kim Il Sung’s proposal to unify the Korean 
Peninsula by force in 1950 and promised to provide Chinese troops and military equipment to 
North Korea.16 Their assessment was that the US would not intervene. However, to their 
surprise, the US led the United Nations Command to fight against North Korea after the 
 
13 "Guanyu Muqian Guoji Xingshi Xia Dihou Renwu De Zhishi 关于目前国际形势下敌后任务的指示 [The 
Instruction on the Mission to the Enemy's Rear under the Current International Situation]," in Zhonggong 
Zhongyang Wenjian Xuanji: 1943-44 中共中央文件选集: 1943-44 [The Selected Documents of the CCP Central 
Committee: 1943-44], ed. The Central Archive (Beijing: The CCP Central Party School Press, 1991), pp. 138-9. 
14 "Lun Lianhe Zhengfu 论联合政府 [On Coalition Government]," in Mao Zedong Xuanji 毛泽东选集 [The 
Selected Works of Mao Zedong], ed. Mao Zedong (Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1991), pp. 1065-6. 
15 "Lun Chijiuzhan 论持久战 [On Protracted War]," in Mao Zedong Xuanji 毛泽东选集 [The Selected Works of 
Mao Zedong], ed. Mao Zedong (Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1991), Vol. 2, pp. 466, 508, and 09. 
16 "Shtekefu Zhi Weixinshiji Dian: Jin Richeng Tongbao Jinyi Zai Beiping Huitan Qingkuang 什特科夫致维辛
斯基电: 金日成通报金一在北平会谈情况 [Shtykov's Cable to Vyshinsky: Kim Il Sung Informs the Meeting of 
Kim Yi in Beiping]."; "Kewaliaofu Zhi Sidalin Dian: Mao Zedong Tongbao Yu Jinyi Huitan De Qingkuang 科瓦
廖夫至斯大林电: 毛泽东通报与金一会谈的情况 [Kobajieb's Cable to Stalin: Mao Zedong Informs the Meeting 
with Kim Yi]," in Zhongsu Guanxi: Eguo Danganguan Jiemi Wenjian Xuanbian 中苏关系: 俄国档案馆解密文
件选编 [Sino-Soviet Relations: The Selected Declassified Documents in Russian Archives], ed. Shen Zhihua 
(Shanghai: The Orient Publishing Center, 2014), Vol. 2, pp. 53-4. 
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outbreak of the Korean War, and protected the government of the ROC in Taiwan by 
neutralizing the Taiwan Strait. To ensure North Korea’s survival, China organized the 
Northeast Border Defense Army (NEBDA) in July 1950 and then dispatched it to the North 
Korean battlefield under the name of the People’s Volunteer Army (PVA) in October. 
For Chinese leaders, fighting against a militarily superior opponent was a very difficult 
decision to make. Regarding this decision, two things are certain nowadays from available 
sources: 
1. A policy debate among Chinese leaders on whether to fight against the US, lasted 
from the end of June until October 18 1950. An initial decision to send the PVA 
to North Korea was made at an enlarged Central Politburo meeting on October 5. 
This decision was re-confirmed twice at emergent Politburo meetings on October 
13 and 18. 
2. At least nineteen Chinese leaders were involved in this policy debate: Mao, Zhu, 
Peng, Deng, Zhou Enlai, Gao Gang, Liu Shaoqi, Ren Bishi, Chen Yun, Kang Shen, 
Peng Zhen, Lin Boqu, Dong Biwu, Zhang Wentian, Lin Biao, Li Fuchun, Yang 
Shangkun, Nie Ronzhen, and Hu Qiaomu. 
However, scholars are still debating what the determining factor was that pushed China to fight 
against the US in this war. To be sure, it is possible that there is more than one factor behind 
this decision. The purpose of this section is to explore China’s buffer thinking toward North 
Korea as an explanation. 
Chinese leaders did not view North Korea as a buffer state after the rivalrous Sino-American 
relationship was established in June 1946 (Please see Chapter Four). As documented in the 
previous section, the CCP did not initially consider Korea as being geopolitically valuable to 
China. Once the Sino-US rivalry emerged in June 1946, the assessment of CCP leaders on 
North Korea’s brewing military action was that the most likely US invasion route of China 
would be via Taiwan, and that Japan, not the US, would be the party that might intervene in 
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North Korea’s military action.17 This assessment did not change even one month before the 
outbreak of the Korean War.18 
The US’ intervention after the outbreak of the Korean War, specifically its landing at Incheon, 
fundamentally changed the way that Chinese leaders perceived the value of North Korea, from 
a minority nationality to a buffered perspective. Chinese leaders spent approximately four 
months debating over whether China should save North Korea, during which time the 
geopolitical value of North Korea to China gradually emerged: the two states were like lips and 
teeth. If North Korea was occupied by the US, it would certainly become a US invasion route 
to China. Multiple sources indicate the buffer thinking logic that “we need to maintain the 
existence of North Korea now otherwise the US may use it against us later” was a prominent 
reason that some of the nineteen Chinese leaders involved in this long policy debate believed 
that saving North Korea was necessary. Mao, for instance, stated at a Politburo meeting on 
August 4: 
If American imperialism won, it [the US] would be smug and threaten us. [We] cannot 
not help North Korea. [We] have to.19 
In a report to Mao on August 15, Gao, the commander of the NEBDA, stated the importance 
of fighting against the US in North Korea on the basis of buffer thinking: 
The US’ invasion of Korea is one part of its entire invasion plan…It is attempting to 
occupy Korea as a springboard for invading northeast and north China…If American 
invaders occupy North Korea, there is no doubt they will prepare for the invasion of 
the northeast and north of our China…Obviously, it is beneficial to us to destroy the 
enemy outside of our territory.20 
 
17 "Shtekefu Zhi Weixinshiji Dian: Jin Richeng Tongbao Jinyi Zai Beiping Huitan Qingkuang 什特科夫致维辛
斯基电: 金日成通报金一在北平会谈情况 [Shtykov's Cable to Vyshinsky: Kim Il Sung Informs the Meeting of 
Kim Yi in Beiping]." 
18 "Shiekefu Zhi Weixinshiji Dian: Jin Richeng Fanghua Jihua 什特科夫致维辛斯基电: 金日成访华计划 
[Shtykov's Cable to Vyshinsky: Kim Il Sung's Plan to Visit China]," in Zhongsu Guanxi: Eguo Danganguan Jiemi 
Wenjian Xuanbian 中苏关系: 俄国档案馆解密文件选编 [Sino-Soviet Relations: The Selected Declassified 
Documents in Russian Archives], ed. Shen Zhihua (Shanghai: The Orient Publishing Center, 2014), Vol. 2, pp. 
407-8. 
19  Gongchandang Zhongyao Huiyi Jishi: 1921-2011 共产党重要会议纪事: 1921-2011 [The Chronicle of 
Important Meetings of the Chinese Communist Party: 1921-2011], ed. Weiping Zhang Huaxuan Jiang, and Shen 
Xiao (Beijing: Central Party Literature Press, 2011), p. 264. 
20 Dai Maolin and Zhao Xiaoguang, Gau Gang Zhuan 高岗传 [Gao Guang]  (Xian: Shangxi People's Publishing 
House, 2011), pp. 239-41. 
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In hindsight, the opinion that Peng expressed at an enlarged Politburo meeting on October 5 
was the most critical in China’s decision to defend North Korea. At a Politburo meeting on 
October 4, the majority of Chinese leaders were still opposed to the idea of fighting against the 
US. However, the decision was ultimately made after Peng voiced his opinion the next day: 
Assisting Korea is necessary. If we lost, the price we would pay at most is winning 
this liberation war late. But, if we let the US deploy its forces on the bank of the Yalu 
River and Taiwan, it can find an excuse to initiate an invasion at any time.21 
The importance of buffer thinking toward North Korea in this decision is further supported by 
the evidence that this was the only reason that Mao re-confirmed the decision a week later. 
After the initial decision was made on October 5, Mao immediately asked for military 
assistance from the Soviet Union to further pacify the anxiety of Chinese leaders who disagreed 
with this decision. The Soviet Union, however, refused to provide any air cover for the PVA 
and demanded China purchase Soviet military equipment with cash.22 In response to this 
lukewarm reception, Mao cabled Joseph Stalin saying that China would still send the forces to 
North Korea because “If Americans reach China’s border, then North Korea will be a ‘potential 
disease of the heart’ for us and northeast China will be under constant threat.”23 
For Chinese leaders, keeping a buffer around China’s border would simultaneously also benefit 
the internal security of the newly established PRC regime. The NEBDA was mainly composed 
of the PLA 38th, 39th, and 40th Armies, which were originally deployed in southern China to 
eliminate remnant ROC forces on the Chinese mainland, and defend against a possible ROC 
military roll back from Taiwan. If the NEBDA was stationed at the Yalu River to guard against 
the US forces for a long period of time, China’s control and defense of southern China would 
be weakened in the long run.24 
 
21  Gongchandang Zhongyao Huiyi Jishi: 1921-2011 共产党重要会议纪事: 1921-2011 [The Chronicle of 
Important Meetings of the Chinese Communist Party: 1921-2011], p. 266. 
22 Shen Zhihua, Chaoxian Zhanzheng Zaitan: Zhongsuchao De Hezuo Yu Fenqi 朝鮮戰爭再探: 中蘇朝的合作
與分歧 [Rediscover the Korean War: Cooperation and Discrepancy among China, the Soviet Union and North 
Korea]  (Hong Kong: Joint Publishing, 2013), p. 300. 
23 "Luoshen Zhi Sidalin Dian: Mao Zedong Tongzhi Zhongguo Jueding Chubing Chaoxian 罗申致斯大林电: 毛
泽东通知中国决定出兵朝鲜 [Roshchin's Cable to Stalin: Mao Zedong Informs China's Decision of Sending 
Troops to North Korea]," in Zhongsu Guanxi: Eguo Danganguan Jiemi Wenjian Xuanbian 中苏关系: 俄国档案
馆解密文件选编 [Sino-Soviet Relations: The Selected Declassified Documents in Russian Archives], ed. Shen 
Zhihua (Shanghai: The Orient Publishing Center, 2014), Vol. 3, pp. 96-7. 
24  Gongchandang Zhongyao Huiyi Jishi: 1921-2011 共产党重要会议纪事: 1921-2011 [The Chronicle of 
Important Meetings of the Chinese Communist Party: 1921-2011], p. 267. 
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As in the case of Taiwan, the historical memory of how the Japanese Empire invaded China 
via Korea strengthened the necessity of maintaining the existence of North Korea to Chinese 
leaders. Since the Japanese surrender, Chinese leaders had noticed an emerging similarity 
between US’ China policy and the Japanese Empire’s China policy, in which the US seemed 
to replace the previous role of Japan in Asia. The US’ act of neutralizing the Taiwan Strait and 
invading North Korea evoked for Chinese leaders the memory of the Continental Policy of 
Japan: encroach upon China first via Taiwan and second via Korea. Defending North Korea, 
was, therefore, premised on avoiding a repetition of this bitter history.25 Wu Xiuquan’s speech 
at the United Nations explicitly indicated this geopolitical anxiety: 
Tanaka Giichi, one of the planners of the Japanese invasion, once said: “to conquer the 
world, one has to first conquer Asia; to conquer Asia, one has to first conquer China; 
to conquer China, one has to first conquer Manchu and Mongolia; to conquer Manchu 
and Mongolia, one has to first conquer Korea and Taiwan”…US imperialism invasion 
of Taiwan and North Korea is literally an imitation of Tanaka Giichi’s plan, and 
follows the old path of Japanese imperialism.26 
Most importantly, China’s decision to send forces to North Korea had a very close connection 
with China’s buffer thinking toward Taiwan, which is another important factor some scholars 
have neglected. As discussed in Chapter Four, Chinese leaders started to view Taiwan from a 
buffered perspective in March 1949. “Taking Taiwan by applying military pressure on the US 
in the Korean War” was also one critical calculation of Chinese leaders behind this decision, 
as evidenced in the cable correspondences between Stalin and Mao. On October 1 1950, Stalin 
formally asked China to save North Korea. Mao’s first reply was that most Chinese leaders 
tended to avoid a direct military conflict with the US. Stalin, however, persuaded Mao by 
arguing that China needed to demonstrate its power to the US by engaging in this war, and only 
by doing so could China gain a concession from the US over Taiwan. Otherwise, the US would 
 
25 "Weishenme Women Dui Meiguo Qinlue Chaoxian Buneng Zhizhi Buli 为什么我们对美国侵略朝鲜不能置
之不理 [Why We Cannot Turn A Blind Eye to the US Invasion of North Korea]," People's Daily, November 6 
1950. 
26 "Anlihui Taolun Konsu Meiguo Wuzhuang Qintai 安理会讨论控诉美国武装侵台案 [The UNSC Discussion 
on the Indictment of US Militarily Invasion of Taiwan]," People's Daily, November 30 1950. It is necessary to 
point out that the authenticity of the Tanaka Memorial is very controversial. While most Japanese scholars believe 
that it is a forgery document, Chinese scholars tend to believe the document is genuine. Despite this controversy, 
the Tanaka Memorial was quite an influential and effective tool for Chinese and Americans to justify and hence 
mobilize the support for their wars against Japan at that time. Please see: John J. Stephan, "The Tanaka Memorial 
(1927): Authentic or Spurious?," Modern Asian Studies 7, no. 4 (1973). 
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hold Taiwan as a military base for itself or Japan in the future.27 Mao agreed with Stalin’s 
assessment and believed this war should start sooner rather than later.28 
The above argument of “gaining two buffers through one fight” is further supported by the 
evidence of how China negotiated with the US over the cease-fire on the Korean Peninsula in 
the following years. In December 1950, the international community asked China about its 
terms for stopping the military action on the peninsula. Both Chinese and Soviet officials 
agreed that US withdrawal from Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait should be one of the terms 
demanded by China.29 In 1951, when Mao started to actively seek a cease-fire on the peninsula, 
the idea of asking for a concession from the US over the issue of Taiwan came to his mind 
again.30 
Certainly, there could be more than one explanatory factor behind China’s decision to save 
North Korea. Aside from buffer thinking, scholars have applied four main approaches to 
understanding the motivation behind China’s military decision. The remainder of this section 
will discuss the strengths and weaknesses of each approach against an approach that focuses 
on China’s buffer thinking. 
The first approach, which was initially developed by Allen Whiting, focuses on China’s 
national security.31 China could not tolerate a hostile force occupying Korea because the 
Chinese capital of Beijing is just few hundred kilometers away from the Sino-North Korean 
 
27 "Sidalin Zhi Mao Zedong Dian: Guanyu Zhongguo Chubing Wenti De Kaolv 斯大林致毛泽东电: 关于中国
出兵问题的考虑 [Stalin's Cable to Mao Zedong: The Considerations of China Sending Forces]," in Zhongsu 
Guanxi: Eguo Danganguan Jiemi Wenjian Xuanbian 中苏关系: 俄国档案馆解密文件选编  [Sino-Soviet 
Relations: The Selected Declassified Documents in Russian Archives], ed. Shen Zhihua (Shanghai: The Orient 
Publishing Center, 2014), Vol. 3, p.81. 
28 "Luoshen Zhi Sidalin Dian: Mao Zedong Dui Chubing Chaoxian De Taidu 罗申致斯大林电: 毛泽东对出兵
朝鲜的态度 [Roshchin's Cable to Stalin: Mao Zedong's Attitude toward Sending Troops to North Korea]," in 
Zhongsu Guanxi: Eguo Danganguan Jiemi Wenjian Xuanbian 中苏关系: 俄国档案馆解密文件选编 [Sino-
Soviet Relations: The Selected Declassified Documents in Russian Archives], ed. Shen Zhihua (Shanghai: The 
Orient Publishing Center, 2014), Vol. 3, p. 84. 
29 "Luoshen Zhimosike Dian: Zhongguo Zhengfu Guanyu Tingzhi Zai Chaoxian Junshi Xingdong De Tiaojian 罗
申关于中国政府停止在朝鲜军事行动的条件的电报 [Rochshin's Cable to Moscow: On the Terms of the 
Chinese Government Stopping Military Actions in North Korea]," in Zhongsu Guanxi: Eguo Danganguan Jiemi 
Wenjian Xuanbian 中苏关系: 俄国档案馆解密文件选编 [Sino-Soviet Relations: The Selected Declassified 
Documents in Russian Archives], ed. Shen Zhihua (Shanghai: The Orient Publishing Center, 2014), Vol. 3, p. 152. 
30 "Mao Zedong Zhi Kao Guang, Jin Richeng Dian 毛泽东致高岗金日成电: 关于停战谈判问题 [Mao's Cable 
to Gao Gang and Kim Il Sung: On the Issue of Truce and Negotiation]," in Zhongsu Guanxi: Eguo Danganguan 
Jiemi Wenjian Xuanbian 中苏关系 : 俄国档案馆解密文件选编  [Sino-Soviet Relations: The Selected 
Declassified Documents in Russian Archives], ed. Shen Zhihua (Shanghai: The Orient Publishing Center, 2014), 
Vol. 3, p. 312. 
31 Whiting purposed more than one explanation to analyze the motivation of China’s entry of North Korea. Please 
see Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War, CH 8. 
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border. Also, the newly established PRC regime relied heavily on its industrial base in northeast 
China, which would be within striking range of US forces in Korea. In recent years, more 
nuanced arguments were developed on the basis of this approach. Thomas Christensen, for 
example, used the logic of so-called “windows of opportunity and vulnerability” to explain 
calculations of the Chinese leadership in regard to a series of military actions by China. He 
argued that Mao and Peng perceived that if China chose not to fight against the US at that time, 
the security environment of China would only worsen further as the US would attack China 
from Korea and Taiwan at some later time of its choosing.32 
The arguments of this approach overlap with the buffer thinking argument developed here to 
some degree, but do not explain why the expulsion of the US forces from North Korea was 
ultimately Mao’s choice for resolving this security concern. In fact, an option preferred by most 
Chinese leaders preferred at that time was giving up North Korea and allowing Koreans to fight 
guerrilla warfare in China’s northeast.33 Stalin seemed to agree with this decision after having 
a serious discussion with Zhou and Lin Biao on October 11 in Moscow. Therefore, it must be 
asked: Why was the land controlled by North Korea so sacred and untouchable to Mao and a 
few Chinese leaders that made military expulsion of US forces from North Korea was the final 
decision? Chinese leaders’ historical memory of Japan’s invasion of China via Korea fills this 
missing piece of the national security arguments. 
The second approach focuses on Sino-Soviet Union relations as the key to understanding 
China’s decision. The argument that Stalin forced Mao to save North Korea is quite prevalent 
in academic circles.34 Stalin formally asked Mao to send Chinese troops to North Korea on 
October 1. For Mao, this was a proposal he was unable to refuse because he had just concluded 
the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance with Stalin a few months 
previously. In accordance with this treaty, China would gain military protection and economic 
assistance from the Soviet Union. Thus, if Mao refused to defend North Korea, Stalin might 
choose not to deliver what he promised in the treaty. Losing the Soviet Union’s support would 
put China at great risk when facing a hostile US. 
 
32 Thomas J. Christensen, "Windows and War: Trend Analysis and Beijing's Use of Force." 
33 Shen Zhihua, Chaoxian Zhanzheng Zaitan: Zhongsuchao De Hezuo Yu Fenqi 朝鮮戰爭再探: 中蘇朝的合作
與分歧 [Rediscover the Korean War: Cooperation and Discrepancy among China, the Soviet Union and North 
Korea], pp. 280-9. 
34 Ibid., p. 313. 
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However, this explanation rules out the possibility that China was eager to rescue North Korea 
even before Stalin’s request. A number of documents have revealed that, after US involvement 
in the war, China kept asking North Korea to provide China with North Korean maps and 
uniforms and actively expressed its willingness to send 320,000 troops to the North Korean 
battlefield.35 It was Stalin and Kim Il Sung that had been intentionally keeping China out of 
this war until October 1950.36 Therefore, it is fair to say that the Soviet Union did ask China to 
rescue North Korea, but this does not mean China did not want to save North Korea for its own 
geopolitical imperatives. 
The third approach to understanding China’s decision is from the CCP’s public image among 
socialist states. Both Chen Jian and Shen Zhihua pointed out that the CCP saw the Korean War 
as an opportunity and a challenge in terms of the CCP’s status in the socialist camp.37 The 
CCP’s image and influence in Asian revolutions would be furthered if China pushed back the 
Western international order in time. By contrast, the CCP’s image would be greatly damaged 
if the CCP turned a blind eye to the survival of North Korea. 
However, at best, the CCP’s image is only a contributing factor to China’s decision to save 
North Korea. The only existing evidence that could possibly support this reasoning is one 
statement made by Mao at an enlarged Politburo meeting on October 4: “You all have your 
 
35 "Shtekefu Zhi Sidalin Dian: Chaoxian Zhengfu Yaoqiu Zhongguo Geiyu Junshi Yuanzhu 什特科夫致斯大林
电: 朝鲜政府要求中国给予军事援助 [Shtykov's Cable to Stalin: The North Korean Government Asks for 
Military Assistance from China]," in Zhongsu Guanxi: Eguo Danganguan Jiemi Wenjian Xuanbian 中苏关系: 
俄国档案馆解密文件选编 [Sino-Soviet Relations: The Selected Declassified Documents in Russian Archives], 
ed. Shen Zhihua (Shanghai: Orient Publishing Center, 2014), Vol 2, pp. 434-5; "Shtekefu Zhi Sidalin Dian: 
Qianxian Zhuangkuang He Zhongguo Canzhan Wenti 什特科夫致斯大林电: 前线状况和中国参战问题 
[Shtykov's Cable to Stalin: The Situation of the Frontline and the Issue of China's Participation of the War]," in 
Zhongsu Guanxi: Eguo Danganguan Jiemi Wenjian Xuanbian 中苏关系: 俄国档案馆解密文件选编 [Sino-
Soviet Relations: The Selected Declassified Documents in Russian Archives], ed. Shen Zhihua (Shanghai: Orient 
Publishing Center, 2014), Vol. 2, pp. 435-7. 
36 "Luoshen Zhi Sidalin Dian: Zhou Enlai's Suggestions to the Korean War 罗申致斯大林电: 周恩来对朝鲜战
事的建议 [Roshchin's Cable to Stalin: Zhou Enlai's Suggestions to the Korean Wasr]," in Zhongsu Guanxi: Eguo 
Danganguan Jiemi Wenjian Xuanbian 中苏关系: 俄国档案馆解密文件选编 [Sino-Soviet Relations: The 
Selected Declassified Documents in Russian Archives], ed. Shen Zhihua (Shanghai: The Orient Publishing Center, 
2014), Vol 3., pp. 51-2; "Shetekefu Zhi Geluomike Dian: Jin Richeng Xuenwen Kefou Qing Zhongguo Jundui 
Canzhan 什特科夫致葛罗米柯电: 金日成询问可否请中国军队参战 [Shtykov's Cable to Gromyko: Kim Il 
Sung Is Asking About the Particpation of the Chinese Troops]," in Zhongsu Guanxi: Eguo Danganguan Jiemi 
Wenjian Xuanbian 中苏关系: 俄国档案馆解密文件选编 [Sino-Soviet Relations: The Selected Declassified 
Documents in Russian Archives], ed. Shen Zhihua (Shanghai, 2014), Vol. 3, pp. 58-9. 
37 Chen Jian, Mao's China and the Cold War, pp. 87-8; Shen Zhihua, Chaoxian Zhanzheng Zaitan: Zhongsuchao 
De Hezuo Yu Fenqi 朝鮮戰爭再探: 中蘇朝的合作與分歧 [Rediscover the Korean War: Cooperation and 
Discrepancy among China, the Soviet Union and North Korea], p. 307. 
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points. But, [I] still feel sad that we stand aside and do nothing when others are in danger.”38 
As documented above, nevertheless, what most occupied the minds of Chinese leaders during 
the long policy debate from July to October 1950 were tangible, China-focused, security-
related issues, not the CCP’s image. 
Finally, a more recent approach to explaining China’s decision focuses on Mao’s psychological 
character. Andrew Kennedy argued that it was Mao’s optimistic estimation about the outcome 
of the war against the US, which Mao derived from the experience of the Chinese Civil War 
(1927–49), that pushed the Chinese leadership to make the final decision.39 In a similar vein, 
Michael Sheng contended that Mao’s aspiration to be a Lenin of the East motivated him to 
intervene in the Korean War.40 
This argument is complementary with the buffer thinking argument developed in this chapter. 
Mao’s personal character was indeed a critical factor in the decision-making process. Without 
him, China would have not joined the war. However, it is also true that he still had to gain 
support from other senior CCP leaders within the party if there was no consensus before the 
1960s. This was exactly why the nineteen Chinese leaders held at least fourteen senior meetings 
from the end of June to October 18—nearly one meeting per week.41 The frequency and scale 
of those meetings suggested the limitation of Mao’s personal decision-making power in this 
matter. Therefore, instead of focusing on the role of Mao in this decision-making process, this 
chapter focuses on factors with stronger explanatory power because ultimately, these are the 
factors that convinced other senior CCP leaders who initially disagreed. The buffer thinking 
held by a number of Chinese leaders, even Stalin, aligns with such thinking. 
 
5.3 Buffer Thinking Revisited 
 
 
38  Gongchandang Zhongyao Huiyi Jishi: 1921-2011 共产党重要会议纪事: 1921-2011 [The Chronicle of 
Important Meetings of the Chinese Communist Party: 1921-2011], p. 266. 
39 Andrew Bingham Kennedy, The International Ambitions of Mao and Nehru  (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012), CH 4. 
40 Michael Sheng, "Mao's Role in the Korean Conflict: A Revision," Twentieth-Century China 39, no. 3 (2014). 
41 Xu Zerong, "Zhongguo Jieru Chaoxian Zhanzheng Zhi Shimo Yu Mubiao 中国介入朝鲜战争之始末与目标 
[The Beginning, Ending, and Objectives of China's Intervention in the Korean War]," Zhuanjiwenxue 传记文学 
77, no. 4 (2000): p. 47. 
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The origin of the first North Korean nuclear crisis of 1993–94 can be traced back to the alliance 
relationship among North Korea, China, and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. In the 
1950s, North Korea began research on a civilian nuclear power program. With assistance and 
training from the Soviet Union, North Korea gained necessary nuclear know-how and 
equipment in the 1960s. In 1965, the Soviet Union provided North Korea with a small two-to-
four megawatt reactor, which was later placed in Yongbyon and operated in 1967. China’s help 
came in the 1970s (discussed in the next section in more detail).42 Although North Korea was 
outside the bounds of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) at that time, it still signed the Type 
66 Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1977. 
Under this agreement, the IAEA could examine the reactor in 1988 and 1989. 
It was the second reactor established in North Korea that raised concerns for the US. In 1982, 
North Korea started to construct its own reactor at Yongbyon to complement the reactor 
provided by the Soviet Union. To the US, however, this reactor aroused suspicion for many 
reasons. First, the size and the design of the second reactor made it suitable for producing the 
necessary material for nuclear weapons—plutonium—rather than purely civilian use of nuclear 
power. Second, via its spy satellite, the US noticed facilities associated with developing nuclear 
weapons, such as nuclear test sites and plutonium reprocessing plants, appearing in North 
Korea after the commencement of the construction of the second reactor. Third, although North 
Korea agreed to join the NPT on December 12 1985, in the end it did not sign a followed 
safeguard agreement or provide a list of nuclear facilities for the IAEA to inspect. 
The conflict between North Korea and the US over this nuclear issue was heightened after 1992. 
While the US was suspicious of the real intentions behind North Korea’s nuclear activities, 
North Korea asserted that the demands of the IAEA violated its national sovereignty and 
claimed that the IAEA was being manipulated by the US. The conflict between the two sides 
peaked at two specific moments: 1) March 1993, when North Korea declared its intention to 
withdraw from the NPT, and 2) May 1994, when North Korea unilaterally unloaded the spent 
fuel rods from its second reactor and destroyed crucial historical information contained in its 
rods. The conflict gradually eased after the meeting between former US President Jimmy Carter 
and Kim Il Sung at Pyongyang in June 1994, and officially ended with the conclusion of the 
Agreed Framework in October 1994. 
 
42 Michael J. Mazarr, North Korea and the Bomb: A Case Study in Nonproliferation  (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1995), pp. 28-9. 
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Regarding this crisis, the current literature in English usually focuses on two aspects: the 
rationale of North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, or US-North Korea interactions during 
the crisis through the lenses of coercive diplomacy or what Denny Roy called “the Madman 
Theory.”43 In this fruitful academic discussion, however, China’s behavior during the crisis has 
not been studied in great detail. The Chinese literature regarding this crisis has a similar gap: 
the role of China during this nuclear crisis has mostly been neglected. Chinese scholars usually 
maintain that China, following Deng’s maxim of “keep a low profile and bide our time,” 
viewed this dispute as a matter between the US and North Korea, and left it up to the US to 
resolve the issue.44 
In fact, China did act during the crisis and such actions fundamentally affected the outcome of 
the crisis. In terms of China’s perspective, a nuclear-armed North Korea was not in China’s 
best interests as Chinese officials repeatedly stated during the crisis that “China does not want 
to see the existence of nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula.”45 Nevertheless, US military 
action against North Korea or the application of economic sanctions on North Korea could lead 
to its collapse. The loss of this geopolitical buffer and an ensuing unified Korea with US forces 
stationed within there was the least desirable outcome for China. This geopolitical mentality 
was the fundamental driver of China’s actions during the crisis. The rest of this section will 
 
43 Victor D. Cha, "What Do They Really Want?: Obama's North Korea Conundrum," The Washington Quarterly 
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Contemporary China 22, no. 80 (2013); Denny Roy, "North Korea and the 'Madman' Theory," Security Dialogue 
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present a detailed explanation of how this buffer thinking of China toward North Korea drove 
China to protect North Korea through nuanced diplomatic and military means during this crisis. 
China still regarded North Korea as its buffer state after a truce was established on the Korean 
Peninsula in 1953. Chinese officials seldom mentioned the geopolitical importance of North 
Korea to the security of China from the end of the Korean War to the end of the Cold War. The 
lack of reference in this period, however, was not because Chinese leaders had changed how 
they perceived the territorial value of North Korea to China, but mainly because they had not 
faced a situation where the survival of North Korea was endangered. The cooperation between 
China and the US in the 1970s also temporarily buried this potential geopolitical rivalry over 
the Korean Peninsula. Nevertheless, Chinese leaders still believed a US invasion of China 
would occur eventually at some point. This worry could be seen in Deng’s reminder to the most 
senior Chinese officials in 1989 when he was about to retire: 
Regarding the issue of war in the international sphere, the US and the Soviet Union 
will not wage a war against each other now…However, the developed countries’ 
policy of bullying undeveloped countries remains. China has to secure its position 
otherwise others will bully us…We are not afraid of war…We will let the invaders be 
dragged into our territory.46 
The lessening tension between the US and the Soviet Union at the end of 1989 exacerbated 
Chinese leaders’ concerns that the strategic rivalry between China and the US was about to 
resume. The vanishing of the primary force driving the US to accommodate China raised 
concerns for Chinese leaders that China would gradually become the natural target of the US, 
as was evidenced by the increased discussion of the “looming China threat” in Western 
scholarship.47 Chinese President Jiang Zemin’s statement at an enlarged meeting of the Central 
Military Commission (CMC) in January 1993 characterized this concern: 
Deng Xiaoping comrade sharply pointed out that “I hope the Cold War ends. But, I 
feel disappointed now. It is possible that one cold war has just ended but another two 
 
46 Deng Xiaoping, "Gaige Kaifang Zhengce Wending, Zhongguo Da You Xiwang 改革开放政策稳定, 中国大
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47 Nicholas D. Kristof, "The Rise of China."; Denny Roy, "Hegemon on the Horizon? China's Threat to East Asian 
Security," International Security 19, no. 1 (1994); David Shambaugh, "China's Security Policy in the Post‐Cold 
War Era," Survival 34, no. 2 (1992); Ross H. Munro, "Awakening Dragon: The Real Danger in Asia Is from 
China," Policy Review 62, no. 10 (1992). 
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cold wars are beginning.” The current international situations proved that Deng’s 
foresight was totally correct.48 
It was precisely this background that caused Chinese leaders in the post-Cold War era to revisit 
the geopolitical importance of North Korea. The most obvious clue to this re-emergence of 
buffer thinking was the increased reference to the uniqueness of the Sino-North Korean 
relationship in Chinese officials’ statements regarding North Korea, re-emphasizing that the 
bilateral relationship was like “lips and teeth” or was built by the older generation of 
revolutionaries of both sides.49 The message China intended to send to the outside world behind 
those statements was clear—the fate of North Korea and the security of China were so closely 
linked that China and North Korea must fight side by side against their mutual enemy. If North 
Korea was gone, then China would feel cold. Driven by this buffer thinking, China tried to 
maintain the existence of North Korea via nuanced diplomatic and military means after the first 
North Korean nuclear crisis broke out. 
In terms of diplomacy, China helped North Korea avoid a situation in which the international 
community collectively sanctioned North Korea. From China’s perspective, putting any 
pressure on North Korea could trigger a regime collapse, so China had to be very firm on the 
position that no pressure should be put on North Korea. Therefore, China attempted to control 
the nuclear issue so that it would only be addressed in the IAEA and that the involvement of 
the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) would be blocked. Evidently, this position of 
China was one important factor making the Board of the IAEA adopt a moderate wording in 
the 2636 Resolution issued on February 25 1993 to caution North Korea about its nuclear 
activities.50 The language the resolution used was to request “access to two additional sites” 
rather than “accept the special inspections,” which North Korea had been strongly opposed to. 
The resolution even offered North Korea one more month to resume its cooperation in the 
resolution.  
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The UNSC was another diplomatic arena in which China tried to protect North Korea. When 
North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT on March 12 1993, this issue 
was ultimately referred to the UNSC by the IAEA. When asked whether China would veto the 
UNSC’s sanction, Chinese Premier Li Peng hinted that China might veto by saying “North 
Korea is a sovereign country. The international community should listen to their opinion. 
Bringing this issue to the UNSC will not necessarily help solve this issue smoothly.”51 Then 
China tried to quell the publicity of this issue in the UNSC by nixing the idea of holding a 
formal meeting to issue a Presidential Statement on North Korea on April 8 1993.52 Similar to 
the IAEA case, this position of China was the reason why the US did not put sanctions on North 
Korea or use tougher language in the UN Security Resolution 825.53 
The US began to assess available military options against North Korea after the fall of 1993 
including going to war against North Korea directly, a pre-emptive strike, and strengthening 
US forces in South Korea.54 On November 15 1993, top US officials met in the White House 
Situation Room to discuss military options for the first time. After that, the US steadily built 
up its forces on the Korean Peninsula: Patriot missiles were deployed, the arrival of new AH-
64 Apache attack helicopters was sped up, Team Spirit resumed, and a secret discussion of war 
plans between the US and Japan was initiated. US Secretary of Defense William Perry 
personally assessed the readiness of US forces in Asia in April 1994. After the briefing of the 
Cabinet Room on May 19, which was presented by Perry, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff John Shalikashvili, and the Commander of US Forces in Korea Gary Luck, the US was 
ready for a second Korean War.55 
To signal that a military strike on North Korea was unacceptable, China demonstrated its 
determination to fight for North Korea militarily. To China, the steady buildup of US military 
forces on the Korean Peninsula was an important signal of the increasing likelihood of a US 
invasion of North Korea. In response, China began its own military buildup in Northeast China 
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provinces at roughly the same time. On September 22 1993, the Chinese Minister of Defense 
Chi Haotian personally inspected the preparation of the Shenyang Military Region, which was 
mainly responsible for the military warfare on the Korean Peninsula. On the next day, the PLA 
demonstrated its ability to conduct night-time firing.56  In October, Shenyang City issued 
compulsory conscription. In the following months, two new military subdistricts near the Sino-
North Korean border were established in the Shenyang Military Region: the Jinxi Military 
Subdistrict and the Songyuan Military Subdistrict. According to the doctrine of the PLA, a 
military subdistrict serves the purpose of the provision of military reserve forces, mobilization, 
and safeguarding borders. At the peak of the crisis in June 1994, China promised to send 
approximately 85,000 troops from the Shenyang and Jinan Military Districts to North Korea if 
a war broke out on the peninsula.57 
Clearly, this military posture of China was driven by its buffer thinking toward North Korea. 
The best evidence of this line of reasoning is that when the US was preparing to resolve the 
nuclear crisis by military means in June 1994, China accordingly strengthened its affirmation 
that it would never abandon North Korea. On June 7, Jiang emphasized in public when he met 
a visiting North Korean military delegation that “China and North Korea are cordial neighbors, 
like lips and teeth. The two parties, the two countries, and the two armies have a traditional 
friendship.”58 After a few weeks, the commander of the Shenyang Military Region Wang Ke 
visited Pyongyang to show his support to North Korea. In a meeting with Kim Il Sung, Wang 
stated: 
The PRC-DPRK friendship was built by Mao Zedong, Comrade Zhou Enlai, and 
President Kim. This friendship will be further consolidated and developed in the future. 
China will make unremitting efforts to achieve this goal.59 
Regarding China’s protection of North Korea during this crisis, one prevalent point of view in 
the current scholarship is that such behavior was mainly driven by concerns about a potential 
flood of North Korean refugees into China if North Korea collapsed.60 According to this 
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argument: A North Korean defeat by the US and its allies was foreseeable should a war occur. 
A fall of the Kim regime would create millions of North Korean refugees, who would cross the 
Sino-Korean border and flee into China’s northeastern provinces. The economic sanctions 
imposed by the international community on North Korea would bring about the same result. 
Those refugees would load a series of social problems and economic burden to China, and 
hence destroy China’s hard-earned opportunity for economic development after the Sino-
Soviet rapprochement. 
However, this argument is grounded on many questionable assumptions. The first assumption 
is that China was not able to conduct any preventive measures to control the influx of the 
refugees. There were, in fact, many options available to China to deal with the influx of 
refugees at that moment if China wanted to. The simplest way would be to quickly close the 
bridges joining China and North Korea and greatly tighten control over the Sino-North Korean 
border to prevent a refugee influx in the event of war. That was how the Chinese government 
dealt with nuclear crises in the 2000s. In 2006, China did build massive barbed wires fences 
and concrete walls along the Sino-North Korean border to prevent the influx of refugees in the 
event of another North Korean nuclear crisis.61 Building refugee camps inside North Korea 
was also an available option, which China did opt for in 2017.62 
Second, there is a second assumption that North Korean refugees would only move northward. 
It is true that passing through the Sino-North Korean border is the primary route for North 
Korean defectors escaping from North Korea. The reason why the defectors chose this path, 
nevertheless, was not because they preferred China to South Korea but because the 38th parallel 
was in a military standoff. A war on the peninsula would surely break this standoff. Rather than 
moving northward, it is possible that North Koreans would move southward or even simply 
wait for their Korean compatriots during wartime. 
A third assumption is that there is no country or international organization that would help 
China alleviate this humanitarian crisis. The international community, including Japan, South 
Korea, Taiwan, and the US have been providing food, aid, and medical assistance to people in 
North Korea for years. International organizations and non-governmental organizations such 
as the UN’s World Food Programme and Food and Agriculture Organization have also been 
providing humanitarian aid to North Korea. China probably did not have much faith in 
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cooperating with the US and its allies over the refugee issue. But, a question that arises here is 
why did China not even open this option for discussion? 
This chapter does not argue that this widely accepted argument was not a contributing factor 
to China’s protection of North Korea during the nuclear crisis of 1993–94; rather, it seeks to 
point out that the refugee argument alone is not sufficient to drive this protective behavior by 
China. There were many viable options that China could have adopted to lessen the impact of 
refugees if that was China’s main concern. Without factoring in China’s buffer thinking toward 
North Korea, this explanation is incomplete. 
 
5.4 The Persistence of Buffer Thinking 
 
The first North Korean nuclear crisis was officially ended through the Agreed Framework of 
October 1994, under which both the US and North Korea agreed to undertake concrete steps 
to solve the nuclear issue peacefully. North Korea agreed to freeze its three graphite-moderated 
reactors and related nuclear facilities in exchange for the US organizing an international 
consortium, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, to finance and supply 
two light-water reactors to replace the reactors and facilities. The US also agreed to provide 
North Korea with heavy oil at a rate of 500,000 metric tons annually to offset the energy loss 
of North Korea on account of this freeze. More importantly, the US promised to provide a 
formal security guarantee and normalize relations with North Korea while North Korea would 
remain in the NPT and agreed to strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. 
However, neither the US nor North Korea faithfully implemented the Agreed Framework in 
the following years due to various domestic and international factor. The US did not complete 
the construction of the promised light-water reactors for North Korea nor supply heavy oil to 
North Korea at the rate stipulated in the framework. The formal security guarantee to North 
Korea did not materialize in the end either. North Korea, for its part, clandestinely embarked 
on its uranium nuclear program with assistance from Pakistan. To further its nuclear deterrent 
against the US and its allies, North Korea began developing long-range missiles capable of 
striking South Korea and Japan. 
Both the United States and North Korea defended their own violations by accusing one another 
of violating the Agreed Framework first, and this action-reaction conflict between the two sides 
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gradually escalated into a crisis in October 2002. On October 16, the US announced that North 
Korean officials had already admitted to US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly that North 
Korea was covertly conducting a highly enriched uranium (HEU) program.63 This date is 
usually regarded by scholars as the beginning of the Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis. 
This second nuclear crisis was slowly deescalated by China’s proactive intervention from the 
spring of 2003, which contributed to the formalization of a multilateral platform called the Six-
Party Talks to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue in August 2003. In hindsight, the talks 
did not address the root of the nuclear crisis and was ultimately ineffective, but it did help North 
Korea to avoid a coming war with the US in 2003. Regarding China’s rationale of proactive 
intervention in this crisis, there are three prevalent explanations in the existing literature: China 
was being a responsible great power, China was avoiding a nuclear domino effect, and China 
was maintaining a buffer against the US.64 
The first explanation is closely associated with China’s changing perspective of international 
affairs. Scholars arguing along this line believed that China’s perspective of international 
affairs had changed substantively due to its growing domestic economy and global influence. 
As a great power sharing a border with North Korea and constituting its main trading partner, 
China actively or passively acknowledged the necessity of being a responsible stakeholder in 
preventing North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons. Then Vice Foreign Minister Wang 
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Yi’s article “Building Friendship and Partnership with Neighboring Countries” of April 2003 
is evidence of this evolving conceptual change among the Chinese leadership.65 
The main deficiency of this explanation is its inability to provide a satisfactory answer to why 
China only took a more active role in the spring of 2003. The Second North Korean Nuclear 
Crisis can be traced back to the breach of commitments by both the US and North Korea. 
However, from 1994 to 2003, the Chinese government did not issue any policy papers or 
statements indicating a change in how it viewed the issue. The most relevant one is the 
promotion of “new security concept,” which was first advocated by Jiang in 1997. But this 
concept only vaguely called upon other countries to join China in abandoning a Cold-War 
mentality. So if China wanted to be a responsible stakeholder, why did it not intervene earlier? 
The second explanation builds on China’s risk assessment of the potential negative 
consequences of a nuclear-armed North Korea. China had been the only country with nuclear 
weapons in Northeast Asia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. This nuclear monopoly status 
in the region significantly contributed to China’s sense of security and is one important reason 
why China supports the non-nuclear proliferation regime. Some scholars have contended that 
a nuclear-armed North Korea was unlikely to pose a military threat to China in the short term, 
but might trigger a nuclear arms-race in the region in the longer term, in which Japan, South 
Korea, and Taiwan might start to consider acquiring their own nuclear weapons. If that 
occurred, the secure environment China had been enjoying would be destroyed. Charles 
Pritchard, a top aide of the George W. Bush government during the negotiation with North 
Korea, explained this as follows: “The longer-term consequences of failure to resolve the 
nuclear issue could conceivably move the issue to a higher position on Beijing’s list of vital 
national interests.”66 
Similarly, the timing of China’s involvement is a problem that needs to be considered in this 
explanation. Although Jiang claimed that China was “completely in the dark” regarding the 
information of North Korea’s HEU program in a press conference with Bush, given the close 
relationship between China and North Korea maintained via party and military linkages, this 
claim should be taken with a grain of salt.67 As mentioned in the last section, China’s assistance 
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to North Korean nuclear know-how began in the 1970s.68 China agreed to train North Korean 
nuclear scientists and technicians after Kim Il Sung’s visit to China in 1975. In 1977, China’s 
Seventh Ministry of Machine Building, which was responsible for China’s ballistic missile 
development, hosted the North Koreans’ visit to the Lop Nur nuclear test site. One report of 
the UNSC in 2017 also confirmed that Chinese firms provided a major portion of North Korean 
missiles.69 Thus, if the potential nuclear domino effect in Northeast Asia was the key factor 
that propelled China to deal with this nuclear crisis proactively, China could have intervened 
in North Korea’s nuclear weapons program at any given moment. Why wait until the spring of 
2003? 
Since the timing of China’s intervention is a key flaw of the two explanations above, a sound 
explanation should address this issue well. Due to the considerable increase in the possibility 
of a US-North Korea military showdown in early 2003, the maintenance of a North Korean 
buffer against the US on the Korean Peninsula holds more explanatory power than the other 
two explanations. Nevertheless, most works arguing along this line have glossed over how this 
factor affected China’s behavior during this crisis.70 The rest of the section will clarify this 
causation in detail. 
Chinese leaders did not alter how they view North Korea geopolitically after the conclusion of 
the Agreed Framework. After the First North Korean Nuclear Crisis, both China and North 
Korea underwent a leadership consolidation or transition period, during which the Chinese 
leadership continued the perspective that North Korea is a buffer of China on the Korean 
Peninsula. The clearest evidence of this continuity was that top Chinese leaders such as Jiang 
and Li Ruihuan still continued using the term “lips and teeth” to denote the Sino-North Korean 
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relationship.71 Jiang and Kim Jong Il did not visit each other until 2001, but the high-level visits 
between the two sides were as frequent as in the past.72 The lack of a visit by Jiang to North 
Korea in this period could be interpreted in terms of China’s diplomatic principle of non-
intervention in the other’s domestic affairs—China was allowing Kim Jong Il to consolidate 
his power at home after the death of Kim Il Sung in 1994. 
Further evidence that China still viewed North Korea as its buffer against the US can be seen 
in how China responded to the historical visit between the US and North Korea in 2000. 
Normally, Chinese officials do not use the term “lips and teeth” on every occasion they engage 
with North Korea because the term is superlative descriptor of the Sino-North Korean 
relationship. When China applies such a term, the context is often one in which North Korea 
is about to deviate actively or passively from China’s preferred trajectory. By emphasizing “if 
the lips are gone the teeth will feel cold,” China sends a message to the international audience 
that the existence of North Korea in China’s preferred form is something China will not 
compromise on. The historical meeting between Kim Jong Il and US Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright is one example of this. Only one day before Albright and Kim Jong Il were 
set to hold their historic meeting, China sent a huge senior military delegation to North Korea 
for a high-profile celebration of the 50th anniversary of the Korean War. The meeting with 
Albright paled in comparison. The message of this move was that China would not let the US 
dominate North Korea. Chi, the Vice Chairman of the CMC, stated in Pyongyang: 
China and North Korea are connected by mountains and rivers, like lips and teeth. 
Peoples and armies in both countries have built a profound relationship by opposing 
the invasion of powerful countries and struggling to embark on the socialism 
revolution and construction together.73 
Accordingly, this continuity of China’s buffer perspective on North Korea is the key to 
understanding China’s behavior during the Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis. The incident 
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of terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 did not make China think of the danger of terrorism 
at large or the specific danger of the spread of nuclear weapons, but the potential danger of the 
US using the attacks as an excuse to expand its global hegemony. Jiang stated this worry at a 
CCP internal conference two months after the attacks: 
We should see clearly that the US will never give up its global strategy. The US will 
further its global strategy under the name of anti-terrorism, thereby to achieve goals 
which it wanted to achieve but found hard to achieve previously; to strike objects 
which it wanted to strike but could not strike previously; to control nations which it 
wanted to control but could not control previously and; to wade in areas where it 
wanted to wade in but found hard to wade in previously.74 
Setting the survival of North Korea as a top priority, China’s attitude toward this issue had 
been passive at the very beginning, despite US leaders having tried to motivate or even push 
Chinese leaders to weigh in multiple times. In order to avoid a collapse of North Korea, China 
did not exercise any substantive leverage to pressure North Korea, but only repeated the same 
diplomatic rhetoric: that China supports a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula and adheres to peace 
and stability on the peninsula. This posture of China did not change fundamentally even after 
North Korean officials admitted their clandestine HER program to Kelly in October, as it still 
celebrated its relations with North Korea as “lips and teeth” a week later.75 
Though Chinese officials did not explicitly state their geopolitical anxiety that, if North Korea 
was gone, the US would use the Korean Peninsula to invade China in public this time, scholars 
often agree the potential negative impact on China’s security caused by the US military 
presence along the Sino-North Korean border at the time was the main driving force pushing 
China to actively intervene in this crisis later.76 
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思路籌劃工作 [Plan Works by Stable, Secure, Flexible, and Diversified Thinking]," in Jiang Zemin Wenxuan 江
泽民文选 [The Selected Works of Jiang Zemin] (Beijing: People's Press, 2006), p. 367. 
75 "Qingzhu Jin Zhengri Bei Tuiju Wei Chaodang Zongshuji Wu Zhounian Ji Jiandang Wushiqi Zhounian 庆祝
⾦正⽇被推举为朝党总书记五周年暨建党五⼗七周年 [To Celebrate the 5th Anniversary of Kim Jong Il Being 
Promoted as the General Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea and the 57th Anniversary of the Eestablishment 
of the Party]," People's Daily, October 10 2002. 
76 Lin Limin, "Chaohe Weiji Guanli Yu Zhongguo De Waijiao Jueze 朝核危机管理与中国的外交抉择 [The 
Management of North Korean Nuclear Crisis and China's Diplomacy Choice]," p. 33; Mike Chinoy, Meltdown: 
The Inside Story of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis  (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2008), p. 165. The first 
serious debate over the strategic value of North Korea to China among Chinese scholars only occurred after North 
Korea tested its nuclear weapons in 2006. Regarding the first of China’s North Korean policy debates, please see: 
Xu Jin, "Chaoxian Hewenti: Zhongguo Ying Qiangli Jieru Haishi Zhongli Wuxuan 朝鲜核问题:中国应强力介
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Evidently, the proactive intervention of China did appear only after the Chinese leaders 
perceived the survival of North Korea as being truly endangered in the spring of 2003. 
Although there is not yet any available evidence indicating when Chinese leaders decided to 
intervene proactively, the timings of two rounds of China’s intervention did overlap with the 
two tipping points of the crisis, when a military showdown between North Korea and the US 
was seemingly imminent. More importantly, the two rounds of intervention both centered 
around one core objective—preserving North Korea’s existence. 
The first tipping point of the crisis was March 2003. North Korea withdrew from the NPT and 
expelled IAEA inspectors in January. In February, North Korea restarted the reactor that had 
been frozen under the Agreed Framework. In doing so, it could move the 8,000 nuclear fuel 
rods sealed at Yongbyon into the plutonium reprocessing plant for the production of nuclear 
weapons-grade plutonium. In response, the US began to reinforce its military deployment 
around the Korean Peninsula. More military personnel were dispatched to South Korea, 12 B-
1 and 12 B-52 long-range bombers were put on alert for rapid deployment to Guam, more 
reconnaissance aircraft were to be sent, and the USS Carl Vinson was on standby to back up 
the USS Kitty Hawk in Japan. On March 2, North Korea’s fighter jets intercepted a US 
reconnaissance plane over the Sea of Japan. 
Driven by the geopolitical anxiety that the North Korean buffer might disappear if a war 
occurred, China started its first round the intervention. On the one hand, China showed its 
commitment to defending North Korea’s existence by conducting a massive seven-day military 
drill along the Sino-North Korea border.77 The Shengyang Military Region practiced offense, 
defense, and rapid deployment exercises in January 2003. The message to the US was clear—
China would not sit idly by if the US invaded North Korea. On the other hand, China also 
exercised its leverage on North Korea to bring it back to the negotiation table. In early March, 
China symbolically cut off its oil supply to North Korea for three days and then dispatched 
Vice Premier Qian Qichen to visit North Korea to convince Kim to solve this issue by dialogue. 
The result of this round of the intervention was a trilateral talk between China, North Korea, 
and the US in Beijing in April. 
 
入还是中立斡旋 [China’s Role in the Nuclear Issue of the Korean Peninsula: Mediator or Contender?]," Guoji 
Jinji Pinglun 国际经济评论 [International Economic Review] 6(2011): p. 147; "Shades of Red: China's Debate 
over North Korea,"  (International Crisis Group, 2009), p. 5. 
77 Oliver August, "China and US Flex Muscles," The Times, January 24 2003. 
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The failure of the trilateral talk in April heightened the US’ determination to solve this issue 
by military means. In May 2003, US President Bush landed on the aircraft carrier USS 
Abraham Lincoln to give a speech announcing the major combat operations in the Iraq War 
were over, implying North Korea was the next target on the US strike list. Afterward, US forces 
in South Korea subsequently moved southward, pre-emotively avoiding military retaliation 
from North Korea. Richard Perle, a chief adviser to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, 
advocated “President George W. Bush should consider bombing North Korea's nuclear 
production facilities if diplomatic efforts fail to convince Pyongyang to disarm.”78 
Concern about losing its buffer, China initiated a second round of intervention. China 
dispatched the previous Director of the International Department Dai Bingguo, who believed 
the relationship between China and North Korea is like lips and teeth,79 to Russia, North Korea, 
and the US to organize another multilateral talk to avoid impending US military action toward 
North Korea. Dai told Condoleezza Rice, Colin Powell, and Donald Rumsfeld successively 
that China opposed war in any circumstances.80 Most importantly, the official position of China 
on this issue added one more critical term later—a security guarantee to North Korea, as 
announced by Chinese President Hu Jintao in the joint statement between Russia and China.81 
This term marks the beginning of China’s position in the Six-Party Talks. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
The CCP first viewed the Korean Peninsula from a minority nationality perspective. From this 
viewpoint, the peninsula was a piece of land waiting to be liberated by Korean from the 
Japanese colonial rule. Like the case of Taiwan, the value of Korea to the CCP leaders was 
associated mostly with the CCP’s own fights against the Japanese and the KMT in the early 
period after the CCP was formed. It was the Korean War that fundamentally changed the way 
China perceived the peninsula, from non-geopolitical to having geopolitical value. North Korea 
 
78 Eric Rosenberg, "U.S. Official Backs Bombing N. Korea," Times, June 12 2003.  
79 Please see footnote 74. 
80 Dai Bingguo, Zhanlue Duihua: Dai Bingguo Huiyilu 战略对话: 戴秉国回忆录 [Strategic Dialogue: Dai 
Bingguo's Memoir]  (Beijing: People's Publishing House, 2016), pp. 209-17. 
81 "Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Yu Erluosi Lianbang Lianhe Shengming 中华人民共和国与尔罗斯联邦联合
声明 The Joint Statement between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation," People's Daily, 
May 29 2003. 
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became a critical buffer state keeping the US away from the Sino-North Korean border. A 
crucial factor behind the decision of Chinese leaders to defend North Korea was the belief that 
it was necessary to “maintaining the existence of North Korea now, otherwise the US may 
invade China via North Korea later.” The path by which the Japanese Empire invaded China 
via the peninsula further strengthened the necessity of maintaining North Korean as a buffer. 
This buffer thinking toward North Korea reappeared in the minds of Chinese leaders after the 
end of Cold War, and resulted in China’s military and diplomatic protection of North Korea 
during the First North Korean Nuclear Crisis. Eight years later, when China faced another 
nuclear crisis wherein North Korea’s survival was endangered again, this geopolitical mentality 
was still the most persuasive factor driving China’s behavior of intervening in the conflict 
between the US and North Korea. 
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CH 6 The Case of Mongolia 
 
 
 
 
This chapter shifts the focus of the discussion from the Sino-US buffer system to the Sino-
Soviet buffer system, which centers on the case of Mongolia. The purpose of this chapter is to 
bridge the causation between China’s buffer thinking toward Mongolia and China’s Mongolia 
policies. It argues that China’s Mongolia policy since the 1960s can be viewed as a decades-
long process in which China attempts to neutralize Mongolia in political, military, and legal 
domains. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s very first policy toward Mongolia was to 
support the independence of the Mongolian People’s Republic (MPR) on the basis of the 
principle of national self-determination. This policy served two critical political needs of the 
CCP in the 1920s to 1950s—reconciling Chinese nationalism and the geopolitical interests of 
Soviet Union and weakening the Republic of China (ROC)’s support base. China’s buffer 
thinking toward Mongolia was formed in the mid-1964 in the context of the Sino-Soviet rivalry. 
This thinking, combined with China’s failure to politically neutralize Mongolia, contributed to 
the initiation of the Third Front Construction (TFC, sanxian jianshe 三线建设). Driven by the 
same geopolitical rationale, Deng’s China actively sought to neutralize Mongolia militarily 
during the Sino-Soviet rapprochement in the 1980s. The thinking also contributed to the 
conclusion of the Sino-Mongolian Friendship and Cooperation Relationship Treaty with 
Mongolia of 1994. 
The first section of this chapter will detail the early view of the CCP on the territory controlled 
by the MPR. The second section portrays the formation of a Sino-Soviet rivalry relationship, 
and the process in which China’s buffer thinking toward Mongolia evolved from this 
relationship. The three subsequent sections will examine the explanatory power of this thinking 
through the cases of the TFC in the 1960s, Soviet military withdrawal from Mongolia in the 
1980s, and the demise of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. 
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6.1 The CCP’s Early View of Mongolia: Reluctant Minority 
Nationality 
 
In the Qing Dynasty, Mongolia could be separated into five subregions: Northern Mongolia 
(which was also called Outer Mongolia), Southern Mongolia (which was also called Inner 
Mongolia), Qinghai Mongolia, Ningxia Mongolia, and Xinjiang Mongolia. The Qing Empire 
dominated the latter four regions effectively, but its control over Outer Mongolia was relatively 
weak. When the empire suffered from external pressure and internal turmoil in the mid-19th 
century, some Mongolians in Outer Mongolia began to seek to break away from Qing control. 
They gained the most support from the Russian Empire, which attempted to build a series of 
buffer states along China’s northern frontier for its strategic and commercial interests in Inner 
Asia.1 However, Russia also suffered its own domestic revolution at the beginning of the 20th 
century. Therefore, the political status of Outer Mongolia vacillated between Chinese control, 
autonomy, and independence from the 1910s to the 1920s. Eventually, the MPR was 
established by the strong support from the Soviet Union in 1924.2  
The Mongolian independence issue ranked highly as a priority in CCP policy, but the CCP’s 
initial perception of Mongolia’s value and its first policy toward Mongolia was strongly 
influenced, if not controlled, by the Soviet Union. To understand why this was the case, it is 
necessary to understand the “patron and client” relationship between the Soviet Union and the 
CCP.  
The CCP’s asymmetrical reliance on the Soviet Union was the basis upon which the Soviet 
Union could exercise its control over the CCP. To foment a communist revolution in China, 
the Communist International (Comintern), which the Soviet Union designed as a tool to realize 
a global anti-imperialism revolution, started to reach out to prominent Chinese communist 
leaders such as Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao in the early 20th century. With the funding from 
and the guidance of the Comintern, the CCP was officially established in 1921 as a branch of 
the Comintern in China. Naturally, the survival of this nascent communist party in China 
 
1 Li Yu-shu, "Cong Menggong Liushi Nian Lai Yanbian Dui Waimeng Xiankung De Tantao 從蒙共六十年來演
變對外蒙現況的探討 [Probe of Changes in Mongolian Communism in Outer Mongolian Current Situation since 
1971]," Mengzang Zhuanti Yanjiu Congshu 蒙藏專題研究叢書 [Research Series on Special Topics] 9(1985): p. 
21; Sergey Radchenko, "Choibalsan's Great Mongolia Dream," Inner Asia 11, no. 2 (2009): p. 234. 
2 The MPR refers to Mongolia hereafter in this chapter. 
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depended on all kinds of support from the Comintern encompassing funding, equipment, 
ideological and theoretical guidance, and international political recognition. 
An extensive pro-Soviet Union leadership inside the CCP was the main conduit for the Soviet 
Union to exercise its influence and control over the CCP. Before the rise of Mao Zedong, top 
CCP leaders such as Chen, Ju Qiubai, Li Lisan, Zhou Enlai, Wang Ming, and Bo Gu were all 
anointed by the Comintern.3  Influential CCP members such as Wang, Zhu De, Nie Rongzhen, 
Deng Xiaoping, and Yang Shangkun were also recruited and trained in Moscow. The pro-
Soviet Union leadership was usually responsible for reconciling and even quelling other CCP 
members’ disagreements and resistance to Comintern directives.4 
This layer of the relationship between the CCP and the Soviet Union serves as a starting point 
to understanding how the CCP initially perceived the value of Mongolia. After separating 
Mongolia from China, the Soviet Union made its geopolitical interests in Mongolia clear in the 
treaty recognizing the MPR. It stipulated that “The MPR will not allow activities aiming at 
compromising the security interests of the Soviet Union such as recruiting or shipping enemy’s 
weaponry to occur on its territory.”5 For most Chinese at that time, the Soviet Union’s support 
of MPR independence and subsequent diplomatic recognition, not only undermined China’s 
sovereignty but also violated the Treaty of Kyakhta of 1915. Accordingly, the Republic of 
China (ROC) government in Beijing criticized the Soviet Union’s de facto control over 
Mongolia as a demonstration of the Soviet Union’s territorial ambitions on China. However, 
the CCP did not view this issue this way. Siding with the Soviet Union, the CCP put pressure 
on the ROC government to recognize Mongolia. Li Dazhou argued against the ROC Foreign 
Minister Gu Weijun in 1922 that Mongolians would have a better life if they were under the 
rule of the Soviet Union.6 Zhang Guotao, a vital member of the CCP Politburo, also publicly 
defended the Soviet Union: 
 
3 Michael H. Hunt, The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy  (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1996), p. 87. 
4 Historians of the CCP all pointed out that the CCP leadership sometimes had doubt or even complaints about 
the line and order the Comintern demanded of the CCP, especially on the issue of joining the Kuomintang under 
the First United Front. Please see: Alexander Pantsov, The Bolsheviks and the Chinese Revolution: 1919-1927  
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000), CH 4; Arif Dirlik, The Origins of Chinese Communism  (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1989), CH 9; Tony Saich, ed. The Rise to Power of The Chinese Communist Party: 
Documents and Analysis (Armonk, New York & London, England: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), pp. xli-xlii. 
5 "Laonong Zhengfu Yu Menggu Dinyue Shi 劳农政府与蒙古定约事 [On the Treaty between the Soviet Union 
Government and Mongolia],"  (Institute of Modern History Online Database, Academia Sinica). 
6 Liu Xiaoyuan, Reins of Liberation: An Entangled History of Mongolia Independence, Chinese Territoriality, 
and Great Power Hegemony, 1911-1950  (Washington, D.C.; Stanford, Calif.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; 
Stanford University Press, 2006), p. 81. 
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It [Mongolia] has only three options: first, being a colony of Japan and the Russian 
White Army; second, being a slaughterhouse of the Chinese warlords; third, allowing 
Mongolians to be independent…To achieve a real independence, it is necessary for 
Mongolia to build the closest relationship with the new Russia…There is only one 
decision that Chinese should make immediately: Should we let Mongolia become a 
colony of Japan, the Russian White Army, or Chinese warlords? Or praise and envy 
the newly independent MPR, admire new Russia’s righteous behavior, and then build 
a close relationship with Mongolians in practice.7 
Clearly, minority nationality was the CCP’s first view of Mongolia. For the CCP, the correct 
way to solve the Mongolian independence issue was to follow Vladimir Lenin’s principle of 
national self-determination and federation system. Since Mongolians were very distinct from 
Han Chinese nationally and economically, they deserved the right of national self-
determination. The CCP also upheld a position that Mongolia should be able to freely choose 
whether it wanted to be a part of the future Chinese Federal Republic or not. Even if Mongolia 
agreed to associate with China in the future, it would be still outside of China in an 
administrative sense. Accordingly, the policy of supporting Mongolian independence was 
formulated in 1922.8 The CCP further wrote this position into the draft of the CCP Constitution 
in 1923 and the 1931 Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic. 
In fact, the policy of supporting Mongolian independence did not so much reflect the CCP’s 
own revolutionary ideology as it did the Soviet Union’s control over the CCP. While the CCP 
expended much effort to defend its Mongolia policy, it kept an ironic silence on the fact that 
the Soviet Union had de facto control over Mongolia, which directly contradicted the spirit of 
national self-determination. The CCP also refrained from mentioning the Russian Empire in 
the manifesto of 1922.9 Certainly, it is hard to prove that the Comintern was behind this policy, 
 
7 Sheng Renxue, Zhang Guotao Yanlun Yu Nianpu 张国焘言论与年谱 [Speeches and the Chronological Record 
of Zhang Guotao]  (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 1985), pp. 129-30. 
8 "Guanyu Guoji Diguozhuyi Yu Zhongguo He Zhongguo Gongchandang De Jueyian 关于国际帝国主义与中
国和中国共产党的決議案 [About the Resolution on International Imperialism and China and the CCP]," in 
Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenjian Xuanji: 1921-25 中共中央文件选集: 1921-25 [The Selected Documents of the 
CCP Central Committee: 1921-25], ed. The Central Archive (Beijing: The CCP Central Party School Press, 1991), 
pp. 6-63; "Zhongguo Gongchandang Dierci Quanguo Dahui Xuanyan 中国共产党第二次全国大会宣言 [The 
Manifesto of the Second National Congress of the CCP]," p. 111. 
9 This manifesto used a lot of space to criticize the territorial ambition and economic exploitation of imperialist 
countries such as Japan, the US, and Britain in China since 1839, but it intentionally kept silence on the role of 
the Russian Empire, which gained more territories from China than any country did in this history. Sarah Paine 
precisely calculated the size of the territory the Russian Empire gained from China in this period. Excluding Outer 
Mongolia, the territory Russia took from China equals five times the area of Japan and more than seven times that 
of Great Britain. Including Outer Mongolia, it exceeds that of India and one-third the size of the US. Please see: 
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but a policy trend of the CCP became increasingly clear in the following years—whenever 
there was a conflict between Chinese nationalism and the Soviet Union’s geopolitical interests, 
the CCP prioritized the latter over the former. In other words, the national self-determination 
principle was actually a tool that the CCP used to reconcile this conflict and, most importantly, 
to weaken the support base of the ROC government. 
This policy trend continued following the rise of Mao in the CCP after 1935. Historians usually 
agree that Mao and Moscow held very different visions of how to realize the communist 
revolution in China in many respects.10 Nevertheless, evidence suggests that the policy trend 
of prioritizing the Soviet Union’s geopolitical interests did not change fundamentally in Mao’s 
era. For example, when Edgar Snow asked about the nature of the relationship between 
Mongolia and the Soviet Union, Mao immediately corrected him by saying that “The 
relationship between Outer Mongolia and the Soviet Union, now and in the past, has always 
been based on the principle of complete equality.”11 Mao’s 1939 article on “The Chinese 
Revolution and the CCP” also evidenced this.12 
During the Anti-Japanese War (1937–45), the CCP displayed a puzzling policy shift vis-à-vis 
Mongolia, by which it abandoned its support of Mongolian independence. The CCP’s new 
policy on Mongolia appeared in Mao’s “On the New Stage” report at the Sixth Plenary Session 
of the Sixth Central Committee in 1938.13 In this report, the CCP did not advocate the idea of 
“respecting the will of Mongolians” any longer, and the idea of the Chinese Federal Republic 
was replaced by “uniting China together with Han Chinese and other minority nationalities.” 
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Least Bad Choice: The Tortuous Course of Establishing the Sino-Soviet Alliance (1944-1950)]," Jindaish Yanjiu 
近代史研究 [Modern Chinese History Studies] 6(2010). 
11 Edgar Snow, Red Star over China, pp. 443-4. 
12 In many ways, this article was Mao’s version of the manifesto of 1922 mentioned previously, in which he 
attempted to explain the Chinese revolution in his own terms. While Mao harshly criticized the way in which the 
US, Britain, France, and Japan imposed colonial rule on China since the Opium War, the role of the Soviet Union, 
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article. Please see: Mao Zedong, "Zhongguo Geming Yu Zhongguo Gongchandang 中国革命与中国共产党 [The 
Chinese Revolution and the CCP]," in Maozedong Xuanji 毛泽东选集 [The Selected Works of Mao Zedong] 
(Beijing: People's Publishing House: 1991), Vol. 2, pp. 621-56. 
13 "Lun Xin Jieduan 论新阶段 [On the New Stage]," p. 619.  
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In 1940, the CCP further asserted that Mongolians in Inner Mongolia should build a united 
country with Han Chinese under the Kuomintang (KMT)’s the Three People’s Principle.14 
The Soviet Union’s pressure on the CCP, again, is the key to understanding this policy shift. 
To make China strong enough to trap and stop Japanese military ventures, the Soviet Union 
asked the CCP to ally with the KMT under Chiang Kai-shek’s command in 1935. This order 
encountered widespread opposition inside the CCP from both pro-Soviet Union members and 
non-pro-Soviet Union members, but the CCP ultimately obeyed and fought with the KMT 
under the Second United Front.15 For this reason, the CCP had to adjust its Mongolia policy in 
the KMT’s favor. Not surprisingly, the CCP immediately returned to its previous position after 
the Japanese surrendered, when the power struggle against the KMT in the second phase of the 
Chinese Civil War (1945–49) required the CCP to demonstrate its policy differences from the 
KMT.16 
It should be emphasized here that the genuine attitude of the CCP toward Mongolian 
independence might have been less clear than it was on the surface. Much evidence suggests 
that the CCP may have harbored ambiguous sentiments toward Mongolia. For example, Alan 
Wachman discovered that maps of China printed on many stamps issued by the CCP to CCP-
controlled areas before 1949 paradoxically showed that China’s territory still encompassed 
Mongolia.17 Those maps might not reflect the CCP’s real attitude toward Mongolia, but maps 
do have a function of conveying an idea of who belongs to a certain community and what 
 
14 "Guanyu Kangzhanzhong Mengguminzu Wenti Tigang 关于抗战中蒙古民族问题提纲 [An Outline of the 
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territory is included in the community. In this sense, the CCP might not have fully embraced 
the policy of supporting Mongolian independence on a psychological level. 
The lack of a consistent term to refer to the MPR was another supporting evidence of the 
equivocal sentiments of the CCP, which implies the CCP had not taken the reality of an 
independent Mongolia seriously at the time. In 1932, the CCP Central Committee used a 
politically correct  term, “the MPR,” in one internal document.18 However, in another internal 
document the following year, the CCP used “the Outer Mongolia People’s Republic” instead.19 
In 1934, this term changed into “the Outer Mongolia Republic.”20 In 1941, the CCP publicly 
used “Outer Mongolia,” a term implying that the MPR was still a part of China.21 
Despite the CCP’s reluctance, reconciling Chinese nationalism and the Soviet Union’s 
geopolitical interests, and weakening the ROC through the principle of self-determination 
based on a minority nationality perspective continued until the establishment of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC). Mao did harbor a desire to bring Mongolia back under China’s 
control, but this desire never eclipsed the practical imperative of gaining the Soviet Union’s 
support. For instance, Mao carefully pried into the Soviet Union’s position on the possibility 
of reincorporating Mongolia into China in a meeting with Anastas Mikoyan in 1949. However, 
when Mikoyan refused this possibility, he immediately backed down from the idea, saying 
“We certainly will not defend the great Han chauvinism policy and will never mention the issue 
of Mongolian unification again.”22 Also, in his meetings with Stalin in Moscow on December 
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16 1949 and January 2 1950, Mao did not expend too much effort in arguing for the return of 
Mongolia, but tried to secure Soviet military protection and material assistance for the PRC.23 
This position also explains why Mao summoned Zhou to prepare to recognize the MPR right 
after Mao met Stalin.24 The continuity of this policy trend after the establishment of the PRC 
is best summarized by Hu Hua’s article in People’s Daily right before the PRC formally 
recognized the MPR: 
The reactionary government of the KMT, which has been insisting on the great Han 
chauvinism, does not want to recognize the independence of Mongolia…The 
independence of Mongolia is the birth of a new country based on the principle of 
national self-determination…It is very odd that some Chinese even have this suzerain 
sentiment that Mongolia must belong to China’s territorial map. They are indeed 
poisoned by the great Han chauvinism…The Soviet government made it very clear in 
exchanged documents that it will respect the independence and territorial integrity of 
the MPR. The Soviet Union will never seize the opportunity to claim the MPR as its 
territory.25 
 
6.2 The Formation of China’s Buffer Thinking toward Mongolia 
 
As shown in the cases of Taiwan and North Korea, the geopolitical value of a particular 
territory only became apparent to Chinese leaders when they began to perceive a rivalrous 
relationship forming around the territory. The case of Mongolia is no exception. The way 
Chinese leaders perceived the value of Mongolia to China was subordinated to the broader 
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context of Sino-Soviet relations. In the Sino-Soviet honeymoon period at the beginning of the 
PRC’s establishment, geopolitical values of Mongolian territory did not exist in the minds of 
Chinese leaders. When China perceived the Soviet Union as a hostile rival in the 1960s, 
Mongolia’s geopolitical value gradually surfaced: Mongolia was one route the Soviet Union 
could take to invade China from the north. The task of this section, therefore, is to provide a 
detailed illustration of how China’s buffer thinking toward Mongolia emerged in the minds of 
Chinese leaders in the context of Sino-Soviet rivalry.   
China started to work on its first national defense plan to address the new geopolitical 
environment it faced after the Korean War (1950–53). After a series of studies at the end of 
1953, Chinese leaders concluded that China needed to seize the time to modernize its forces as 
soon as possible, and that the Soviet Union’s assistance was the key to achieving that end.26 
From that time, China started to rely on the Soviet Union for military modernization, which 
included learning from Soviet military knowledge and experiences of modern warfare, hiring 
Soviet officials to train the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), reforming the PLA on the basis 
of Soviet institutions, attending the Soviet Union’s military drills, sending students to study in 
Moscow, and updating military equipment.27 In February 1955, Peng Dehuai consulted the 
Soviet Minister of Defense Georgy Zhukov in Moscow on the matter of a proper national 
defense strategy for China.28 In December, the very first strategic guidelines for China in the 
PRC’s history—active defense (jiji fangyu 积极防御)—were formulated at an enlarged Central 
Military Committee (CMC) meeting.29 
Unsurprisingly, these strategic guidelines did not assign any geopolitical significance to the 
territory of Mongolia. The guidelines required China to deter or delay a surprise attack from 
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imperialism by employing several political and military means simultaneously, including 
enlarging activities of international united fronts, strengthening fortifications along the Chinese 
coast, and diversification of industrial construction.30 The perceived threat and the areas China 
was defending were unambiguous under this military posture—the threat posed by the US and 
its military  from the east and south of China, i.e., the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, and Vietnam. 
The north of China was an area of zero military threat in the minds of Chinese leaders during 
this amicable period in the Sino-Soviet relationship. 
On the other hand, Chinese leaders also regarded Mongolia as a socialist brother country at that 
time. Mongolians assisted the CCP’s socialist revolution in China in many ways throughout 
history. Ideologically, Mongolians, who achieved their own liberation earlier than the Chinese 
did, served as a good model for the CCP to sell the socialist revolution to other minority 
nationalities in China. Materially, Mao’s insistence on relocating the CCP to a place close to 
the borders of the MPR to acquire the Soviet Union and the MPR’s salvation after the Long 
March proved to be a correct decision.31 The MPR also participated in defeating the Japanese 
during World War II (1939–45) and repelling the Americans in the Korean War. This socialist 
comradeship between China and Mongolia was reflected in how an editorial in People’s Daily 
described this relationship in 1954: 
The friendship between Chinese and Mongolians, which was based on Marxism-
Leninism, developed in the wars. It is unbreakable…The fraternal friendship between 
the two peoples entered into a new era after the establishment of the PRC.32  
In this context, although some Chinese leaders did wish that China could reunite with Mongolia 
someday, that wish stemmed more from Chinese nationalism than from geopolitical concerns. 
Liu Shaoqi’s two exchanges with the Soviet Union were exemplified this. The first exchange 
was Liu’s report to the Soviet Union three months before the establishment of the PRC. As 
mentioned previously, the Soviet Union’s unwavering offer of support of MPR independence 
was very clear to Mao in the Mao-Mikoyan meetings of February 1949. Liu, who was writing 
a report briefing the Soviet Union on China’s new policies, carefully asked Stalin again in July 
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whether China should recognize the MPR on the basis of the self-determination principle. Liu 
hinted that some Chinese raised questions about Mongolian independence. 33  The second 
exchange occurred with Mikoyan’s visit to China in 1956. The new Soviet Union leader Nikita 
Khrushchev denounced Stalin and his policies after the death of Stalin. Chinese leaders 
speculated that this might result in the Soviet Union changing its position on Mongolian 
independence. By comparing Sino-Mongolian history with Soviet-Ukrainian history, Liu told 
Mikoyan that the Mongolian secession from China pained the Chinese. 34 
Sino-Soviet relations gradually deteriorated after the Twentieth Congress of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union in 1956. Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization campaign, the Soviet Union’s 
initiative of peaceful coexistence with the capitalist camp, and the failure of Mao’s Great Leap 
Forward, were three particularly important factors that lead Mao to perceive that his position 
in the CCP was in peril. To shift this internal tension to an external target, Mao initiated an 
ideological polemic and diplomatic campaigns against the Soviet Union in 1958. In response, 
the Soviet Union isolated China from the socialist camp and withdrew all Soviet experts and 
advisers from China in 1960.35 As this bilateral friction intensified each year, navigating the 
relationship with the Soviet Union became a national security issue for China. 
From a buffer state point of view, a Sino-Soviet rivalry emerged in mid-1964. As defined in 
Chapter Three, the perception of an impending military invasion is a necessary condition for 
the formation of a rivalrous relationship between two states. It is not clear when exactly China 
formally identified the Soviet Union as a hostile rival ready to invade China, as many Chinese 
leaders frequently expressed their worry about the possibility of a Soviet invasion of China 
after 1960.36 Nevertheless, two vital meetings among the Chinese leadership in mid-1964 can 
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retrospectively be regarded as marking the beginning of this view. The first meeting was a CCP 
Politburo meeting on May 27 1964, wherein Mao explained the necessity of initiating the TFC 
(discussed in detail in the following section) and the Socialist Education Movement for China’s 
preparation for a Soviet invasion.37 The second was a military meeting held in July, at which 
Mao specifically ordered military leaders to pay equal attention to the threat posed by the Soviet 
Union from the north to the threat posed by the US from the east.38 In hindsight, the two 
meetings fundamentally altered China’s 1957 military posture, pointing to a radical change in 
how China perceived the nature of its relationship with the Soviet Union from an ally to a 
potential enemy. 
The emergence of this Sino-Soviet rivalry gradually caused Chinese leaders to perceive 
Mongolian territory geopolitically. In contrast to their previous attitude that linking Mongolian 
independence to Chinese nationalism only, Chinese leaders now began to associate this 
territory with the Soviet Union’s potential territorial ambitions on China. Mongolia, along with 
other territories taken by the Russian Empire while China was militarily weak, was taken by 
the Soviet Union against China’s will. Put it differently, Chinese leaders’ uneasiness about 
Mongolian independence was no longer focused on only Chinese nationalism, but also the fact 
that a potential invader took Mongolia. The geopolitical value added to Mongolia could be seen 
in many public statements Mao made on Mongolia in 1964.39 
However, China’s actions, which entailed a changed military posture toward the Soviet Union 
and diplomatically raising the return of Mongolia, had an unwanted effect of expediting 
military cooperation between the Soviet Union and Mongolia. Having a wary eye on China, 
Mongolia formally requested the Soviet Union’s military protection to safeguard its 
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independence in December 1965.40 In January 1966, the Soviet Union signed a twenty-year 
defense treaty with Mongolia. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Politburo 
adopted a resolution of stationing Soviet forces in Mongolia the following year.41 In 1968, the 
Soviet forces moved into Mongolian territory, meaning the Mongolian buffer between China 
and the Soviet Union officially disappeared in the sense of the concept of buffer state. 
Evidently, the conclusion of the Soviet-Mongolian defense treaty of 1966 made Chinese 
leaders very anxious about China’s geopolitical vulnerability against Mongolia. To Chinese 
leaders, the Soviet-Mongolian defense treaty served as a part of the Soviet Union’s strategic 
encirclement of China from the north and west, in the context of an emerging Soviet-US grand 
alliance targeting China.42 Mongolia would be one military springboard for the Soviet Union 
to launch a military strike on China under the Brezhnev Doctrine. Although the Soviet Union 
might not seriously consider launch such a strike on or occupy China, the forces deployed in 
Mongolia was quite threatening in the eyes of Chinese leaders. The statement of Sun Yixian, 
the Second Secretary at China’s Embassy to the MPR at that moment, precisely characterized 
this geopolitical anxiety: 
Beijing is less than 500 kilometers away from the Sino-Mongolian border. They [the 
Soviet forces] plan to advance to Beijing in a week…Although the military posture of 
the Soviet forces in Mongolia is defensive in nature, not offensive, there is no question 
that the Soviet Union certainly regards Mongolia as its forward base to invade China’s 
hinterland in terms of strategy.43 
Similar to the cases of Taiwan and North Korea, historical memory fueled this geopolitical 
anxiety. During the Sino-Soviet split, Chinese leaders kept analogizing what the Soviet Union 
was doing to the Tsar’s expansion into China in the Qing Dynasty. Labelling Brezhnev as a 
“new Tsar,” the assessment that the Soviet Union was on the path of emulating the Russian 
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Empire was very prevalent among Chinese leaders. A book edited by the editorial departments 
of People’s Daily, Hongqi Magazine, and PLA Daily together solemnly warned: 
The Soviet revisionist new Tsar has completely taken over the old Tsar’s expansionist 
tradition…They have turned a number of East European countries and the Mongolian 
People’s Republic into their colonies and dependencies. They vainly attempt to occupy 
more Chinese territories, openly copying the old Tsar’s policy towards China and 
clamouring that China’s northern frontier was marked by the Great Wall.44 
As outlined in Chapter Three, buffer thinking is a geopolitical mentality made by one pair of 
rivals, determine to “secure this territory against my rival now, otherwise the rival may launch 
a military attack from it against me in the future once the rival has occupied the territory.” What 
we have seen so far is only the second half of the thinking: China believed that the Soviet would 
use Mongolia to attack China. Puzzlingly, however, China seemed to sit idly, accepting the 
process as its rival gradually absorbed the Mongolian buffer from 1966. Why did China’s 
geopolitical anxieties against Mongolia not generate the same corresponding behavior of 
securing the buffer as it did in the conflicts against the US for Taiwan and North Korea? The 
following section will answer this question. 
 
6.3 Retreat from the Borderland: Politically Neutralizing 
Mongolia—In Vain  
 
When it came to the cases of Taiwan and North Korea, what “securing this buffer” means for 
China was the adoption of offensive military measures to stop the rival from gradually taking 
over the buffer. However, the Mongolian case did not follow this pattern. While Chinese 
leaders did acknowledge the Soviet military threat from Mongolia, they did not adopt any 
offensive military measures to stop the Soviet Union from stationing in Mongolia. How can 
we explain China’s inaction toward securing the Mongolian buffer? The task of this section is 
to answer this question from the perspective of China’s buffer thinking toward Mongolia. 
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In fact, China did react against the Soviet occupation of the Mongolian buffer based on its 
buffer thinking toward Mongolia. Instead of using force to maintain the existence of the buffer, 
China launched a grand strategic retreat from the Sino-Mongolian border from 1964 onwards. 
This was especially embodied in the TFC, the most famous national construction of China in 
the 1960s. The rationale behind this strategic retreat was less about luring the Soviet forces in 
deep than keeping an artificial buffer zone between China and the Sino-Mongolian border. 
The origin of the TFC was a defense assessment by Chinese leaders for how to properly defend 
against a surprise attack from an enemy of China. A report of the PLA General Staff 
Department in April 1964, which analyzed the economic vulnerability of China during wartime, 
was the formal beginning of the TFC.45 Mao agreed with this report in August and a special 
working group focusing on the study of the TFC was hence established. The purpose of the 
TFC was to build and reserve enough self-sustaining warring capability for a future war in 
China’s great interior. Military factories, steel mills, oil fields, power plants, coal mines, salt 
mines, railways, storage houses, universities, research institutions, and food storehouses were 
all moved to or built in China’s western and southwestern areas encompassing Sichuan, 
Qinghai, Gansu, Shaanxi, Chongqing, Guizhou, Ningxia, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, and Yunnan. 
This enormous project lasted more than a decade and cost more than half of China’s national 
investment at its peak during 1966–70.46 
The Soviet military threat was a critical—if not the main—factor prompting China to initiate 
the TFC. The conventional wisdom on the rationale behind the initiation of the TFC was an 
escalated US military threat from Vietnam.47  However, there are at least three important 
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reasons suggesting that China’s perception of the Soviet military threat also contributed to its 
initiation. 
First, the timing of the TFC initiation closely overlapped with the timing of Chinese leaders’ 
identification of the Soviet Union as China’s geopolitical rival. Much evidence reveals that 
when Chinese leaders were discussing the TFC, the Soviet military threat to China was often 
included in the conversation. Mao, for instance, stated at a meeting of the Politburo Standing 
Committee of the CCP on June 8 1964: 
Ted Hill [Chairman of the Communist Party of Australia] said he knew that 
Khrushchev is a bad guy. We know that, but we do not want to talk about it in public. 
[We] have to build the first, second, and third fronts to prepare for the war…[We] have 
to have the third front, have a hinterland in the southwest, be faster.48 
When Mao discussed the military and strategic affairs of China with senior Chinese leaders on 
July 2 of the same year, he said: 
We have to build the third front in Tianjin and Beijing areas. We cannot focus only on 
the east side and ignore the north side. [We] have to prepare everything for a possible 
invasion from our enemy.49 
Zhou said to senior military leaders at a war preparation meeting on May 21 1965: 
Imperialism [the US] and revisionism [the Soviet Union] ally with each other and 
attack us, and may even launch a nuclear war. These are all the worst-case scenarios. 
We have to prepare…We could only do this step by step…Do the small and big third 
fronts.50 
Moreover, the so-called escalation of US military involvement in the Vietnam War (1955–75) 
was not realized until mid-1965. The US started to play a chief role in Vietnamese affairs after 
France left Indochina in 1955. However, the US rather restrained its military presence in 
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Vietnam until August 1964. The first US ground troops arrived in Vietnam in March 1965 due 
to North Vietnam’s Vietcong raid on the US and South Vietnamese forces. Lorenz Luthi and 
Andrew Kennedy’s works both pointed out that the time that Chinese leaders started to 
seriously think about a possible war between China and the US over the Vietnam issue was no 
earlier than mid-1965.51 In other words, by mid-1965, the TFC had already been in process. 
Second, the geographical distribution of the TFC implied where China’s main threat lay. In 
November 1964, the CCP Central issued a document asking certain areas to strengthen the 
construction of the TFC and the preparation for a coming war.52 Those areas included Dongbei, 
Huabei, Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning, Inner Mongolia, and Shanxi. Geographically, those 
areas were far away from China’s coastline, which supposedly would suffer the first wave of 
attack of US invasion on China, but next to the Sino-Mongolian and Sino-Soviet borders, which 
would be front lines of Sino-Soviet military conflicts. So if the Soviet Union had not been one 
of the potential enemies against whom China intended to defend, which country would have 
been able to launch a military strike to those areas at that moment? 
Furthermore, the pivot of the TFC seemed to follow the military reality. Chinese leaders 
diverted most of the resources invested in the TFC to the southwestern area of China, especially 
to Panzhihua city in Sichuan. Scholars usually agree on the importance of Panzhihua to the 
TFC.53 Mao once emphasized the importance of Panzhihua to his war preparation by saying, 
“I cannot sleep well if the construction of the Panzhihua steel mill has yet to be properly 
completed.”54 Interestingly, the city was only approximately 500 kilometers away from the 
Sino-Vietnamese border, but very far away from Soviet arms range. If the key purpose of the 
TFC had been to preserve China’s war capabilities against the US in Vietnam, why would 
China have put the core of the project so close to the Sino-Vietnamese border? 
 
51 Andrew Bingham Kennedy, The International Ambitions of Mao and Nehru: National Efficacy Beliefs and the 
Making of Foreign Policy, pp. 110-1; Lorenz M. Luthi, The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World, 
p. 316. 
52 "Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Jiaqiang Yier Xian De Houfang Jianshe He Beizhan Gongzuo De Zhishi 中
共中央关于加强一二线的后方建设和备战工作的指示 [The CCP Central's Instruction on Strengthening the 
Interior Construction and War Preparation on the First and Second Fronts]," in Jianguo Yilai Zhongyao Wenxian 
Xuanbian 建国以来重要文献选编 [A Selection of Important Documents since the Founding of the PRC], ed. 
CCP Central Institute of Historical Documents (Beijing: Central Party Literature Press, 1992), Vol. 19, pp. 312-
6. 
53 Judd C. Kinzley, "Crisis and the Development of China's Southwestern Periphery: The Transformation of 
Panzhihua, 1936-1969," Modern China 38, no. 5 (2012): p. 577; Barry Naughton, "The Third Front: Defence 
Industrialization in the Chinese Interior," p. 357. 
54 Chen Donglin, "Cong Chichuanyong Jihua Dao Beizhan Jihua: Sanwu Jihua Zhidao Sixiang De Zhuanbian 
Guocheng 从吃穿用计划到战备计划: 三五计划指导思想的转变过程 [From A Plan for Clothing, Eating, and 
Living to a Plan for War: The Transition Process of the Guilding Thinking of the Third Five-Year Plan]," p. 70. 
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Thirdly, the Sino-American rapprochement process started much earlier than Henry 
Kissinger’s secret visit to China in 1971. Evidence suggested that China started to adjust its 
position in the China-Soviet Union-US triangle relationship in 1964. On the surface, US 
imperialism was still the main target of China’s propaganda machine. In practice, however, 
Chinese leaders started to send subtle messages to Washington, hinting China would like to 
have a cordial relationship with the US. Snow’s 1965 interview with Mao was the best example 
in this regard.55 
On the other hand, the US also responded to the messages of China positively. Various Russian 
documents reveal that the Soviet Union was well aware of this budding Sino-American 
rapprochement in the mid-1960s. In 1966, a report by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
regarding the Sino-American relations assessment indicated that “The US and China are 
cautiously sounding out each other’s intentions and seeking a way to reconcile the disputes and 
materialize the normalization of relations of both sides.”56 Brezhnev also expressed his worry 
about this trend at a plenary session of the Central Committee of the CPSU in December 1966, 
confessing “Information from all sides made us worry. Chinese officials are making a supreme 
effort to seek to establish connections with Americans.”57 
Certainly, this section is not to argue here that the US threat from Vietnam had nothing to do 
with China’s decision to initiate the TFC, but it rather emphasizes that for Chinese leaders, the 
specter of a Soviet invasion of China from the north loomed equally to, if not bigger than, a 
US invasion of China from the south throughout the 1960s. The rationale behind the initiation 
of the TFC had an important linkage with the Soviet military threat, and this is where China’s 
buffer thinking toward Mongolia comes in. 
In a broader sense, China’s buffer thinking toward Mongolia contributed to the initiation of the 
TFC. As shown in Chapters Four and Five, China’s behavior in securing a buffer contains two 
 
55  Regarding the content of this interview, please visit: https://newrepublic.com/article/119916/edgar-snow-
interview-china-chairman-mao-zedong (accessed July 19 2018) 
56 "Waijiaobu Yuandongsi De Baogao: Guanyu 1966 Nian De Zhongmei Guanxi 外交部远东司的报告: 关于
1966年中美的关系 [A Report of the Far East Division of the MOF]," in Zhongsu Guanxi: Eguo Danganguan 
Jiemi Wenjian Xuanbian 中苏关系 : 俄国档案馆解密文件选编  [Sino-Soviet Relations: The Selected 
Declassified Documents in Russian Archives], ed. Shen Zhihua (Shanghai: The Orient Publishing Center, 2014), 
p. 299. 
57 "Sugong Zhongyang Quanhui Huiyi Jilu: Bolieziniefu Guanyu Suzhong Guanxi De Baogao 苏共中央全会会
议记录: 勃列兹涅夫关于苏中关系的报告 [The Meeting Record of the Plenary Session of the CPSU: Brezhnev's 
Report on the Sino-Soviet Relations]," in Zhongsu Guanxi: Eguo Danganguan Jiemi Wenjian Xuanbian 中苏关
系 : 俄国档案馆解密文件选编  [Sino-Soviet Relations: The Selected Declassified Documents in Russian 
Archives], ed. Shen Zhihua (Shanghai: The Orient Publishing Center, 2014), p. 275. 
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interrelated meanings to the security of China: 1) cutting off a potential rival’s invasion route 
to China; and 2) protecting China’s cities and industrial bases behind the buffer. For the latter 
meaning, while maintaining the existence of North Korea meant keeping the industrial base 
located in northeastern China safe, expelling US forces out of Taiwan ensured the safety of the 
industrial base along the Chinese coastline. This logic of “gaining security by keeping a 
distance from the rival” is also evident in the case of Mongolia. The Inner Mongolia 
Autonomous Region bordering Mongolia was one critical place that Chinese leaders assigned 
to retreat from the Sino-Mongolian border under the TFC. This retreat was not only in terms 
of the industrial base but also military and administrative. In 1967, China only deployed around 
sixty thousand forces from its over two million troops in the region.58 In July 1969, China 
further put this region under the administrative control of Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning in 
the west, and Ningxia and Gansu in the east. In this sense, the Inner Mongolia Autonomous 
Region was an artificial buffer zone created by China after the Soviet Union dominated the 
Mongolian buffer. 
How should we explain this dissimilar behavior of China in the case of Mongolia when it faced 
similar situations in the cases of Taiwan and North Korea? The answer is twofold. On a 
structural level, China wanted to avoid fighting against two superpowers at the same time. In 
contrast to the 1950s, in which the Soviet Union supported China militarily, it was very unlikely 
that China would gain US military support against the Soviet Union as both China and the US 
were only tentatively developing a mutual relationship in 1966. In this context, a war against 
the Soviet Union meant that China ran the risk of fighting against two superpowers at the same 
time in two different theaters. Accordingly, Chinese leaders turned to a strategy at a state 
level—keeping Mongolia politically neutral in the Sino-Soviet rivalry.59 
Before the start of the TFC, China attempted to push Mongolia to be politically neutral, if not 
pro-China, in many ways. Economic aid was one important tool that China used as leverage to 
sway Mongolia’s political loyalty from Moscow to Beijing. Compared to the Soviet Union’s 
lukewarm economic aid to Mongolia in the 1950s, economic aid provided by China was more 
generous and active. Specifically, China comprehensively assisted Mongolia’s livelihood 
sectors, including textiles, glass mills, farms, roads, and power stations and imported horses 
and fur from Mongolia. Mongolia was the only socialist country enjoying a high increase in 
 
58 "Quofangbu Zhanqing Jianbao "Qingbao Baogao" Ziliao 国防部战情简报"情报报告"资料 ["Intelligence 
Report" Material of the War Intelligence Brief of the DoD]," ed. Academia Historica of the ROC. 
59 The Soviet forces in Mongolia had withdrawn from Mongolia in 1956. 
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trade with China in 1956.60 Chinese leaders certainly viewed those economic aids through the 
lens of the Sino-Soviet rivalry. For example, Yang, a Chinese delegate attending the conference 
for the 43th anniversary celebration of the Russian Revolution in Moscow in 1960, was enraged 
by Mongolia’s pro-Soviet Union statement at the celebration. He angrily stated, “Shame on 
Tsedenbal, who said nothing about China’s economic aid to Mongolia!”61 
China’s labor force was another tool which China used to place pressure on Mongolia’s foreign 
policy allegiance. Given that Mongolia had a significant lack of labor, China sent more than 
ten thousand Chinese workers to Mongolia per year to assist with Mongolia’s economic and 
social construction.62 The workers were all carefully selected per their family backgrounds and 
political attitudes, and were educated on the importance of the Sino-Mongolian friendship to 
China’s international as well as domestic situation.63 Those politically loyal workers, in fact, 
were a means for China to pressure Mongolia to adopt a more pro-China foreign policy during 
the Sino-Soviet rivalry. The furious exchanges between Zhou and Mongolian Prime Minister 
Yumjaagiin Tsedenbal on 25 and 27 December 1962 showed how China pressured Mongolia 
via this issue.64 The Soviet Union believed this strategy of China toward Mongolia was a part 
of its strategy to turning other socialist countries against the Soviet Union.65 
 
60 "Sulian Zhu Zhongguo Dashiguan 1956 Nian Gongzuo Baogao 苏联驻中国大使馆 1956年工作报考 [A Work 
Report of the Soviet Union Embassy in China of 1956]," in Zhongsu Guanxi: Eguo Danganguan Jiemi Wenjian 
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in Russian Archives], ed. Shen Zhihua (Shanghai: The Orient Publishing Center, 2014), p. 215. 
61 Yang Shangkun, Yang Shangkun Riji: Shang 杨尚昆日记: 上 [Yang Shangkun's Diary: I]  (Beijing: Central 
Party Literature Press, 2001). 
62 Regarding the issue of Chinese workers sent to Mongolia, please see this detailed study: Gu Jikun, "Zhongguo 
Gongren Fumeng Yuanjian Wenti De Lishi Kaocha: 1949-1973 中国工人赴蒙援建问题的历史考察: 1949-1973 
[A Historical Investigation on Chinese Workers to Mongolia for Aid: 1949-1973]," Zhonggong Dangshi Yanjiu 
中共党史研究 [CPC History Studies] 4(2015). 
63 "Guowuyuan Guanyu Chodiao Zhigong Zhichi Menggu Renmin Gongheguo Shengchan Jianshe De Tongzhi 
国务院关于抽调职工支持蒙古人民共和国生产建设的通知 [The State Council's Notice on Transferring Some 
Workers to Support the Development of the MPR]," ed. Beijing Municipal Archives. 
64 "Qiernianke Yu Cebogemide Huitan Jiyao: Tongbao Zhongmeng Bianjie Tanpan Qingkuang 契尔年科与策伯
德米格会谈纪要: 通报中蒙边界谈判情况 [A Note on the Chernenko-Tsebegmid Meeting: Informing the Sino-
Mongolian Border Negotiation]," in Zhongsu Guanxi: Eguo Danganguan Jiemi Wenjian Xuanbian 中苏关系: 俄
国档案馆解密文件选编 [Sino-Soviet Relations: The Selected Declassified Documents in Russian Archives], ed. 
Shen Zhihua (Shanghai: The Orient Publishing Center, 2014). 
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会谈纪要: 中国试图离间苏蒙关系 [A Note of the Chernenko-Tsebegmid Meeting: China Is Trying to Drive a 
Wedge between the Soviet Union and Mongolia]," in Zhongsu Guanxi: Eguo Danganguan Jiemi Wenjian 
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Territorial concession was another way that China tried to keep Mongolia close.66 Although 
China officially recognized Mongolia’s independence in 1949, the border between the two 
sides was not clearly demarcated until 1962. This situation was partly due to China’s wish that 
Mongolia be incorporated into China soon and partly due to Chinese leaders’ resentment that 
the current tacit border between China and Mongolia was unilaterally assigned by the Soviet 
Union. In a similar fashion to the economic aid, Chinese leaders viewed the border negotiation 
with Mongolia from the lens of the Sino-Soviet rivalry. In 1962, when China started to 
officially respond to Mongolia’s 1958 request to demarcate the border, it asked Mongolia not 
to leak this negotiation to the Soviet Union.67 In terms of the result of the border negotiation, 
China generously gave Mongolia 12 thousand square kilometers of territory from 17 thousand 
square kilometers of disputed territory.68 Given the timing of China’s decision to negotiate with 
Mongolia over this issue and China’s significant concession, China’s motives were self-
explanatory. Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi hinted when he commented on this border-
demarcating issue: 
In recent years, the Mongolian leadership followed Khrushchev revisionists and 
opposed China, but we do not withdraw our aid to Mongolia. We are a new China, 
led by Marx-Leninism and Mao Zedong’s thought. We are not Khrushchev 
revisionists. It is for Mongolian to decide whether it is more beneficial to work with 
China.69 
 
66 Taylor Fravel argued that the failure of the Great Leap Forward and political unrest in Xinjiang were the main 
reasons why China began this territorial negotiation with Mongolia in 1962. He developed this argument around 
2005. However, the sources newly available after 2005 presented in this section tend to suggest this behavior of 
China is a product of the Sino-Soviet rivalry. Please see: M. Taylor. Fravel, "Regime Insecurity and International 
Cooperation: Explaining China's Compromises in Territorial Disputes," pp. 69-74; M. Taylor Fravel, Strong 
Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China's Territorial Disputes CH 2. 
67 "Qiernianke Yu Cebogemide Huitan Jiyao: Zhongmeng Bianjie Tanpan Wenti 契尔年科与策伯德米格会谈
纪要 : 中蒙边界谈判问题  [A Note of the Chernenko-Tsebegmid Meeting: The Sino-Mongolian Border 
Negoitation Issue]," in Zhongsu Guanxi: Eguo Danganguan Jiemi Wenjian Xuanbian 中苏关系: 俄国档案馆解
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的关系 (1952-1984) [The Sion-Outer Mongolian Relations in the Tsedenbal Era (1952-1984)]  (Taipei: ROC 
Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission, 2000), p. 52; Shen Zhihua, "Shi Yu Yuan Wei: Lengzhan Shiqi 
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69 "Chen Yi Fuzhongli Jian Waizhang Juxing Zhongwai Jizhe Zhaodaihui Fabiao Zhongyao Tanhua 陈毅副总理
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Therefore, the impossibility of gaining help from the US plus the failure to keep Mongolia 
politically neutral in the Sino-Soviet rivalry, led China to ultimately decide to retreat from the 
borderland. 
 
6.4 Efforts to Militarily Neutralize Mongolia 
 
The Soviet Union began to deploy military forces to Mongolia in 1968 per the Soviet-Mongolia 
defense treaty in 1966. The forces, however, were moved back to the Soviet Union at the end 
of the 1980s in tandem with the normalization of relations between the Soviet Union and China, 
known as the Sino-Soviet rapprochement. Regarding the question of how this rapprochement 
happened, scholars have usually attributed the momentum provided by Mikhail Gorbachev’s 
new thinking toward Asia, which eventually broke the political impasse between China and the 
Soviet Union.70 Compared to the Soviet Union, China was rather passive and cautious as it set 
three inflexible preconditions for the initiation of the rapprochement: Soviet military 
withdrawal from Mongolia and the Sino-Soviet borders, Soviet ceasing its support of the 
Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, and Soviet stopping the war against Afghanistan. As for 
the timing of China’s response to the rapprochement, Lowell Dittmer indicated it was in the 
early 1980s.71 
However, this section argues that the literature has not observed China’s years-long diplomatic 
effort aimed at militarily neutralizing Mongolia from 1979 to 1989. This diplomatic effort of 
China, driven by China’s buffer thinking toward Mongolia, centered on two key ideas about 
making Mongolia militarily neutral between the Soviet Union and China: a complete military 
withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Mongolia, and a legal promise by the Soviet Union not 
to militarily use Mongolia again. Broadly speaking, this effort of China also contributed to the 
realization of the Sino-Soviet rapprochement. In this sense, China was not the passive and slow 
player that it has been portrayed as in the normalization process. The following will detail how 
 
70 Stephen M. Young, "Gorbachev's Asian Policy: Balancing the New and the Old," Asian Survey 28, no. 3 (1988); 
John W. Garver, "The "New Type" of Sino-Soviet Relations," ibid.29, no. 12 (1989); Sergey Radchenko, "Soviet 
Withdrawal from Mongolia, 1986-1992: A Reassessment," The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 25, no. 2 (2012); 
Louise do Rosario, "Don't Call Me Comrade," Far Eastern Economic Review 143, no. 7 (1989); Sheikh Mutahir 
Ahmad, "Sino-Soviet Rapprochement: Its Impact on South Asia," Pakistan Horizon 43, no. 1 (1990). 
71 Lowell Dittmer, Sino-Soviet Normalization and Its International Implications: 1945-1990  (Seattle and London: 
University of Washington Press, 1992), CH 14. 
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China’s buffer thinking toward Mongolia drove this diplomatic effort of China during this 
decade. 
The Soviet Union initiated a wave of military argumentation for the Far East in the late 1970s 
along with an intensifying rivalry against China. After Brezhnev visited the commands of the 
Far East in April 1978, the Soviet Union established the Far East Theater, which integrated 
Mongolian Districts with the Transbaikal District, the Far Eastern District, and the Pacific 
Ocean Fleet. This new coordination organization seemingly symbolized the Soviet Union’s 
growing recognition of the importance of the Eastern front and the shift of its strategic priorities 
from the West to the East. According to Japan’s White Paper, the Soviet military deployment 
along the Sino-Soviet borders increased from forty-four divisions to fifty-eight divisions in 
1979–89, and its forces in Mongolia were usually maintained at around four to five divisions.72 
Although the quantity of Soviet forces in Mongolia increased, the troops were in reality not 
intended for invading of China but for defending Mongolian and Soviet territory. Based on 
types of weapon systems and military posture, Westerns analysts tend to agree that Soviet 
forces in Mongolia were more defensive-oriented.73 To make their intention clearer, the Soviet 
Union and Mongolia stipulated the defense treaty between the two sides would adhere to the 
Charter of the United Nations. In March 1978, Mongolia even issued a governmental statement 
to China, indicating the Soviet forces stationed in Mongolia were there by the request of 
Mongolia because China had not yet abandoned its territorial ambition toward Mongolia.74 
Additionally, Sino-Soviet relations in the 1970s were not as tense as they had been before the 
1970s in many respects, even under the influence of the Brezhnev Doctrine. In the 1970s, the 
Soviet Union firmly opposed China in military and diplomatic arenas but, in the meantime, 
also welcomed a reconciliation with China and kept reassuring China that its territorial integrity 
would be guaranteed under the principle of peaceful coexistence. 75  As for interstate 
connections, different sorts of scientific, cultural, and academic exchanges between the two 
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sides were also taking place on a daily basis throughout this period.76 The value of Sino-Soviet 
bilateral trade gradually recovered from its lowest point in 1970 and reached 2.6 billion US 
dollars in 1986.77 
Despite the objective fact that the Sino-Soviet tension had eased, buffer thinking toward 
Mongolia still lingered in the minds of Chinese leaders. The consensus of Chinese leaders 
throughout the 1970s was that a Soviet invasion of China was ultimately inevitable because the 
Soviet Union was an imperialist power with a socialist façade.78 The history of how the Russian 
Empire had encroached on Asia strengthened this threat perception, since the course of the 
global military expansion of the Soviet Union was very similar to that of the Tsar period, if not 
indeed superior to it. Mongolia, in this context, was one vital strategic spot from which the 
Soviet Union would launch its military strike on China and hence capture China’s capital easily. 
In 1978, Chinese Defense Minister Xu Xianqing warned that “the Soviet social-imperialism is 
our most dangerous and principal enemy.”79 
Driven by the same buffer thinking, Deng’s China demonstrated very different behavior from 
that of Mao in responding to the Soviet military threat from Mongolia. The root of this 
difference stemmed from Deng’s unique worldview—the world was underpinned by three 
critical pillars (the US, the Soviet Union, and China) rather than “one line” of alliance against 
the Soviet Union.80 To Deng, the nature of relations between China and the two countries 
remained the same, but an invasion of China was not inevitable if China could actively play 
the game of diplomacy. Accordingly, instead of continuing to refuse the Soviet’s proposal to 
reconcile, China should take this opportunity to reshape its security environment. Specifically, 
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since the Soviet military threat from Mongolia was the most urgent security issue China was 
facing, China should actively defuse that threat rather than passively preserving its war 
capability against the Soviet Union through the TFC.81 
From 1979 to 1989, this worldview of Deng further translated into three major waves of 
diplomatic efforts that attempted to make Mongolia a militarily neutral state. The first wave of 
diplomatic efforts began in 1979. After China and the US cleared their path to form a quasi-
alliance in 1972, the Soviet Union gradually slid into international isolation. Deng capitalized 
on the Soviet Union’s desire to find a way to turn around this disadvantaged position. 
Specifically, when the Sino-Soviet friendship treaty was about to expire in 1979, China refused 
the Soviet Union’s proposal to continue this treaty but suggested that both sides initiate 
diplomatic negotiations on how to amend Sino-Soviet relations, to which the Soviet Union 
eventually agreed. 82 
China set its priority during the negotiations as the military neutralization of Mongolia. Chinese 
leaders set two principles at a CCP Politburo meeting on August 29 1979 for the upcoming 
negotiations with the Soviet Union: 1) Soviet military withdrawal from Mongolia; and 2) 
Soviet guarantee of no military station and military bases in China’s neighboring country.83 
Both principles were essential to making Mongolia a neutral state in a military sense. For 
Chinese leaders, the very existence of the Soviet forces in Mongolia compromised the Soviet 
Union’s sincerity to this rapprochement. Deng’s later comments on the Sino-Soviet 
rapprochement when he met Richard Nixon in September 1979 reflected this geopolitical 
rationale: 
The precondition of the negotiation is removing those obstacles, which are the Soviet 
Union’s expansionism and hegemonism, not just about the Sino-Soviet borders…Can 
the Soviet forces in Mongolia continue? Certainly, we must raise this issue by asking 
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the Soviet withdrawal from Mongolia. In addition, both China and the Soviet Union 
should not build military bases in each other’s neighboring countries.84 
The second wave of Chinese efforts to push the Soviet Union to give up its military presence 
in Mongolia started in 1982. The Soviet Union refused to include the Mongolian issue in the 
negotiations during the first wave of China’s diplomatic efforts. After a few years, however, 
Brezhnev’s remark in Tashkent hinted that the Soviet Union could have some flexibility on the 
border issue with China.85 Seeing this as another opportunity, China held its very first press 
conference in PRC history after two days of responding to Brezhnev.86 Similar to the first wave, 
Deng held a senior Chinese leader meeting in the summer of 1982 to establish principles and 
strategies regarding how to negotiate with the Soviet Union.87 Once again, Chinese leaders put 
Soviet military withdrawal from Mongolia, combined with withdrawal from the Sino-Soviet 
borders, as the priority among the other issues. In the following negotiations with the Soviets, 
the history of how the Russian Empire encroached on China became a part of the arguments 
with which Qian Qichen criticized his Soviet counterpart, Andrei Gromyko.88 
China’s efforts did result in a subtle change in the Soviet Union’s position in this time. 
Although the Soviet Union did not agree to withdraw any forces from Mongolia during the 
negotiations, its position on this issue shifted from “not to discuss issues related to a third 
country” to “not to harm the interests of a third country.” Evidently, utilizing China’s 
geopolitical anxiety over Mongolia to maintain the momentum of the negotiations became a 
factor that Soviet leaders thought about. Gromyko, for example, proposed at a CPSU Politburo 
meeting in 1983 that a partial withdrawal from Mongolia could further the Sino-Soviet 
normalization process.89 
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The third wave of Chinese efforts took place after Gorbachev succeed Chernenko as the 
General Secretary of the CPSU in March 1985. Since Gorbachev took office, Deng 
aggressively hinted to the Soviet Union at multiple meetings with foreign visitors that 
Gorbachev had not yet done anything to improve Sino-Soviet relations, and the removal of any 
of the three obstacles would be conducive to the rapprochement.90 In 1986, Gorbachev formally 
responded to Deng’s appeal in a speech at Vladivostok, expressing that the Soviet Union was 
considering withdrawing a significant number of Soviet forces from Mongolia.91 Once again, 
China quickly seized this opportunity and proceeded with a two-pronged diplomatic maneuver 
toward Mongolia and the Soviet Union simultaneously with the objective of neutralizing 
Mongolia militarily. 
In its actions toward Mongolia, China aimed to defuse Mongolia’s suspicions regarding 
China’s territorial ambitions. China understood that a rapprochement with Mongolia was 
necessary since Mongolia’s suspicion of China was one important factor impeding the Soviet 
withdrawal. Ten days after Gorbachev’s speech, China sent Vice Foreign Minister Liu Shuqing 
for talks in Ulaanbaatar, the highest level of Chinese officials to be sent to Mongolia in the past 
two decades. Liu’s mission was to ease Mongolia’s resistance to the withdrawal. Although 
Mongolia refused Liu’s proposal of full Soviet military withdrawal, a consular agreement with 
China was concluded.92 
To further reassure Mongolia, China took many concrete steps in the following years to 
demonstrate that China would respect Mongolia’s territorial sovereignty after the Soviet 
withdrawal. Given that Chinese forces intruded on Mongolia’s territory many times during the 
Sino-Soviet split, a border agreement regarding how to deal with border disputes between the 
two sides was concluded in 1988, indicting that China would respect the current Sino-Mongolia 
border thereafter. In March 1989, Yang said to the visiting Mongolian Foreign Minister that 
“China will respect Mongolia’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.”93 This 
phrase was later written into the Sino-Mongolian Joint Communique of 1990 and became a 
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standard diplomatic phrase used by China in most statements and legal documents on the Sino-
Mongolian relations.94 
In its actions toward the Soviet Union, China sought to ensure that the Soviet forces would 
never return to Mongolia’s territory in the future. After the Soviet Union agreed to the 
withdrawal, the focus of Chinese officials turned to making the Soviet withdrawal irreversible 
and complete. For example, when Soviet Ministry of Defense announced the first wave of 
withdrawal from Mongolia in January 1987, Deng immediately questioned the sincerity of the 
Soviet Union by pointing to the fact that the Soviet bases and facilities in Mongolia were still 
intact, which permitted the Soviets to reestablish their presence overnight if they wished.95 
Qian also pressed his Soviet counterpart during the negotiations by saying “You said that 75 
percent of Soviet forces would be withdrawn from Mongolia. Excellent. But, what will happen 
to the remaining 25 percent? Should one leave a tail?”96 
To consolidate the military neutralization of Mongolia, China pushed the Soviet Union to 
legally promise on not to using Mongolia for military purposes in the future. This goal was 
eventually realized in the Sino-Soviet Joint Communique issued at the Deng-Gorbachev 
summit in 1989, which specifically stipulated that each side would not militarily use the 
territory of a country bordering the two sides to threaten the other side.97 To what extent 
China’s request influenced the Soviet Union's decision so far is unknown. It is clear, however, 
that China’s buffer thinking toward Mongolia motivated Deng to militarily neutralize 
Mongolia from the orbit of the Soviet Union, as he confessed to US President George H. W. 
Bush: 
With regard to the Sino-Soviet relationship, if talks with Gorbachev prove to be 
successful, and Sino-Soviet relations are normalized, then what will follow? 
Personally, I think it is still an unknown…Mr. President, you are my friend. I hope you 
will look at the map to see what happened after the Soviet Union severed Outer 
Mongolia from China. What kind of strategic situation did we find ourselves in…The 
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strategic situation I have mentioned is very unfavorable for China…This encirclement 
of China has continued from the Khrushchev period through Brezhnev to the present.98 
 
6.5 Strengthening Mongolian Neutralization 
 
Triggered by multiple internal and external crises, the Soviet Union began to crumble in the 
spring of 1990 and eventually ceased to exist in December 1991. Suddenly, China was free 
from a decades-long shadow of potential Soviet military threat from Mongolia. This completely 
new geopolitical environment China faced after 1991 raised a theoretically meaningful 
question in terms of buffer thinking: how did China deal with Mongolia after the Sino-Soviet 
buffer system disappeared? 
The current literature does not offer an explicit theoretical answer to this question. Although 
many scholars have recognized Mongolia as a buffer state between China and the Soviet 
Union/Russia, the way China responded to Mongolia has not attracted much scholarly 
discussion in terms of the concept of buffer state.99 Theoretically speaking, China should have 
annexed Mongolia once and for all after the Soviet Union disappeared. Because Chinese 
leaders had been haunted by China’s geopolitical vulnerability to Mongolia since the 1960s, 
this course of action would have defused the perennial geopolitical anxiety. Nevertheless, 
China never annexed Mongolia. Instead of incorporating Mongolia into its territory, China 
signed the Sino-Mongolian Friendship and Cooperation Relationship Treaty with Mongolia in 
1994, in which China vowed to respect Mongolia’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial 
integrity.100 
Why was that? How can we explain China’s decision to give up a great opportunity to take 
Mongolia back, which Chinese leaders had desired for decades, and accepted Mongolia’s 
legitimate existence as an independent political entity from China, even though Chinese leaders 
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had long been refraining from recognizing it in public? The current literature on Mongolia has 
an obvious research gap in this regard. Works from the 1990s seem to focus either on 
Mongolia’s democratization movement101 or on Mongolia’s new foreign policy trends.102 To 
be fair, dramatic geopolitical events on a global scale, such as the demise of the Soviet Union 
and the third wave of democratization transforming the socialist camp, easily draw scholars’ 
attention at the time. The problem is, however, the question remains unanswered in the existing 
research on Mongolia.103 Therefore, this section aims to explain the rationale behind China’s 
conclusion of this treaty from the angle of China’s buffer thinking toward Mongolia. 
Chinese leaders arguably held strong buffer thinking toward Mongolia after the demise of the 
Soviet Union in 1991, although the leaders refrained from talking about issues related to 
Mongolia from a geopolitical perspective in public. Leaders in China who controlled the real 
policymaking power in the early 1990s, such as Deng, Yang, Chen Yun, and Li Xiannian, were 
all second-generation CCP leaders who had experienced the Sino-Soviet rivalry in person. 
Their opinions and instructions strongly influenced the third generation of CCP leaders until 
the mid-1990s. In this sense, it is sufficient to argue that China’s buffer thinking toward 
Mongolia still effectively influenced how Chinese leaders perceived Mongolia after 1991. 
In fact, few Chinese scholars would deny the geopolitical importance of Mongolia to China 
owing to Mongolia’s unique location of being sandwiched between China and Russia. Zhang 
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Wenmu, for example, vividly argued that the Mongolian plateau has been functioning as a key 
“game changer” to the wax and wane of Chinese dynasties in history. Taking Mongolia from 
China is equal to opening an incision in China’s chest, which is like stabbing China’s lungs 
and pointing to its heart (Beijing).104 Wang Jianjun pointed out that, historically speaking, most 
threats against China were from the north, which is why a famous general of the Qing Dynasty, 
Zuo Zongtang, insightfully warned, “to place a high value on Xinjiang can protect Mongolia, 
and to protect Mongolia is to guard Beijing.”105 Lu Junyuan maintained that the question of 
whether Mongolia is a security screen for China’s north or a base of foreign threats depends 
on what kind of policy Mongolia holds toward China.106 If Mongolia holds a friendly policy 
toward China, it becomes a buffer between China and Russia. Putting those views together, it 
is apparent that geographical proximity, potential military threat, and historical memory are 
three essential components in these Chinese scholars’ view of Mongolia, which are exactly the 
same three components of buffer thinking analyzed in this thesis. 
Since China’s buffer thinking toward Mongolia continued to be a critical influence on how 
Chinese leaders viewed Mongolia after 1991, what factors then intervened and hence made the 
leaders ultimately decide not to take Mongolia? Arguably, the decision to sign the treaty with 
Mongolia could be a result of three compounding factors. To begin with, economic reform 
preoccupied most of China’s energy after 1990. Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh 
Central Committee of the CCP of 1978, China set the development of socialist modernization 
as the paramount strategic objective of China for the coming decades. To this end, it was 
necessary to create a peaceful environment in which China could concentrate on its economic 
development. Deng, in his Southern Talk of 1992, reiterated such a necessity.107 Conquering 
foreign territory, therefore, fundamentally contradicted this objective. 
Second, the legitimacy of the CCP regime in China was on the brink at that moment. The third 
wave of democratization reached China at the end of the 1980s, during which a myriad of 
students, intellectuals, and urban middle-class groups all over China demanded democracy. 
The zenith of the democratization activity in China was the protest at the Tiananmen Square in 
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June 1989. However, the bloody crackdown by the Chinese government on the protesters 
shocked the international community, which subsequently put a series of long-term economic 
sanctions and weapons embargos on China. Suffering internal and external pressure at the same 
time, waging war on Mongolia would have further damaged China’s tarnished national image 
and possibly served a fatal blow to the faltering CCP regime.108 
Certainly, a severe international event such a crisis or war against a foreign country could 
generate a so-called rally-round-the-flag effect, with people becoming more supportive of their 
government. 109  Scholars have often agreed that the connection between internal political 
stability and use of external force is a compelling way to explain China’s foreign behavior, 
especially in Mao’s era. Thomas Christensen, for example, used the Second Taiwan Strait 
Crisis to explain how Mao mobilized Chinese support for the socialism campaign of the Great 
Leap Forward.110 Following this line of reasoning, Chinese leaders in the early 1990s might 
have considered bolstering the popularity of the CCP regime by creating an international crisis 
against Mongolia and annexing Mongolia accordingly. 
Indeed, this line of reasoning is not empirically groundless. Mongolia started to reach out to 
the US after the Soviet Union decided to withdraw military forces from Mongolia. The 
relationship between the two sides ramped up quickly in all respects under the acceleration of 
Mongolian democratization. The two sides established diplomatic ties in 1987. In August 1990, 
US Secretary of State James Baker paid a high-profile visit to Mongolia. During his visit, he 
meaningfully hinted that “[the US] will be your third neighbor” in his address to Mongolians.111 
In March 1991, both houses of the US Congress made an unprecedented joint resolution, 
“urging the US government to continue to grant all appropriate economic and technical 
assistance to Mongolia and its people.”112 In the following two years, the US agreed to help 
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Mongolia with military personnel training and replace outdated Soviet military equipment with 
US equipment.113 
In the eyes of Chinese leaders, what the US was doing was promptly filling the power vacuum 
between China and Russia left by the Soviet Union. Although Chinese leaders at the time did 
not comment too much on the increasingly close relationship between the US and Mongolia in 
public, Chinese scholars were very vigilant about the potential geopolitical consequences of it. 
They mainly interpreted the US approach to Mongolia from two different standpoints but 
shared the same belief—China would be the US enemy in the future.114 On the one hand, 
supporting Mongolia’s democracy served as an important part of the US’ grand strategy of 
promoting a peaceful evolution against China. On the other hand, the US attempted to use 
Mongolia to contain China, as exemplified in one sentence frequently cited by Chinese scholars, 
“[what the US is doing is] intervening in a place between the bear’s mouth and the dragon’s 
claw.”115 
Thus, to explain China’s puzzling agreement to the treaty of 1994, at a time of the demise of 
the Soviet Union and the fast-evolving US-Mongolian relationship, one has also to consider a 
factor that is able to pacify China’s perennial geopolitical anxiety over Mongolia. Among other 
things, Mongolia’s foreign policy course of neutralizing itself had the most significant effect 
in this regard. This course of action by Mongolia was timely and served the fundamental 
geopolitical goal of China toward Mongolia since the 1960s—neutralizing Mongolia. 
Mongolia started to readjust its foreign policy course from comprehensively leaning on the 
Soviet Union to a more balanced and neutral position between its two neighbors at the end of 
the 1980s. Faced with the withered military support of the Soviet Union, Mongolia turned to 
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rely on political means to ensure Mongolia’s independence and sovereignty in the future, and 
the idea of Mongolian neutralization was born. To reach this goal, Mongolia needed to develop 
an equal relationship with its two powerful neighbors externally and faithfully embrace this 
policy course internally at the same time. The debut of this course of foreign policy was 
Punsalmaagiyn Ochirbat’s visit to China in May 1990. Ochirbat, who was elected as Chairman 
of the Presidium of the People’s Great Hural of Mongolia two months previously, 
unprecedentedly chose China rather than the Soviet Union to be his first foreign visit country, 
symbolizing the first move of this neutralized position. He said, “Mongolia valued its 
cooperative relationship with China and the Soviet Union at the same time.”116  In 1991, 
Mongolia joined the Non-Aligned Movement and took an active part in the Ministerial 
Conferences. In January the following year, Mongolia’s new constitution explicitly specified 
that stationing foreign military forces in Mongolia and traversing Mongolia’s territory were 
both prohibited. 
Apparently, China welcomed the idea of Mongolian neutralization after the Tiananmen 
crackdown. As discussed in the last section, China attempted to restore its relationship with 
Mongolia after the mid-1980s, which served as part of efforts towards the military 
neutralization of Mongolia. Following the trend of reconciliation with Mongolia, Chinese 
leaders were willing to see Mongolia take this path one step further as this would contribute to 
the stable and peaceful security environment China desperately needed during the time of the 
CCP regime crisis. In a meeting with Ochirbat in May 1990, for example, Chinese Premier Li 
Peng stressed that the Sino-Mongolian border areas should become peaceful areas and China’s 
priority was to maintain political stability.117 Chinese President Jiang Zemin reiterated this 
priority the next day.118 
Instead of changing its position on Mongolian neutralization, China continued to support it 
after the demise of the Soviet Union in December 1991. China responded to the dramatic 
change of the geopolitical environment around Mongolia quickly in 1992, and it was apparent 
from a series of measures adopted by China that it wanted to keep neutralizing Mongolia in 
this volatile environment. For instance, Mongolian Prime Minister Dashiin Byambasuren paid 
a visit to China in May 1992. In the meetings with Byambasuren, Jiang, Yang, and Li all 
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conveyed the same message that China wanted to keep close communications with Mongolian 
leaders during this complex and unstable international situation. While Li hoped that the mutual 
border between China and Mongolia would be peaceful and cooperative, he also promised that 
China’s policy toward Mongolia would not change and the policy would still be under the 
guidance of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between China and Mongolia of 1960, 
and the Sino-Mongolian Joint Communique of 1990.119 The Sino-Russo Joint Statement on the 
Foundation of the Mutual Relations signed in December 1992 was further evidence of this as 
the statement continued the spirit of the Sino-Soviet Joint Statement of 1989—not to militarily 
use the territory of a country bordering the two sides to threaten the other side.120 
Against this backdrop, it was not too surprising to see that China agreed to sign the Sino-
Mongolian Friendship and Cooperation Relationship Treaty with Mongolia in 1994. To legally 
cement its neutralized position one step further, Mongolia firstly approached Russia to gain the 
guarantee of a great power. The two sides concluded the Russo-Mongolian Treaty on Friendly 
Relations and Cooperation in 1993, which legalized Mongolia’s neutralized position.121 Then 
Mongolia approached China with a similar treaty, in which both sides agreed on Mongolia’s 
neutralized political and military position: 
Both of the signatories will not participate in any military and political alliance against 
the other party; will not sign any treaty undermining the national sovereignty and 
security of the other party; none of the parties will allow a third state to use its territory 
to undermine the national sovereignty and security of the other party.122 
Arguably, it was this very clause that made China consent to legally bind itself to a 
position of respecting Mongolia’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, 
because a politically and militarily neutralized Mongolia was exactly what China had 
been pursuing for decades. More importantly, this comprehensive idea of neutralizing 
Mongolia satisfied the geopolitical goal of China at a time when Chinese leaders 
desperately needed a stable security environment. This explained why Li, when signing 
the treaty, commented that “China praises Mongolia’s aggressive effort to maintain the 
 
119 Ma Xiaoning, "Zhongmeng Liangguo Zongli Juxing Huitan 中蒙两国总理举行会谈 [A Meeting was Held 
between Prime Ministers of China and Mongolia]," ibid., May 9 1992. 
120  Regarding the text of this joint statement, please visit: http://www.cctv.com/special/903/6/70491.html 
(accessed September 7 2018) 
121 Regarding the text of this joint statement, please visit: 
 file:///C:/Users/u5281821/Downloads/01Mar_DonrovG_Redacted.pdf (accessed September 7 2018) 
122 Regarding the content of this treaty, please visit: 
 https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/tytj_674911/tyfg_674913/t5725.shtml (accessed August 28 2018) 
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peace and stability in this region.”123 Since then, the idea of Mongolian neutralization has 
consistently appeared together with the idea of China’s respect for Mongolia’s 
independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity in a number of statements and treaties 
between the two sides. 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
 
The geopolitical value of Mongolia did not appear in the minds of CCP leaders under the 
asymmetrical CCP-Soviet Union relationship before the establishment of the PRC. In contrast 
to the KMT, which emphasized Mongolia as a natural shield protecting the survival of China,124 
and the Soviet Union, which focused on Mongolia’s geopolitical function in fending off the 
Soviet’s potential enemy, the CCP was the only party viewing Mongolia through a minority 
nationality lens. Owing to this perspective, supporting Mongolia’s independence on the basis 
of the principle of national self-determination offered the CCP a useful tool for managing the 
conflicts between Chinese nationalism and the Soviet Union geopolitical interests as well as to 
weaken the support base of the KMT. China’s buffer thinking toward Mongolia appeared only 
after the Sino-Soviet rivalry relationship emerged in 1964. Mongolia was believed to be one 
place from which the Soviet Union would launch its military strike on China. The memory of 
how the Russian Empire encroached on China augmented this belief. Driven by this 
geopolitical mentality, China initiated the TFC in the 1960s, pushing for Soviet military 
withdrawal from Mongolia in the 1970–80s, and signing a treaty respecting Mongolia’s 
independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity in 1994. Although China demonstrated 
three different types of behavior in the three episodes, the purpose of neutralizing Mongolia 
was behind all of the three. 
  
 
123 Xu Hongzhi and Ao Qier, "Lipeng Zongli Tong Zhasilai Zongli Huitan 李鹏总理同扎斯莱总理会谈 [Premier 
Li Peng Met with Prime Minister Jasrai]," People's Daily, April 30 1994. 
124 Chiang Kai-shek, Zhongguo Zhi Mingyun 中國之命運 [China's Destiny], p. 6. 
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CH 7 Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
This chapter will first summarize the four major findings of this thesis, and then it will discuss 
in detail the contributions of this thesis to the fields of IR and geopolitics. The final section will 
outline four future research directions related to China’s buffer thinking as a final conclusion.  
 
7.1 China’s Buffer Thinking 
 
This thesis began with an empirical puzzle: China’s behavior toward North Korea, Taiwan, and 
Mongolia has a decades-long consistency, shown in China’s policy goals of maintaining the 
existence of North Korea, annexing Taiwan, and neutralizing Mongolia. The argument this 
thesis provides is that this behavior is driven by China’s buffer thinking toward the three 
territories. Buffer thinking is a geopolitical mentality that entails the logic of “secure this 
territory against my rival now, otherwise the rival may launch a military attack from it against 
me in the future once the rival has occupied the territory.” This mentality only emerges after a 
rivalrous relationship has become established (in China’s case, with the US or the Soviet 
Union). Starting from a defensive calculus of how to cut off a potential invasion route of a rival 
and protect cities and industrial bases behind a buffer, the conclusion Chinese leaders arrived 
at is to actively secure the territory of the buffer beyond China’s borders. Although China 
demonstrated different types of “securing behavior in different cases and at different times, 
ranging from military actions and diplomatic negotiations, to even a grand strategic retreat from 
a front line, all of these actions serve the same purpose—keeping a physical distance from the 
rival. The historical memories of how China was invaded via the buffers in the past further 
strengthens the necessity of securing the buffer. In this way, buffer thinking is a unique 
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synthesis of the sensitivity to the geographical location of a buffer, traumatic historical 
memories of the buffer, and estimations of potential military threats of a rival via the buffer. 
There are four major findings that have emerged from the three case studies in this thesis. First 
and foremost, geopolitical imperatives have played a much more prominent role in the making 
of Chinese foreign policy than scholars have previously recognized. As detailed in Chapter 
Two, scholars in China Studies have drawn a wide range of variables to explain China’s foreign 
policy, including history, ideology, power struggle within the CCP, and nationalism and so 
forth. These studies have often led to the conclusion that China is a passive and inward-looking 
state. The geopolitical imperatives of China did not gain much scholarly attention for many 
years. This lack of attention is especially discernable in the English world. As this thesis has 
documented, however, China’s buffer thinking based on geopolitical imperatives has been a 
dominating factor in shaping China’s interactions with Taiwan, North Korea, and Mongolia. 
This has been evident across a number of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) administrations: 
from Mao’s China to Deng’s China, to Jiang’s China, and then to Hu’s China. Beijing has long 
been closely watching and managing these buffers around its periphery. It is highly likely that 
Xi Jinping’s China would be driven by the same thinking particularly given the Sino-US rivalry 
that has been gaining traction since 2016. In this sense, the behavioral consistency of China 
should not simply be construed as bureaucratic inertia, but should also be interpreted as a 
decades-long effort in which China rationally and intentionally has pursuing a more secure 
geopolitical environment around its periphery. Without factoring in China’s buffer thinking, 
one cannot fully understand the rationale behind China’s behavior toward Taiwan, North Korea, 
and Mongolia. 
Second, the CCP’s perception of the value of Taiwan, North Korea, and Mongolia has evolved 
thought three fairly distinct periods: a non-geopolitical period (1921–1946), a shaping period 
(1946–1964), and a geopolitical period (1964–). In the non-geopolitical period, there is little 
evidence to suggest that the CCP’s views of these three territories held geopolitical significance 
to the security of China. Minority nationality was the principal lens through which the CCP 
saw the value of the three, which was mostly for fighting against Japan and weakening the 
support base of the Kuomintang. The period from 1946–1964 represented a definitive twenty-
years in which Chinese leaders started to recognize the geopolitical value of Taiwan, North 
Korea, and Mongolia. As explained in Chapter Three, buffer state status is not only an objective 
reality, but is also shaped by the subjective perception of buffered states of their rivalry with 
another state. Accordingly, before the emergence of the Sino–US rivalry in June 1946, the CCP 
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did not see any geopolitical value of Taiwan Island to the security of China. Similarly, on the 
eve of the Korean War (1950–53), Mao Zedong’s promise to help Kim Il Sung in the execution 
of his plan to unify the peninsula by force was not predicated on the geopolitical value of the 
Korean Peninsula. Prior to identifying the Soviet Union as a hostile state with the ambition to 
invade China in 1964, Beijing did not defend or even demarcate the Sino-Mongolian border. 
Ultimately, however, the geopolitical value of each territory appeared in the minds of Chinese 
leaders at the respective junctures of 1949, 1950, and 1964. In the CCP’s eyes, those territories 
constituted potential routes through which a rival could launch military attacks against China. 
Since this shaping period, the geopolitical value of these three territories has remained crucial 
in the minds of Chinese leaders. 
Third, the effect of historical memories on China’s behavior is profound and vast. One 
significant effect of the historical memories of how the Japanese Empire, the Russian Empire, 
the US, and the Soviet Union undermined the security interests of China via the three buffers 
is that the threat assessment by Chinese leaders sometimes disconnected with the military 
reality. When assessing a military threat, Chinese leaders have typically prioritized their own 
historical memories over other factors, such as intentions, purposes, or preconditions. As 
mentioned in Chapter Four and Chapter Five, for instance, the Mongolian-Soviet defense treaty 
in 1964 shared many similarities with the mutual defense treaty that Taiwan and the US signed 
in 1955. Both were aimed at maintaining the status quo by a greater power offering its military 
protection to a smaller power neighboring China. Both would only be activated if China 
undermined the territorial integrity of the smaller power. And both indicated their adherence 
to the Charter of the United Nations. For instance, at the signing of the Mongolian-Soviet 
defense treaty, Leonid Brezhnev commented as follows: 
As is known, China has not renounced its claim towards its northern neighbors, and 
this is sufficient for both the Soviet Union and Mongolia to be vigilant…The basic 
sense of the Russian-Mongolian treaty lies in the fact that it recognizes the real 
possibility that the independence of a Socialist country can be endangered by another 
Socialist country.1 
However, those factors did not carry the same weight as China’s own historical memory of 
how the Tsar’s encroachment on Qing China’s sovereignty. The case of North Korea exhibited 
a similar pattern. During the Korean War, Harry Truman’s strategic objective to avoid 
 
1 Ram Rahul Sheel, "Mongolia in International Perspective," International Studies 22, no. 3 (1985): p. 231. 
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spreading the conflict onto China’s soil was clear, however, the assumption of Chinese leaders 
during the war was that the US was determined to copy the strategy of the Japanese Empire. 
The effect of these historical memories is that China’s buffer thinking has acted like a “glue,” 
firmly sticking a part of China onto an old polarity despite the power configuration of the 
international system has entered into a new pattern. Such memories are encapsulated in a series 
of vividly historical descriptions of China’s geopolitical vulnerability to the three buffers: “The 
US is trying to occupy Taiwan as the Japanese Empire did in 1895;” “MacArthur and Dulles 
regarded Taiwan as an unsinkable aircraft carrier in Asia and the Pacific;” “US imperialism 
invasion of Taiwan and North Korea is literally copying Tanaka Giichi’s plan;” “The developed 
countries’ policy of bullying undeveloped countries remains;” and “The Soviet revisionist new 
Tsar has completely taken over the old Tsar’s expansionist tradition.”2 Given that the sources 
used in this thesis were official statements and internal declassified documents, the position of 
this thesis is that, instead of simply regarding those descriptions as propaganda, they should be 
treated as powerful tools utilized by Chinese leaders both in seeking consensus inside the CCP 
and mobilizing support from ordinary Chinese people. Moreover, it is not too difficult to 
discover that the recent statements by Chinese officials, policy papers, news, or scholarly works 
regarding how China looks at the three buffers have inherited the same historical memories. In 
this way, once Chinese leaders apply buffer thinking to a given territory, it is very difficult for 
them to get rid of the shadow of this geopolitical mentality whenever they look at that territory. 
Finally, buffer thinking has sound explanatory power for understanding China’s behavior in 
relation to other competing explanations. As discussed in Chapter Three, the selection of 
Taiwan, North Korea, and Mongolia as case studies made it possible to examine China’s buffer 
thinking in a methodologically rigorous fashion. This is because the three cases constitute 
different types of buffers for China in terms of their disparate geographical settings as buffer 
states. Mongolia, being an inland state exclusively bordering China and Russia, is a classic 
buffer state. Taiwan, being an island located 150 kilometers from the Chinese coast and with 
ambiguous US support, least fits the buffer state concept. North Korea, adjoining China’s 
border on one side and a state that houses US forces on the other, is a case somewhere in 
between. This thesis demonstrated that the explanatory power of China’s buffer thinking was 
strongest in the case of Taiwan and weakest in the case of Mongolia. This means the argument 
 
2 For the citations in this paragraph, please see previous chapters. 
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propounded in this thesis has considerable explanatory power because it survived a critical 
least-likely test. 
On the other hand, the weak performance of the most-likely case of Mongolia cannot and 
should not deny the significance of China’s buffer thinking developed in this thesis. As shown 
in Chapter Six, the Mongolian case entailed a considerable degree of influence from structural 
and state level factors, which was the main reason why China’s behavior toward Mongolia 
demonstrated the greatest variance among the three cases. However, the influence of China’s 
buffer thinking in the Mongolian case is still clearly discernable. More importantly, the weak 
performance of China’s buffer thinking in this case should be attributed more to the limited 
sources than a lack of explanatory power per se. Among the three cases, declassified documents 
on Mongolia are the most limited in China and, in general, Chinese officials largely refrain 
from mentioning making geopolitical reference to Mongolia. By contrast, sources on China’s 
geopolitical views of Taiwan are ample, and Chinese officials do not shy away from voicing 
their military plans against Taiwan in the public realm. If Mongolia-related document were 
more accessible in China, it is likely that the explanatory power of China’s buffer thinking 
toward its peripheral and neighboring states would be increased significantly. 
 
7.2 Contribution to IR and Geopolitics 
 
The most important contribution of this thesis has been the bringing back of geography to the 
field of IR. The term “geopolitics” was coined by Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellen in 
an 1899 article to emphasize the importance of understanding the rationale of state behavior 
from each state’s unique geographical conditions, or spatial conditions in a broader sense.3 
Since then, geopolitics became a popular academic discipline in many countries, Germany in 
particular, in the first half of the 20th century. However, being discredited as a pseudo-science 
due to its association with Nazi ideology, geopolitics considerably lost its attraction in 
academic circles after World War II (WWII, 1939–45). The result is that the term geopolitics 
is widely employed in the context of global politics, but usually with no rigorous definition and 
not treated geography seriously as an intervene or independent variable in their works. For 
 
3 Regarding Kjiellen’s works please see this detailed review: Carl Marklund, "The Return of Geopolitics in the 
Era of Soft Power: Rereading Rudolf Kjellén on Geopolitical Imaginary and Competitive Identity," Geopolitics 
20, no. 2 (2015). 
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example, it seems that the term geopolitics is exchangeable to terms such as global, security, 
or even great power to a large certain extent in Michael Dempsey’s commentary on the future 
flash points: 
If 2018 was a year marked by international challenges that percolated but did not boil 
over into full-blown crises, next year may well be the year in which that good fortune 
runs out…So, let me highlight five major geopolitical challenges that I fear may 
become more troublesome in the coming months, as well as a few less publicized but 
still worrisome “hot spots” that may also command policy maker attention in the year 
ahead.4 
This trend also reflects in a phenomenon that the dominate theories and research agendas in 
several key IR journals occasionally speaks of geography in analyzing state foreign policy. 
There will only five articles show up if one searches by the key word “geography” on 
International Organization in the time period from 1945 to 2019. 5  The search result of 
American Political Science Review is 346 while World Politics is 137. None of the top 50 most 
cited articles of International Security placed geographic factors at the center of their works 
explaining state foreign policy.8 Research regarding geographical factors tends to cluster in 
journals relevant to peace and conflict research. A fashion of conducting quantitative research 
further marginalized the importance of theorizing geographical factors in terms of IR theories 
in this field. As a result, when it comes to scholarly work on geographical factors in the field 
of IR today, the most systematic works are that of Nicholas Spykman published in the 1940s, 
which discusses various geographical factors involved in the making of foreign policy, and 
 
4 Michael P. Dempsey, "The Geopolitical Flash Points of 2019," December 19 2018. 
5 Please see the search result in here: 
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-
organization/listing?q=geography&filters%5BdateYearRange%5D%5Bfrom%5D=1945&filters%5BdateYearR
ange%5D%5Bto%5D=2019&searchWithinIds=146C8B1E6606CE283EBC5B10B255F4C0 (accessed March 20 
2019). 
6 Please see the search result in here:  
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-
review/listing?q=geography&filters%5BdateYearRange%5D%5Bfrom%5D=1945&filters%5BdateYearRange
%5D%5Bto%5D=2019&searchWithinIds=833A7242AC7B607BA7F6168DA072DB3B%2CDEF6D9E6432F4
E804AD2D9416C8C2165 (accessed March 20 2019). 
7 Please see the search result in here: 
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/world-
politics/listing?q=geography&filters%5BdateYearRange%5D%5Bfrom%5D=1945&filters%5BdateYearRange
%5D%5Bto%5D=2019&searchWithinIds=A44674D47342D5A8F85F9FF5A0AFDC43 (accessed March 20 
2019). 
8 Please see the search result in here: 
https://www.mitpressjournals.org/action/showMostCitedArticles?journalCode=isec (accessed March 20 2019). 
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famously revised Halford Mackinder’s Heartland Theory. 9  As for the discussion on 
geography’s relationship with polarity, the research is even rare. One of the most important 
works in this regard is Robert Ross’ “The Geography of the Peace,” a title that honors 
Spykman’s work.10 It is a bit unfortunate that relatively few IR scholars nowadays place 
geography at the center of their research,11 especially considering that geographical and spatial 
concerns have never ceased to influence policymakers after WWII. Hence, by borrowing the 
concept of buffer state from the field of geopolitics and then incorporating it into IR research, 
this thesis continues this vital discussion in the field of IR. 
Second, this thesis also provides critical contributions to IR theories based on material ontology 
and non-material ontology. To theories in the former category, structural realism in particular, 
this thesis had re-conceptualized a widely accepted assumption that the relationship between 
state behavior and structural change is responsive. To theories emphasizing the importance of 
non-material ontology, especially social constructivism, this thesis pointed out one promising 
direction to further this school of thought. 
To study state behavior in a more scientifically rigorous way, Kenneth Waltz proposed a theory 
of structural realism in Theory of International Politics, arguing that structure largely 
determines state behavior.12 According to Waltz’s definition, a structure is composed of two 
elements: attributes of and relations among the units (states) in the international system. 
Although structures vary according to the ordering principle of the international system, the 
specification of the functions of units, and the type of the distribution of power across units, in 
fact structures only differ along the power distribution across units because the ordering 
principle of the system has been anarchy and states are functional alike units. In this sense, 
what state behavior actually responds to is the change in power configuration, or so-called 
polarity, in the international system. Following the advent of structural realism, the assumption 
 
9  Nicholas J. Spykman, "Geography and Foreign Policy, II."; "Frontiers, Security, and International 
Organization," Geographical Review 32, no. 3 (1942); The Geography of the Peace  (New York: Harcourt, Brace 
and Company, 1944); America's Strategy in World Politics, the United States and the Balance of Power  (New 
Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2008); Nicholas J. Spykman and Abbie A. Rollins, "Geographic Objectives 
in Foreign Policy, I."; "Geographic Objectives in Foreign Policy, II," The American Political Science Review 33, 
no. 4 (1939); Nicholas J. Spykman, "Geography and Foreign Policy, I," ibid.32, no. 1 (1938). 
10 Robert S. Ross, "The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-First Century," International Security 
23, no. 4 (1999). 
11 As mentioned in Chapter One, Robert Ross, John Mearsheimer, Jack Levy and William Thompson’s works 
have included geographical factors in their main arguments. 
12 Robert O. Keohane, ed. Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), CH 11; 
Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics. 
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that state behavior will be shaped by changes in polarity has been a key component 
underpinning of various IR theories across different schools of thought up until today.  
However, as demonstrated in Chapters Four to Six, a finding that has emerged in this thesis is 
that the effects of changes in polarity are “territorially conditional” in the case of China. While 
China’s behavior toward great powers such as the Soviet Union and the US have been quite 
responsive to changes of polarity in the system, it is not the case in its behavior toward Taiwan, 
North Korea, and Mongolia. China’s ultimate geopolitical goals against the three small 
neighbors on China’s periphery in fact crossed different power configurations in different 
timeframes. China’s buffer thinking, in other words, has been functioning as an intervening 
variable, mediating the effect of the alternation of the power distribution in the system on 
China’s behavior toward Taiwan, North Korea, and Mongolia over the decades. Moreover, 
China is not the only case in point. Many analysts have observed that Russia’s maintenance of 
Ukraine as a buffer state was one important motive behind its military takeover of Crimea in 
2014, despite the fact that the Cold War ended more than two decades ago.13 Therefore, this 
thesis suggests that one should not treat the assumption that state behavior changes in 
accordance with shifts of polarity in the international system as a given. Instead, scholars and 
analysts may need to examine whether a state exhibits buffer thinking toward another state 
before he/she applies this assumption to his/her works. 
In Alexander Wendt’s social constructivism, on the other hand, international politics is 
interpreted as a dynamic process in which agents’ (states) identities define how they interact 
with one another, which determines what types of anarchical cultures they live in.14 Different 
anarchical cultures, in turn, shape the way that states engage with one another differently. That 
is, two states may view each other as enemies now, but this shared identity between the two 
can become rivals later. Thus, according to Wendt, the way in which one state views another 
state’s identity can change with the passage of time and through interaction. 
The analysis presented in this thesis, however, suggests that Wendt’s theory too may be 
territorially conditional in the case of China. When China perceives an invasion by a rival state 
via a small state to be a real possibility, an identity of “my buffer state” is the identity that 
China gives to the small state and it hence become a default identity whenever China looks at 
 
13 Stephen M. Walt, "History Shows Caution Is the Best Approach for Foreign Action," The New York Times, 
May 15 2015; Peter Harris, "Ukraine's Dilemma: Who’d Want to be a Buffer State?," The National Interest, 5 
September 2014. 
14 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics. 
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this small state. This identity shaped by buffer thinking does not fade when the threat of the 
rival recedes or when the rival interacts differently with China, but remains deeply embedded 
in the territory controlled by the small state. The historical memory of this territory serves as a 
reminder to Chinese leaders of the small state’s identity, making this subjective and unilateral 
perception of buffer state status persists. Furthermore, Wendt does not offer a clear answer to 
the question of what specific mechanisms enable one anarchical culture to evolve into another 
and hence transform the identity of states within it. The answer to the unresolved question may 
hinge upon this question—how to overcome one state’s buffer thinking toward another state? 
Although this thesis provides significant contributions to structural realism and social 
constructivism at the same time, it does not intend to take a side in any IR research paradigm 
debate such as realists vis-à-vis liberalists or rationalists vis-à-vis reflexsivists.15 Alastair Iain 
Johnston touched on the importance of culture and history variables in the making of China’s 
foreign policy behavior in Culture Realism of 1995, which reflected the background of the 
third/fourth IR research paradigm debate in the 1990s.16 The position of this thesis is that it is 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, for this thesis to claim as a supporter in any camp of the 
debates because the boundary separating each camp’s assumptions, ontology, epistemology, 
analytical level, and methodology has never been a clear line. What this thesis does is to use 
tools and methods available from any camp as much as possible. In fact, any side in any of the 
debates may find this thesis disturbing due to this thesis’s certain elements in terms of 
assumptions, analytical level, and arguments. This thesis starts from a realist assumption on 
the responsive nature between state behavior and polarity chnage, opens the black box of 
decision-making in the analytic process as what a liberalist would do, and argues like a 
constructivist that the weight of past history of how the territories were used by China’s 
previous enemies makes Chinese leaders believe the behavior of securing the three buffers is 
necessary. While China’s buffer thinking originates and contains Chinese leaders’ perception 
 
15 Robert O. Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Approaches," International Studies Quarterly 32, no. 4 
(1988). 
16 Alastair Iain Johnston, Culture Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History, pp. 1-4. The 
first IR research paradigm debate occurred in the 1940s, during which realists challenged idealists. The second IR 
research paradigm debate appeared in a disagreement between behaviourists and traditionalists over research 
methodology in the 1950s–1960s. While some scholars think the debate between structural realists and 
institutional liberalists in the 1970s is another wave of IR research paradigm debate, others argue that this debate 
is not a genuine research paradigm debate but a “neo-neo synthesis.” If that debate should be recognized as an 
inter-paradigm debate in the field of IR, then the challenge social constructivists posed to structural realists and 
institutional liberalists in the 1990s is the third IR research paradigm debate. Please see: Ole Waever, "The Rise 
and Fall of the Inter-Paradigm Debate," in International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, ed. Ken Booth Steve 
Smith, and Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
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of military threat from a rival in a rational calculation, the stickiness of the history renders 
China’s behavior disconnected to the objective military reality in some cases.  
This thesis, however, does share the same epistemology with rationalists. The common ground 
of this thesis and rationalists’ theories is that both of us try to build a scientific, objective, and 
verifiable explanation to understand this complex world. While this thesis acknowledges that 
theories at the system level may have to sacrifice a significant degree of complexity, it also 
stands on a position that researchers should try to specify the bounds of applicability of their 
theory as much as possible. Based on the structural realist’s model that states would 
mechanically respond to the change of the polarity, this thesis further specifies the condition 
under which the structural force would not generate the expected outcome in the case of China. 
The same structural force would cause China to perform two different types of behavior if 
buffer thinking exists. In this sense, the contribution of this thesis is going to make this complex 
world more complex because it decoded the simple formula of realists, reminding researchers 
to carefully examine how structural force works on each state individually rather than 
collectively. If China has buffer thinking, who is next? 
Third and finally, this thesis sheds new light on applying the concept of buffer states to the 
field of geopolitics. Generally speaking, the literature on buffer states can be separated into two 
distinct categories. On the one hand, half the works focus on a single empirical case study of a 
buffer state. The themes explored in this type of work are how buffer states between two bigger 
neighbors behave in a rivalrous relationship or how the two neighbors compete for the buffer.17 
On the other hand, there are works that address the theoretical dimension of buffer states 
collectively, such as buffer state’s functions, features, or fates, from a holistic vantage point.18 
These two different approaches to studying buffer states have sharply divided this research 
community, and both sides have overlooked a major factor in their work—a buffered state may 
have multiple buffers in different buffer systems at one time. This factor is significant for 
understanding how buffers function. As demonstrated in Chapter Five, China’s buffer thinking 
 
17 John Chay, "Korea, A Buffer State."; G. P. Deshpande, "Mongolia: The Reluctant Buffer," China Report 4, no. 
19 (1968); Seung-Young Kim, "Russo-Japanese Rivalry over Korean Buffer at the Beginning of the 20th Century 
and its Implications," Diplomacy and Statecract 16(2005); Keith McLachlan, "Afghanistan: The Geopolitics of a 
Buffer State," Geopolitics and International Boundaries 2, no. 1 (1997); Vatthana Pholsena and Ruth Banomyong, 
Laos: From Buffer State to Crossroads?  (Chiang Mai: Mekong press, 2006); Efraim Karsh, "Geographical 
Determinism: Finnish Neutrality Revisited." 
18 Tanisha M. Fazal, "State Death in the International System."; Mary Barnes Gear, "Role of Buffer States in 
International Relations."; Michael Greenfield Partem, "The Buffer System in International Relations."; Rajan 
Menon and Jack L. Snyder, "Buffer Zones: Anachronism, Power Vacuum, or Confidence Builder?."; Olav 
Fagelund Knudsen, "Easten Europe: The Buffer Effect of A Cordon Sanitaire."; Nicholas J. Spykman and Abbie 
A. Rollins, "Geographic Objectives in Foreign Policy, I." 
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toward Taiwan contributed to China’s behavior toward North Korea during the Korean War. 
Both Mao Zedong and Joseph Stalin agreed that, to seize Taiwan, it is necessary to demonstrate 
China’s power on the Korean battlefield. In other words, how a state views buffer state “A” 
may be influenced by its view of buffer state “B.”  
Nevertheless, aside from the case of the Korean War, this thesis has not discovered any explicit 
evidence suggesting a mutual connection between China’s buffer views toward Taiwan, 
Mongolia, and North Korea. However, it is very likely that this lack of evidence is due to the 
fact that, at the time of writing, the only documents that have been declassified by the Chinese 
government are those dated before 1966. Some clues did suggest that China might view the 
Mongolian and Taiwan buffer collectively. The formation of the Sino-Soviet rivalry prompted 
China to cooperate with the US geopolitically in the early 1970s, and the meeting records of 
the negotiation between Chinese and US officials showed that Zhou Enlai went to great lengths 
to argue the necessity of a US withdrawal from Taiwan. The underlying assumption of this 
request of Zhou was that the US and Japan may use this island in the future—which is, 
essentially, buffer thinking.19 This indicates that a linkage between China’s buffer thinking 
toward Taiwan and Mongolia is theoretically possible. Moreover, the lack of evidence in the 
case of China does not and should not exclude the possibility that such a connection may apply 
to other buffered states. For example, the Soviet Union’s buffer thinking toward Poland may 
be related to its treatment of Mongolia and/or Finland.  
Also, this thesis has explored a relatively rigor definition to examine a state’s buffer state status 
by incorporating buffered state’s subjective perception. As Chapter Three indicated, when 
scholars talk about buffers states nowadays, they often rely on a definition of buffer state on 
the basis of objective elements, i.e. geography, function, and power. A better definition for 
buffer state should be—a buffer state is a relatively weak state that is geographically located 
in a place with strategic importance for two or more stronger rival states and that directly 
contributes to matters of key national security for either one of them. And at least one of the 
rival states perceives this strategic importance of the weak state. There several advantages of 
adopting this definition. With a definition included subjective perception of buffered states, 
one is able to make a more academically precise statement regarding buffer states. For example, 
North Korea is a buffer state of China but not a buffer state of the US. Nepal, located between 
 
19 "Memorandum of Conversation," in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-76, Volume XVII, China, 
1969-76, ed. Daniel J. Lawler and Erin R. Mahan (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2010). 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d139 (accessed July 19 2018). 
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China and India, is not a buffer state of China due to the lack of China’s subjective perception. 
Furthermore, except for enabling one to trace the variance of each buffer state’s buffer state 
status as how this thesis has completed, the new definition can further broaden the research 
scope of two types literature on buffer state mentioned above. For example, will the number of 
subjective perceptions from powerful neighbors influence buffer states’ behavior significantly? 
Whether a buffer state with one subjective perception from one powerful neighbor lives longer 
than the one with two subjective perceptions simultaneously? Thus, the new definition will 
enrich the current understanding of the concept of buffer state. 
 
7.3 Pathways for Further Research 
 
Although the focus of this thesis has been on China’s buffer thinking toward Taiwan, North 
Korea, and Mongolia since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), it is 
my hope that scholars who are interested in this topic will continue to explor the concept of 
China’s buffer thinking from other analytical levels and timeframes in the future. There are 
four potential research paths that would build on the findings of this thesis (Figure 6): 
 
Figure 6: Future Research Projects 
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1. The Relationship between Geography and Anarchy 
In addition to the effect of polarity, anarchy is another indispensable assumption accepted by a 
majority of mainstream IR scholars. The anarchical nature of the international system pushes 
states to rely on their own power to protect themselves from attacks by others. Classical IR 
concepts such as balance of power, security dilemma, and relative gain have all developed from 
the concept of anarchy. The effect of anarchy has thus been a key foundation for a vast array 
of IR theories across different schools of thought. Since this thesis has examined the 
relationship between geography and polarity, exploring geography’s relationship with anarchy 
is one necessary step in understanding the role geography plays at the system level in more 
depth. 
Theoretically speaking, states surrounded by buffer states would enjoy a higher level of sense 
of security than states with no surrounding buffers, because the buffered states are spatially 
separated from their rivals by the buffers. Buffer states functions to temper buffered states’ 
perceptions of the external threats they face in this anarchical environment, as the territories of 
the buffer states provide buffered states with extra space and time for observation, intervention, 
mobilization, and defense. This extra space and time can, as a result, mitigate the effects of 
anarchy on buffered states’ behavior. That is why, throughout history, establishing buffer states 
along power frontiers was a common strategy among states seeking to manage their security 
environment. The Holy Roman Empire, for instance, set up “march states” along its frontiers 
to ensure the security of its inland territory. Meanwhile, the British and Russian Empires both 
maintained Afghanistan as a buffer state in the 19th century to avoid a clash of power. Joseph 
Stalin wrenched Mongolia from China’s control on the premise that the Soviet Union required 
a buffer state for its security. 
This function of buffer states in tempering the threat perceptions of states in the anarchical 
environment is also widely recognized by scholars in different fields. Historian Paul Schroeder 
points out that the importance of buffer states for the stability of Europe has been 
underestimated.20 He argues that buffer states such as the Kingdoms of the United Netherlands, 
Scandinavia, Switzerland, the German Confederation all played roles as intermediary bodies 
for absorbing conflicts and connecting mutual interests among Britain, Austria, Russia, and 
 
20 Paul W. Schroeder, "Historical Reality vs. Neo-Realist Theory."; The Transformation of European Politics 
1763-1848; "The 19th Century International System: Changes in the Structure." 
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France in 19th century European international politics. By employing quantitative methods, 
political scientists have proved that there is a significantly positive correlation between spatial 
contiguity and war-prone behavior among states.21 John Mearsheimer, a towering IR figure, 
maintained that the buffer zone between the Soviet Union and Germany in the 1930s 
encouraged the Soviet Union to adopt the behavior of buck-passing.  
Considering the substantial security benefits that buffer states can potentially bring, one would 
assume that great powers would endeavor to maintain the existence of their neighboring buffer 
states at all costs. However, the empirical evidence points to the contrary. Tanisha Fazal, in her 
classic work on buffer states, calculated that 50 out of 207 states in the world “died” due to 
military occupation and conquest since 1816, among which a majority had the status of buffer 
state.22 She found that the lack of trust between two rivaling powers was the primary cause 
behind their decision to take over the buffers in between first before the other one does. In other 
words, having a buffer state against a rival may not necessarily make a state feel more secure 
in the end. 
Thus, one research question that arises from this is—what kind of buffer state behavior would 
increase the sense of threat of the two rivaling powers, and what kind of behavior would serve 
to decrease the sense of threat? 
This question has significant policy importance for leaders in small states neighboring China 
today. Since Xi took power in 2012, China has exhibited aggressive behavior toward the world, 
especially countries in Asia. US Secretary of Defense James Mattis believes this behavior is 
predicated on China’s desire to reshape the world order in its favor at the expense of the US 
and its allies.23 In response to this challenge, the Trump government has pushed back forcefully 
against China on multiple issue areas ranging, from trade to human rights and from 
cybersecurity to geopolitics. While the Sino-US rivalry is ramping up, other leaders in Asia are 
seeking ways to best manage this situation so as not to escalate the rivalry. Taiwanese President 
Tsai Ing-wen, for instance, made the following remarks to her populace on Taiwan’s National 
Day in 2018: 
 
21 John O'Loughlin, "Spatial Models of International Conflicts: Extending Current Theories of War Behavior."; 
Erik Gartzke, "The Capitalist Peace."; John R. Oneal et al., "The Liberal Peace: Interdependence, Democracy, and 
International Conflict, 1950-85."; Patrick J. McDonald, "Great Powers, Hierarchy, and Endogenous Regimes: 
Rethinking the Domestic Causes of Peace."; Giacomo Chiozza, "Is There a Clash of Civilizations? Evidence from 
Patterns of International Conflict Involvement, 1946-97." 
22 Tanisha M. Fazal, State Death: The Politics and Geography of Conquest, Occupation, and Annexation, CH 4. 
23 Mattis commented on China’s behavior in his resignation letter. Please see: "READ: James Mattis' resignation 
letter," CNN, December 21 2018. 
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I trust that you have all seen dramatic changes in the international political and 
economic situation. The US-China trade dispute has led to a restructuring of the global 
industrial division of labor…As president, I want to assure everyone that we will 
neither act rashly to escalate confrontation, nor will we give in.24 
Evidently, the matter of what to do and not to do has become increasingly critical to 
leaders of states bordering China, who are highly vulnerable to such rivalry. 
 
2. The Relationship between Geography and Institutions  
There are some key questions regarding buffer thinking have left unanswered in this thesis due 
to the purpose of the thesis and space limitations. For example, how many types of behavior 
can China’s buffer thinking generate? It is likely and reasonable that buffer thinking can 
generate more than these three types of behavior. Also, the reasons China did not annex 
Mongolia or North Korea, and did not force Taiwan or North Korea to become neutral states, 
are yet to be determined. Although, those questions are theoretically meaningful, they were 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
With regard to explaining why China behaved differently across the three cases, international 
institutions can potentially explain this variance in China’s buffer thinking. One promising 
explanation from an international institutional perspective is that China’s behavior has been 
socialized by the norms and rules of the international community to a great extent. Since China 
already recognized Mongolia as an independent state, seizing Mongolia militarily became a 
very unattractive option to Chinese leaders even though Mongolia was the easiest target among 
the three cases. By contrast, if China keeps refusing to recognize the statehood of the Republic 
of China on Taiwan Island, China can maintain every possible means at its disposal to resolve 
the Taiwan issue. As for North Korea, it is not only recognized by China as a sovereign state, 
but Pyongyang also enjoys the status of a treaty ally of China under the Sino-North Korean 
Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty. Accordingly, of the three states, North Korea 
has been subject to the least intervention. In this sense, international institutions may thus hold 
the key to understanding why the same buffer thinking led to different state behavior. 
 
24 Please see the full text of the speech of Tsai Ing-wen here: 
https://english.president.gov.tw/NEWS/5548 (accessed March 20 2019). 
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Another important question that arises from this institutional perspective is: under what 
conditions can buffer thinking dissipate? As demonstrated previously, it is very difficult for 
Chinese leaders to move out of the shadow of buffer thinking toward a given territory once 
such thinking has been formed. However, it appears that this is not the case for the buffer 
system constituted by France, Germany, and Belgium. Belgium was a buffer state between 
France and Germany in the inter-war period and was occupied consecutively by Germany. 
Theoretically speaking, France’s buffer thinking toward Belgium should be entrenched. 
However, there is little evidence of such a geopolitical mindset among French leaders today, 
and it is highly unlikely this thinking will appear in the foreseeable future. How did France 
overcome its buffer thinking toward Belgium? 
The most likely explanation for this is that a web of international institutions in Europe, such 
as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Europe Union successfully erased, or at least 
considerably contained, the emergence of France’s buffer thinking toward Belgium after WWII. 
While IR functionalists, neo-functionalists, and institutionalists have crafted the theoretical 
concept of the pacifying effect of international institutions/organizations on state behavior 
since the 1940s, very few works have touched upon the issue of France’s geopolitical shift in 
perspective toward Belgium, which has resulted from institutional cooperation.25 
Taken together, to further comprehend the concept of buffer thinking, it is essential to unravel 
the relationship between buffer thinking and international institutions. Shifting the analytical 
level from the system to the state level, a project with the aim to examining the nature of the 
relationship between geography and international institutions, would have tremendous policy 
implications for states surrounding great powers. In particular, the findings of such a project 
could offer valuable insights for policymakers in Taipei, Pyongyang, and Ulaanbaatar 
regarding institutional means to lessen Beijing’s geopolitical sense of insecurity. 
 
3. The Relationship between Geography and Chinese Nationalism 
 
25 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy; Robert O. 
Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, 3rd ed. (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2006); 
Stephen D. Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables."; Ernst 
Bernard Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economical Forces, 1950-1957  (Notre Dame, IN: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1958); David Mitrany, A Working Peace System: An Argument for the Functional 
Development of International Organization  (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1943); Lisa L. 
Martin, "Interests, Power, and Multilateralism," International Organization 46, no. 4 (1992). 
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One prevalent approach to understanding constraints on foreign policy decision-making in 
China is to follow the logic of Innenpolitik.26 Among all of the variables in this logic, Chinese 
nationalism has gained the most attraction in the field of China Studies in recent decades.27 
The conventional wisdom of Chinese nationalism is that the stigma of “the century of 
humiliation” in the minds of the Chinese people is the main factor constraining the policy 
choices of Chinese leaders. The scenario that Chinese leaders worry most about is one 
involving a mass protest of a discontented people united by nationalism against the CCP regime. 
This concern is the key reason why China’s foreign policies toward Taiwan, Japan, and the US 
appear to be irrational and lacking in flexibility. 
While scholars have tended to focus on the cases of Taiwan, Japan, or the US in exploring 
Chinese nationalism, there is a lacuna in the literature on the Cold War socialist states. Are 
there any strains of Chinese nationalism centered on the current/previous socialist states in Asia 
today? If so, what is the relationship between Chinese nationalism and China’s geopolitical 
imperatives toward the socialist states? 
Mongolia is an interesting case in point given that, from China’s perspective, it was part of 
Qing China’s territory and was seized illegally by the Soviet Union. However, it is quite 
puzzling that there has not been any substantial Chinese nationalist movement demanding the 
return of Mongolia to this day. How ordinary Chinese have reacted to the new language policy 
of Mongolia is a good example of this. The current official langue of Mongolia is Cyrillic script, 
which was adopted in the 1940s for better connecting Mongolia to the Soviet world. Since the 
mid-to-late 1980s, the Mongolian government has been trying to revert the importance of 
Uighur-Mongolian script (the Mongol biching), a traditional Mongolian language.28 Although 
this move was more a reflection of how Mongolia plans to position itself in the post-Cold War 
era, this language policy sparked hope for reunification with Mongolia among a significant 
number of Chinese. This was based on the fact that the Uighur-Mongolian script is also 
 
26 Please see Chapter Two. 
27  Allen S. Whiting, China Eyes Japan; Peter Hays Gries, China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and 
Diplomacy; Susan L. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower: How China's Internal Politics Could Derail Its Peaceful 
Rise; Zhao Suisheng, "Foreign Policy Implications of Chinese Nationalism Revisited: The Strident Turn."; 
Alastair Iain Johnston, "The Correlates of Beijing Public Oinion toward the US, 1998-2004," in New Directions 
in the Study of China’s Foreign Policy, ed. Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press, 2006). 
28  Franck Bille', "Sounds and Scripts of Modernity: Language Ideologies and Practices in Contemporary 
Mongolia," Inner Asia 12, no. 2 (2010); Stéphane Grivelet, "Reintroducing the Uighur-Mongolian Script in 
Mongolia Today," Mongolian Studies 18(1995). 
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currently the language utilized in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. This hope for 
reunification was widely expressed in various online forums in China.  
There are also many indications that Chinese nationalism against North Korea has been 
burgeoning in recent years. Since 2006, the year that North Korea conducted its first nuclear 
test, growing numbers of Chinese netizens and scholars are publicly questioning their 
government’s long-standing “sheltering” policy toward North Korea on online forums, through 
social media, and in academic articles in China. This sentiment was something unthinkable 
twenty years ago. One key argument that has been put forward is that keeping North Korea 
close will not bring substantive security benefits to China in modern warfare. Instead, North 
Korea undermines China’s security interests. Deng Yuwen, the deputy editor of Study Times, 
a journal of the Central Party School of the CCP, argued in an op-ed in Financial Times that 
China should abandon North Korea and press for the reunification of the Korean Peninsula.29 
Jia Qingguo, a professor at the Peking University, also believes that it is time for China to 
discuss contingency plans concerning North Korea with the US and South Korea.30 
While there has yet to be significant nationalist movement emerge in relation to either case or 
any sort of resentment against the Chinese government occurring, this trend is academically 
intriguing—Chinese nationalism is increasingly diverging from China’s current geopolitical 
imperatives of neutralizing Mongolia and maintaining the existence of North Korea. This trend 
can provide empirical evidence to the emerging debate on the relationship between Chinese 
nationalism and China’s geopolitical imperatives.31 
In sum, by focusing on an individual level of analysis, this research avenue could ascertain the 
nature of the relationship between geography and Chinese nationalism. In so doing, it would 
not only fill a research gap in the existing literature on Chinese nationalism but would also shed 
light on the most recent research trend of it. 
 
4. The Similarity and the Continuity of Buffer Thinking between the PRC and Qing China 
A final potential project would focus on a different analytical timeframe: is there any evidence 
of buffer thinking in China prior to the PRC period? In light of the fact that buffer thinking 
 
29 Deng Yuwen, "China Should Abandon North Korea," Financial Times, February 27 2013. 
30 Jia Qingguo, "Time to Prepare for the Worst in North Korea," East Asia Forum, September 11 2017. 
31 Alastair Iain Johnston, "Is Chinese Nationalism Rising? Evidence from Beijing," International Security 41, no. 
3 (2017); Christopher Hughes, "Reclassifying Chinese Nationalism: The Geopolitik Turn." 
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emerged in the PRC period in the context of China conceiving of ways to fend off potential 
military threats from specific neighboring territories with geostrategic importance. It is 
probably not the only period in Chinese history in which such thinking emerged. It is likely 
that Qing China exhibited similar thinking toward Taiwan, North Korea, and Mongolia. 
Since its founding in 1644, Qing China faced a series of security challenges from Taiwan, 
Mongolia, and the Korean Peninsula. As mentioned briefly in Chapter Four, rulers of China 
traditionally were not interested in bringing Taiwan Island under their control. When the Dutch 
occupied the Pescadores Islands, Ming China’s territory at that time, as a base to trade with 
China in the early 17th century, the Ming forces expelled them militarily. However, Ming 
officials suggested and then led the Dutch to establish a base on an island which was then terra 
nullius—Taiwan. From that time until Qing China formally took control of the island in 1683, 
Taiwan was occupied by Japanese, Dutch, Spanish, and also Ming loyalist Zheng Chenggong. 
These regimes all posed varying threats to Qing China. 
The Sino-Russo rivalry over Mongolia discussed in Chapter Six can be traced back to the 17th 
century, a period in which Qing China and the Russian Empire rivaled over the Zungar 
Mongols. After defusing military threats from southern China, Qing China gradually expanded 
its territory into the east and south of Mongolia from the end of the 17th century. One important 
strategic motive for Qing China in doing so was the awareness of the presence of the Russian 
threat from Mongolia: Russia was encroaching on Mongolian territory step by step from the 
north and the west. The relationship between Qing China, Russia, and the Zungar Mongols 
could therefore be regarded as the prototype of the modern PRC-Russia-MPR relationship. 
The military threat from the Korean Peninsula toward Qing China was the last to emerge among 
the three territories. Although the Joseon Dynasty of Korea had a bitter history with the 
Manchus, who later established Qing China at the very beginning, it had a very close 
relationship with Qing China throughout most of its history. Korea regarded itself as a little 
brother of Qing China and, in turn, Qing China also treated Korea as a protectorate. 
Accordingly, Qing China was free of military threats from the peninsula for roughly two 
hundred years. This relatively peaceful period, however, was disrupted by the Japanese 
Empire’s challenges after the mid-19th century, which resulted in the Treaty of Ganghwa 
Island, the Donghak Peasant Revolution, the First Sino-Japanese War, and finally the Japanese 
occupation of Korea. 
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Evidently, the geopolitical environment that Qing China once faced was very similar to that of 
the PRC. A potential project would thus expand the analytical timeframe of this thesis, to 
examine the extent to which China’s buffer thinking was evident in the minds of Qing officials 
when managing threats from Taiwan, Mongolia, and the Korean Peninsula. 
This project could provide insightful lessons for IR theory. If the findings show that there is a 
substantial similarity between Qing China and the PRC’s perception of the three territories, 
then IR liberalists focus on norms, ideas, and international institutions may have little 
explanatory power. Although liberal values and mechanisms in the past four hundred years 
have improved the international system in which China operates, when it comes to surrounding 
territories, China still adheres to the same old geopolitical mentality. On the other hand, if the 
findings do not indicate substantial similarity, this would encourage an exploration of what 
liberal mechanisms have altered China’s threat assessment, and the means by which they have 
done so. 
 
Although each of these projects outlined above only addresses a small piece of the puzzle of 
China’s foreign behavior, they would help along with this thesis to hone the concept of buffer 
thinking therein. 
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